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‘Tis so,’ said the Duchess: ‘and the moral of that is— 
“Oh, ‘tis love, ‘tis love, that makes the world go round!”’ 
 
‘Somebody said,’ Alice whispered,  
‘that it’s done by everybody minding their own business!’ 
  
‘Ah, well! It means much the same thing,’ said the Duchess, digging her 
sharp little chin into Alice’s shoulder as she added, ‘and the moral of that is—
“Take care of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves.”’ 
‘How fond she is of finding morals in things!’ Alice thought to herself.  
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Complying with Norms. A Neurocomputational Exploration 
 
Abstract  The subject matter of this thesis can be summarized by a triplet of 
questions and answers. Showing what these questions and answers mean is, in 
essence, the goal of my project. The triplet goes like this: 
 
 Q: How can we make progress in our understanding of social norms and 
  norm compliance? 
 A: Adopting a neurocomputational framework is one effective way to 
  make progress in our understanding of social norms and norm  
  compliance. 
 Q: What could the neurocomputational mechanism of social norm  
  compliance be? 
 A: The mechanism of norm compliance probably consists of Bayesian - 
  Reinforcement Learning algorithms implemented by activity in certain 
  neural populations. 
 Q: What could information about this mechanism tell us about social 
  norms and social norm compliance? 
 A: Information about this mechanism tells us that: 
 a1: Social norms are uncertainty-minimizing devices. 
 a2: Social norm compliance is one trick that agents employ to interact co-
  adaptively and smoothly in their social environment. 
 
 Most of the existing treatments of norms and norm compliance (e.g. Bicchieri 
2006; Binmore 1993; Elster 1989; Gintis 2010; Lewis 1969; Pettit 1990; Sugden 
1986; Ullmann‐Margalit 1977) consist in what Cristina Bicchieri (2006) refers to as 
“rational reconstructions.” A rational reconstruction of the concept of social norm 
“specifies in which sense one may say that norms are rational, or compliance with a 
norm is rational” (Ibid., pp. 10-11). 
 What sets my project apart from these types of treatments is that it aims, first 




 The single most original idea put forth in my project is to bring an alternative 
explanatory framework to bear on social norm compliance. This is the framework of 
computational cognitive neuroscience. The chapters of this thesis describe some 
ways in which central issues concerning social norms can be fruitfully addressed 
within a neurocomputational framework. 
 In order to qualify and articulate the triplet above, my strategy consists firstly 
in laying down the beginnings of a model of the mechanism of norm compliance 
behaviour, and then zooming in on specific aspects of the model. Such a model, the 
chapters of this thesis argue, explains apparently important features of the 
psychology and neuroscience of norm compliance, and helps us to understand the 





The thesis comprises 7 chapters an introduction and a conclusion. 
 The Introduction is in two parts. The first states and illustrates all the main 
claims that are articulated and defended in the following chapters. The second 
explains and justifies the neurocomputational perspective adopted in the thesis. 
 Chapter 1 lays down the beginnings of a model of norm compliance 
behaviour grounded on Bayesian - Reinforcement Learning neural computation. It 
explains in which sense the model describes some of the core features of the 
mechanism of norm compliance. It argues that the neurocomputational framework 
adopted is more progressive than alternatives to understand the mechanism of norm 
compliance. 
 Chapter 2 provides independent reason for a neurocomputational approach to 
norm compliance. It argues that the explanation of paradigmatic cases of norm 
compliance behaviour requires the appeal to neural representations. In so doing, it 
explains the notion of neural representation assumed in the thesis. 
 Chapter 3 addresses the question of what is the representational format of the 
background knowledge that supports norm compliance. It argues that a structured-
probabilistic approach is the more fruitful to make progress with respect to this 
question. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on moral judgement. It argues for two claims. First, some 
central aspects of the psychological mechanism of moral judgement can be described 
within the RL - Bayesian neurocomputational framework laid out in Chapter 1. 
Second, such neurocomputational description of moral judgement can shed new light 
on puzzling findings about specific patterns of moral judgement. 
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 Chapter 5 takes up the questions whether and in which sense language is a 
tool that constitutes moral thinking. It argues that language is unnecessary for moral 
thinking, and yet language can have important effects on moral thought and 
behaviour. 
 Chapter 6 gives grounds for the claim that the emotions are not ultimate 
motives of norm compliance. It distinguishes between different senses of reward 
(and punishment) and singles out the capacity for caring as fundamental for social 
norm compliance. 
 Chapter 7 describes an experimental, neurocomputational project I carried 
out. The project asks whether and to what extent social rewards, as opposed to non-
social rewards, affect our learning of social norms. The chapter provides me the 
opportunity to put at work some of the modelling tools and concepts used and 
explored in previous chapters. 
 The Conclusion glues all together. In light of my exploration, it reconsiders 








Topic and Method 
One way to say what I am up to is by a triplet of questions and answers. Showing 
what these questions and answers mean is the goal of my project. The triplet goes 
like this: 
 
Q: How can we make progress in our understanding of social norms and 
norm compliance? 
A: Adopting a neurocomputational framework is one way to make progress 
in our understanding of social norms and norm compliance. 
Q: What could the neurocomputational mechanism of social norm 
compliance be? 
A: The mechanism of norm compliance probably consists of Bayesian - 
Reinforcement Learning algorithms implemented by activity in certain 
neural populations. 
Q: What could information about this mechanism tell us about social norms 
and social norm compliance? 
A: Information about this mechanism tells us that: 
a1: Social norms are uncertainty-minimizing devices. 
a2: Social norm compliance is one trick we employ to interact co-adaptively 
and smoothly in our social environment. 
 
 This question-answer triplet, in essence, is the subject of what follows. 
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 We live in an uncertain environment, and social interaction dramatically 
contributes to the uncertainty underlying our environment. Although uncertainty 
itself does not appear to possess any normative property, social norms are 
technologies that respond to and manage the uncertainty of our social environment. 
Moral cognition arose when agents began to interact engaging in different 
“experiments of social living”—to use John Stuart Mill’s phrase. The most 
successful social norms, those that are likely to survive and passed on across 
generations, are those that are most successful at facilitating minimization of entropy, 
or uncertainty, given rise by agents’ interactions within the social environment. 
 The idea that social behaviour is bound up with minimization of uncertainty 
is not new. Andrew Schotter (1981) analyses institutional organizations in 
information theoretic terms. He focuses on economic institutions and uses the 
frameworks of game theory and information theory to ground the claim that “social 
norms and institutions are devices that give structure or order to social situations” 
(Schotter 1981, p. 139). Schotter believes that institutions develop out of the 
strategies of agents interacting with each other to solve some economic problem. The 
process that leads to the development of institutions is described by Schotter as a 
“Markovian diffusion process”—that is, as a random process whose future states are 
determined by its most recent state and not by the entire past—whose absorbing 
points—that is, whose states that are impossible to leave—correspond to stable social 
institutions (Ibid., Ch. 3). Absorbing points are states where expectations about the 
behaviour of others become self-fulfilling: belief and reality correspond perfectly in 
that state. This analysis is congenial to what is to follow. But my theoretical 
framework and my focus are unlike Schotter’s. My theoretical framework is the 
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framework of what is called theoretical or computational cognitive neuroscience. 
My focus is the mechanism of social norm compliance. 
 The framework and the approach I adopt are unlike those of a number of 
philosophers and social scientists working, like Schotter, on social norms within the 
tradition of rational choice theory (Bicchieri 2006; Binmore 1994; Elster 1989; 
Gintis 2010; Lewis 1969; Pettit 1990; Sugden 1986; Ullmann‐Margalit 1977). I do 
not use game theory to analyze the creation, evolution and function of economic and 
social institutions. I do not start with a taxonomy that distinguishes social norms 
from other types of regularities. Nor do I provide a formal definition of what social 
norms are. My account is not intended as a conceptual analysis or as a 
systematization of the linguistic intuitions that people have about the word ‘social 
norm’ or about what is morally or socially (im)permissible. 
 Most of the existing treatments of norms and norm compliance consist in 
what Cristina Bicchieri (2006) calls “rational reconstructions.” A rational 
reconstruction of the concept of social norm “specifies in which sense one may say 
that norms are rational, or compliance with a norm is rational” (Ibid., pp. 10-11). 
Rational reconstructions are not aimed at describing the processes or the mechanisms 
of norm compliance. Although they can yield meaningful and testable predictions, 
they are generally not meant to provide an “account of the real beliefs and 
preferences people have or of the way in which they in fact deliberate” (Ibid., p. 3). 
My project does not consist in a rational reconstruction of this type. 
 What sets my project apart is that it is meant to provide a description of some 
core aspects of the mechanism of norm compliance. The single most original idea put 
forth in my project is to bring an alternative explanatory framework to bear on social 
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norm compliance. This is the framework of computational cognitive neuroscience. 
What follows describes some ways in which central issues concerning social norms 
and social norm compliance may be fruitfully addressed from a neurocomputational 
perspective. 
 In order to qualify and articulate the triplet above, my strategy consists in 
firstly laying down the beginnings of a model of some core aspects of the 
neurocomputational mechanisms of norm compliance behaviour, and then zooming 
in on specific aspects of the model. Such a model, I shall argue, explains causally 
relevant features of the psychology and neuroscience of norm compliance. The 
resolute neurocomputational perspective I am taking will lead me to cross the 
personal-subpersonal boundary during my exploration. Partly because of this, one 
may wonder what the “philosophical” contribution of my thesis is and what its 
“scientific” contribution is. 
 As long as a crisp and meaningful line can be drawn between scientific and 
philosophical inquiry or between a scientific and a philosophical issue, we can point 
to the first and third Q-As in the triplet above as the “more philosophical” since they 
plunge, with generality and abstraction, to the foundations of social norms by asking 
“How should we go about to understand social norms?” (first Q-A) and “What are 
social norms?” (third Q-A). The second part of this introduction, on the framework 
adopted here, will explain in what consists the neurocomputational perspective I am 
endorsing, and will start to shed light on these two Q-As. 
 More generally, without qualifying an issue as “philosophical” vs. 
“scientific”, one may ask what my project brings to the table. In what sense is my 
contribution an improvement over the current state of the art on social norms and 
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social behaviour? I maintain that by drawing on the conceptual and empirical 
resources of computational cognitive neuroscience we can integrate in a unifying 
framework the growing amount of data available about the psychology and 
neuroscience of social behaviour. This is likely to bring coherence to scattered issues 
concerning social norms, and open new possibilities for making progress in our 
understanding social and moral behaviour. Chapter 1 will elaborate on this point by 
providing further reasons for why a neurocomputational approach to social behaviour 
should be systematically pursued. 
 Here is an overview of what is to come. The Introduction does two things. 
First, it states the topic of this work by presenting all the major claims that will be 
articulated and defended in the following chapters; then it explains the 
neurocomputational perspective endorsed here. Chapter 1 lays down the beginnings 
of a neurocomputational model of norm compliance behaviour and explains in which 
sense the model describes some core features of the mechanism of norm compliance. 
Chapter 2 provides some more details on the neurocomputational account on offer. It 
argues that the explanation of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance behaviour 
requires the appeal to neural representations. Chapter 3 addresses the question of 
what is the representational format of the background knowledge that supports norm 
compliance, and what approach might be more fruitful to find it out. Chapter 4 
focuses on normative judgement and argues that there is an intimate relationship 
between (normative) judgement and uncertainty-minimization. Chapter 5 takes up 
the questions whether and in which sense language is a tool that constitutes moral 
thinking. Chapter 6 gives grounds for the claim that emotions are not ultimate 
motives of norm compliance. It singles out caring as a fundamental capacity for 
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social norm compliance. Chapter 7 describes an experimental, neurocomputational 
project I carried out. The project asks whether and how social rewards, as opposed to 
non-social rewards, affect our learning of social norms. The chapter provides me 
with the opportunity to put at work some of the modelling tools and concepts I used 
and explored in previous chapters. In the Conclusion, I reconsider the triplet of 




I begin by describing six relatively uncontroversial situations, which will help me to 
introduce important facts and core ideas about social norms and norm compliance. 
The cases described in this section are meant to be no more than intuition tweakers. 
In section 1.2 I use these paradigm examples to extract and elaborate general claims 
that constitute explananda for any explanatory model of norm compliance. By 
extracting such explananda from these cases, I incur an inductive risk. The risk is 
that the paradigm cases I rely on may turn out to be examples of features belonging 
to different kinds of phenomena. This strategy is not unusual in science and 
philosophy, where objects of inquiry are often put into focus only as inquiry goes 
along. Despite such possible preliminary conflations, I hope to show that the 
following six cases are really about one kind of phenomenon: they are all about 
different features of one kind of behaviour. 
 
1. Six Tales about Norm Compliance 
(A) Suppose that you live in the United States and are a blunt smoker. Smoking 
blunts is an increasingly popular way to consume cannabis in the United States. A 
blunt is a tobacco cigar hollowed and filled with cannabis. Ethnographic data suggest 
that blunts users are a distinct group. Typically they are male, black, older teen, into 
Hip Hop and living in metropolitan areas in the United States (Ream et al. 2006). 
 Imagine that you are a blunt smoker. Some of your friends and you have 
pooled money to buy cannabis and a cigar. You gather to smoke somewhere. People 
within your group of blunt smokers share a number of expectations. You are 
expected to share the blunt with other members of the group. Each person is expected 
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to take a couple of puffs and then pass the blunt to another person. If other friends 
come along, they may smoke, but only if they are offered by one of those who have 
contributed money. They are not allowed to light the blunt. One who won’t pass the 
blunt when expected to can be sanctioned by being called “hedgehog.” One who will 
take more puffs than expected can be ridiculed as a “steamer” (Johnson et al. 2006). 
 Such shared expectations can be described as rules. These rules are enforced 
by an argot of social control and the risk of being shunned from the group. The 
majority of blunt users prefer to smoke blunts in groups. Interestingly, those who 
occasionally smoke blunts alone tend to replicate the group practice of taking only a 
few puffs and then putting the blunt out (Dunlap et al. 2006). 
 
(B) Queues are part of our everyday lives. We queue in front of ATMs, public 
bathrooms, at post offices, at concerts, and so forth. Queuing is a practice with many 
variants and local nuances. Probably, a supermarket line in Munich is not exactly like 
a line to get a ticket for a football match outside the San Siro stadium in Milan, or a 
queue to get a drink at a pub in Edinburgh, or a line to get a railway ticket at a station 
in Beijing. 
 Suppose you are queuing to buy a train ticket at a railway station in New 
York City. Somebody cuts in front of you. How would you react? In one of his last 
works, Stanley Milgram examined the reactions of queues to intruders (Milgram et 
al. 1986). Milgram had confederates cut into 129 queues at railway stations and other 
locations in New York City. All his confederates found the mere idea of cutting into 
a queue emotionally taxing, and some refused to take part in the experiment. Those 
who took part entered the queue at between the third and fourth person. The average 
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length of those queues was of 6 persons. The confederate stepped into the queue and 
faced forward while saying in a neutral tone: “Excuse me; I’d like to get in here.” On 
10% of occasions queue-jumpers were physically ejected from the queue. When two 
intruders cut the line right in front of a person, the percentage of people who reacted 
by verbal objections, dirty looks or physical action was 91%. Only 5% of people, 
however, reacted in any way when there were two other people between them and 
the queue jumper. One possible explanation of these results is that people felt a 
unique responsibility for rejecting intruders immediately in front of them. As 
distance from the line intruder increases, such a feeling of unique responsibility 
diminishes. 
 
(C) Suppose that you find a flyer under the windshield of your car parked outside 
a mall. Will you throw the flyer on the street? The answer to this question will 
probably depend on the state of the environment and on the behaviour of the people 
around you. 
 The social psychologist Robert Cialdini addressed the question under what 
conditions people litter with an experiment (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren 1990). Like 
in the case you have just imagined, the experimenters gave people the opportunity to 
litter by placing flyers under the windshield wipers of their cars. Cialdini and his 
colleagues varied the state of the environment where the cars were parked. In one 
condition, the environment was fully littered; in a second condition, it was clean. 
People walking to their cars could witness a confederate who either dropped trash 
into the environment, picked up from the street empty cans and threw them into a 
bin, or simply walked through that street. Cialdini found that people threw on the 
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street the flyers they had found on their cars more often when the environment was 
already littered than when the environment was clean. The most littering occurred 
when people saw someone else dropping rubbish into a littered environment. Of the 
group who saw someone else picking up and bin the litter, almost none threw the 
flyers away on the street. 
 
(D) This morning, after you’d woken up and brushed your teeth, you got dressed. 
Did you consider being a nudist for the day? Presumably, you did not. Now, consider 
tipping in restaurants in North America. On an average day, approximately 10% of 
the people living in the United States eat at sit-down restaurants. This figure, on an 
average month, rises to 58% (Azar 2007a). After completing their meals, almost all 
of these diners add to their bills an additional payment, that is: they leave a tip. Do 
they consider leaving no tip? Almost all of them, presumably, do not. 
 Tips are not legally required. Tipping is not necessary to get good service 
since people leave a tip only after their meal. Diners typically don’t expect to meet 
again the servers who waited them. So, in this case, tipping cannot be sustained by 
repeated two-party interaction. People in North America, it seems, typically tip 
thoughtlessly, that is automatically and without paying attention to what they are 
doing, in the same way you “thoughtlessly” got dressed this morning. 
 
(E) Imagine that on the night of April 14, 1912 you are on the Titanic. The vessel 
is sinking, the captain issues to his officers and crew to abide by the norm WOMEN 
AND CHILDREN FIRST. You are neither a woman nor a child and your life is in 
danger, yet you may not follow your survival instinct. Imagine now that one night in 
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May of 1915 you are on the Lusitania. The ship is torpedoed by a German U-boat; 
your life is in danger. The captain issues the order to follow the norm WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN FIRST. In this case, however, you will probably follow your survival 
instinct and ignore the captain’s orders. The number and type of passengers on both 
the Titanic and the Lusitania were similar. Yet, the behaviour of the people on the 
two vessels was different. 
 Women and children aboard the Titanic were more likely to survive than 
males. On the Lusitania, instead, young males were more likely to survive than 
everyone else. This opposite pattern can be explained by taking into account the fact 
that the Lusitania sank in 18 minutes whereas the Titanic sank more slowly in 2 
hours and 40 minutes—long enough for specific social behavioural patterns to 
emerge. You would probably enforce the captain’s orders on the Titanic but not on 
the Lusitania because you have time to inhibit your survival instinct and follow a 
specific social norm only on the Titanic (Frey et al. 2010). 
 
(F) “Genie” is the pseudonym for a feral child from Los Angeles. She spent 
nearly all of the first thirteen years of her life in isolation, locked inside a bedroom 
strapped to a potty chair (Rymer 1993). When the authorities found Genie in 1970, 
she had one of her first interactions with other people. She had not been spoken since 
infancy. Genie’s cognitive and social abilities were found impaired. Genie had no 
knowledge of the social world; she could understand a handful of words and could 
say only “Stopit” and “Nomore.” After the first seven months of treatments at a 
Children’s Hospital, she was prevalently oblivious to the presence of people around 
her, she had very little social knowledge and displayed behaviour such as spitting 
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constantly and masturbating in the presence of other people. With the help of 
linguists, social workers and psychologists, after years of treatments in caring 
environments, Genie developed some verbal and nonverbal communication skills, 
she became sociable with people she was familiar with, displayed an interest in 
music and she learned to comply with basic social norms such as DO NOT SPIT IN 
PUBLIC. 
 
1.1 Norm Compliance. Nine Features 
With these examples in hand, I now describe nine apparent features of social norm 
compliance. The structure of this section is such that each heading is a specific claim 
related to one such feature. Any paragraphs under a given heading are intended to 
provide additional considerations or details to articulate the heading. 
 
1.1.1 Norm Compliance Depends on Shared, Mutual Expectations 
It seems that an essential characteristic of social norms is that they are constituted by 
people’s mutual expectations about a certain type of behaviour in a given situation 
(Bicchieri 2006; Elster 2009; Pettit 1990; Sugden 1986). So, people’s expectations 
that others don’t litter in the meadows, and that others expect them not to litter in the 
meadows constitute a social norm against littering in the meadows. If people comply 
with a social norm concerning a type of behaviour, they must have certain kinds of 
expectations concerning that behaviour. That people share certain expectations 
concerning behaviour of some sort with others is one reason why social norm 
compliance is social (Elster 2009). In general we don’t share expectations 
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concerning tooth brushing. When we brush (or fail to brush) our teeth we are not 
complying (or failing to comply) with a social norm. 
 If social norm compliance is constitutively dependent on shared expectations, 
then social norms need not correspond to written rules enforced by a legal system. 
Whether some social norm is also recognized by a legal code and enforced by a legal 
institution does not mean that social norms need be codified laws. Typically, people 
don’t receive a medal from the mayor when they comply with a norm of tipping, and 
they don’t risk troubles with the law if they fail to leave a tip in a restaurant. 
 Acting upon what seem to be shared expectations increases the predictability 
of social interaction and decreases uncertainty within society. If social norms are 
constituted by shared expectations and such expectations “encapsulate” past 
experience, then social norms encapsulate past experience. Thus, they act as guides 
“to what to expect from the future” (Douglas 1981, p. 48). The more fully social 
norms are constituted by expectations, the more “they put uncertainty under control;” 
under the pressure of social norms, behaviour tends to acquire distinct boundaries 
and “disorder and confusion disappear” (Ibid.). Douglas’ point on uncertainty is 
central to my thesis. It will be articulated in Chapters 1, 2 and 4 when I argue that to 
have an expectation is to have a certain representation and I explain the sense in 
which norms are entropy minimizing-devices. 
 
1.1.2 Norm Compliance is Intimately Related to Punishments and Rewards 
Violations of social norms typically engender attitudes like anger, contempt, blame, 
and punitive behaviour like avoidance, ostracism, gossip, verbal abuse and physical 
harm directed at the norm violator. Besides anecdotal evidence, there is a substantial 
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body of empirical evidence from experimental economics that underwrites the claim 
that social norms are closely connected with punishment (Andreoni et al. 2003; 
Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995; Sripada 2005). This link is so intimate that some 
philosophers and social scientists argue that social norms are social partly “because 
they are maintained by the sanctions that others impose on norm violators” (Elster 
2009, p. 197). 
 Other people need not intentionally impose punishments on norm violators 
for norm violators to incur punishment. Others may impose sanctions on norm 
violators, even though other people are not intentionally punishing them. To clarify 
the point, consider Milgram’s experiment described above in (B). 
 One form of punishment consists in feeling negative emotions. Feeling 
positive emotions, on the contrary, can be rewarding. Failing to comply with norms 
is typically emotionally taxing. If failing to complying with a norm is emotionally 
taxing, then norm violators typically incur punishment. But this punishment need not 
depend on other people’s intentionally imposing sanctions. Some of Milgram’s 
queue jumpers reported that they felt uneasy and embarrassed at the mere idea of 
breaching others’ expectations in a social situation. Many of them were not 
physically threatened in any way when they cut the queue. They recalled that they 
were nonetheless overwhelmed by negative emotions in jumping the queue. They 
incurred a form of punishment even though other people did not intentionally impose 
any punishment on them. It seems, then, that in general punishment and reward may 
partly be constitutive of social norm compliance. 
 The causal role of punishment seems especially weighty in comparison to 
rewards in giving rise to and sustaining the persistence of social norms (Andreoni et 
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al. 2003; Sigmund et al. 2001). A type of behaviour like TAKING TWO PUFFS AND 
PASSING THE BLUNT AROUND can become a social norm if members of a 
population engage in it because they believe other members will punish them—for 
example by ridiculing or avoiding them, if they don’t. The structure of the motivation 
to meet others’ expectations typically comprises expectations and desires of certain 
kinds. On the one hand, people may anticipate such feelings as unease, shame, guilt 
and embarrassment at the mere idea of breaching other people’s expectations. On the 
other, they may have the desire that others do not sanction, or think bad of them, and 
that others possibly think well of them. 
 Those who are about to jump a queue or diners who are about not to tip might 
feel uncomfortable and awkward anticipating other people’s reaction. They 
anticipate that victims of norm violations—for example the waitresses and patrons 
who do not receive a tip when they expect to be tipped—are likely to feel anger or 
disgust towards the violator. Third parties—like other diners—might feel contempt at 
the norm violator. Being the object of these kinds of attitudes, or just assuming or 
anticipating being the object of these kinds of attitudes, typically makes norm 
violators feel shame or guilt. The anticipation of feeling ashamed, or assuming that 
they will be the object of a negative attitude is often sufficient—it seems—to move 
people to comply with norms. 
 In comparison to punishment, rewards move some people to comply with 
norms, but do not prevent all of those who share certain expectations from norm 
violation. However, reward, in some sense, may also be causally related to norm 
compliance in some situations. A type of behaviour like LEAVING A TIP TO THE 
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PORTER AT A HOTEL can become a norm if people believe that porters are inclined 
to reward them for the tip, for example with a smile or with better service. 
 Although the last paragraphs could have suggested that reward and 
punishment are essentially emotional, it should be emphasized that reward and 
punishment need not be identified with (positive and negative) emotions. In general, 
rewards can be understood as objects or states that make us come back for more. 
Punishments, conversely, can be understood as objects or states that make us not 
come back for more (Schultz 2007b). More specifically, in one sense, we could say 
that reward is something desired because of a feeling of pleasure. In this sense, 
leaving a tip to the porter can be rewarding because it causes positive emotions: it 
feels good. Because it causes positive emotions, people may tend to engage in this 
type of behaviour under similar circumstances in the future. In a different non-
colloquial sense, which will be clarified in chapter 6, reward is something we “want” 
because of its perceived “incentive saliency,” that is, because of its capacity to stand 
out from its surroundings and motivate agents to approach it, regardless of its 
hedonic consequences (Berridge et al. 2009). Under certain circumstances leaving a 
tip to the porter is something we “want” to do because of its “incentive salience,” it is 
something likely to capture behavioural control without invariably triggering an 
emotional reaction. Chapter 6 articulates these claims concerning motivation, 
reward/punishment and emotion, and argues that the emotions are probably not the 
ultimate motive of norm compliance. For the moment, it is worth repeating that 
rewarding states or rewarding behaviour need not be identified with states or 
behaviour that engender hedonic reactions. 
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 Let us consider one last aspect of the relationship between reward, 
punishment and norm compliance. What is it that makes certain behaviour associated 
with rewards or punishments? Why in general do I get punished if I fail to comply 
with a social norm? Why may I get rewarded if I comply with norms? There are two 
types of answers to these kinds of questions. The first has to do with externalities, 
which are secondary or unintended (positive or negative) consequences of some 
activity. When people urinate in the swimming pool, spit in the street, litter in the 
park, or use the public coffee machine without contributing anything, they are 
imposing negative externalities to other members of society. Hence, when people 
engage in such types of behaviours they may get punished because they are engaging 
in behaviour that is harmful to the group. Norms against behaviour such as littering, 
which imposes negative externalities on society, are in the public interest. Violations 
of such norms, therefore, provoke punishment. Analogously, behaviour that brings 
about positive externalities to other members of society gets rewarded. 
 The second type of answer involves no appeal to direct harm or benefit to 
members of society. People’s behaving as expected is what makes certain behaviour 
rewarding. Failing to behave as expected is what provokes punishment. A given 
behaviour is rewarding, in this sense, to the extent that people are certain about what 
their social environment will be like when somebody engages in that behaviour. 
Instead, uncertainty, in some sense, will make a given social behaviour associated 
with punishment. One preliminary way to explain the value of certainty is by 
considering the ability of agents to make plans and engage with their environment. 
When agents are certain about what to expect from each other, they are in the best 
position to make plans and take decisions. Thus, we can say that a given behaviour is 
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associated with rewards because people engage in that behaviour as they are 
expected. Conversely, for raising uncertainty, certain behaviour in social situations 
engenders punishments. 
 
1.1.3 Norm Compliance is Conditional on Having the Right Kind of 
Representation 
Social norms can be stated as universally quantified conditionals of the form: 
 For every x, if Px then Mx 
where the domain of the variable x is any behaviour, P specifies the property that 
identifies the type of behaviour and M specifies some normative property. A 
normative property is a property that can be ascribed with normative predicates such 
as ‘is wrong,’ ‘is right,’ ‘is good’ and so forth. Social norms can involve small or 
large classes of agents. For example, a social norm like CHILDREN AND WOMEN 
FIRST involves a class of agents larger than the class of agents involved in the social 
norm WOMEN FIRST. Nonetheless, both social norms can be stated as universally 
quantified conditionals. The fact that social norms can be stated as universally 
quantified conditionals, therefore, does not mean that social norms do not possess 
many differences of nuance or that they do not admit of exceptions. 
 The preference to comply with norms—for example with a norm of queuing 
such as FIRST COME FIRST SERVED—seems to be conditional in fact. According to 
Bicchieri’s (2006) account, people have a preference to comply with a social norm in 
a situation of a certain type under the conditions that they expect others to comply 
with that norm in that type of situation, and they believe that others think they ought 
to comply with that norm in that type of situation. The cues present in a given 
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situation are important to determine the kinds of expectations that people have in that 
situation, and thereby they are important to determine a preference for norm 
compliance. 
 Consider Cialdini’s experiment on littering described above in (C). One way 
to describe those results is in terms of expectations. Cialdini and his collaborators 
elicited certain expectations in their subjects by manipulating the salience of the cues 
present in the environment. The fact that people dropped trash in the environment led 
subjects to expect that most people littered there. With this expectation activated, 
subjects were less likely to have a preference to comply with a norm against littering. 
Conversely, when people represented the environment as calling for an anti-littering 
norm—for example, when they saw another person picking up trash in an otherwise 
clean environment—they were more likely to have a preference to comply with a 
norm against littering. 
 How we acquire the right kinds of representations, in which sense they are 
“right” and what is their relationship with expectations are questions that I shall 
begin to answer in Chapter 1 and explore further in Chapter 2 and 4. 
 
1.1.4 Norm Compliance Does Not Depend on a Supply of Invariant General 
Principles 
That social norms can be described as universally quantified conditionals does not 
entail that people apply invariant general rules to cases when they comply with 
norms. Put differently, the fact that people’s behaviour displays regularities when 
people comply with norms does not entail that people’s behaviour is caused by 
internally represented, invariant rules when they comply with social norms. 
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 Take the case of tipping illustrated in (D) above. Tipping varies among 
cultures and by service industry. People in North America tip in restaurants, but they 
don’t tip in shoe shops. The fact that service is especially good in a restaurant may 
lead diners in the UK to tip the waitress or the waiter. But the same fact does not lead 
to the same behaviour in Japan. Waitresses and waiters in Japan would find it 
condescending or demeaning to receive a tip for their service. So, it seems that the 
features that count as cues that lead to norm compliance vary across contexts and 
between people. If a feature makes a given situation as one that calls for norm 
compliance, it does not follow that the feature always makes the same type of 
situation as one that calls for norm compliance. 
 Given a type of situation—say, having a meal at a restaurant—and a type of 
feature—say, good service quality at the restaurant—if the feature elicits different 
representations (and hence, different expectations, in a sense to be explained in 
Chapters 1 and 2) from one token-situation to another, then people comply with 
norms of tipping on a case-by-case basis, depending on the way they represent the 
situation. Whether a feature in a social situation counts as a cue for norm 
compliance, and if so, what exact role it is playing there will be sensitive to other 
features and to the learning trajectory of the agent in that situation. 
 People, in general, do not comply with social norms by applying invariant, 
internally represented, general rules to cases. This claim will be further motivated 
Chapter 3, where I explore alternative representational format of social norms and in 





1.1.5 Social Norms Set the Boundaries of (In-)Appropriate Behaviour 
Social norms delimit the boundaries of appropriate behaviour in many different 
domains of social interaction by prescribing or proscribing certain types of action. 
Compare these two statements: 
 (1) Pass the blunt after a couple of puffs. 
 (2) Don’t jump the queue. 
 People’s decisions in case (A), described above, are shaped by the social 
norm stated in (1); people’s reactions in Milgram’s experiment, described in (B), is 
shaped by the social norm stated in (2). The first statement prescribes a type of 
action, whereas the latter proscribes an action. (1) specifies a type of action required 
in a certain social context; instead (2) tells us what is forbidden under certain 
circumstances. 
 A social norm can affect people’s behaviour in a population even if 
compliance to it is not observed. Imagine this social norm: WHOEVER FIRST 
MAKES A PROPOSAL THAT SOMETHING HAS TO BE DONE IS DIRECTLY 
RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SURE THE PROPOSAL IS CARRIED OUT. Imagine 
that students in a tutorial class have this social norm. During a seminar, those 
students may avoid suggesting a topic for discussion because they believe that that 
social norm will be followed, and, hence, they will have to prepare the talk. Nobody 
is violating the norm here. Everybody is avoiding it, and still the norm is guiding the 
students’ behaviour by specifying that if certain conditions are satisfied, a type of 
behaviour is likely to follow. 
 The way people move when they are in certain types of situations can make 
visible that social norms set some boundaries for our behaviour. By complying with 
32 
 
a norm like PASS THE BLUNT AFTER A COUPLE OF PUFFS, people’s behaviour 
involves movements of some sort. When people comply with prescriptive norms, 
they behave in such a way as to form a recognizable pattern of movements. So when 
people tip at restaurants—thereby complying with the norm LEAVE A TIP AFTER 
YOUR MEAIL AT THE RESTAURANT—they typically take a look at the bill, add a 
certain percentage of the bill and leave the total on the table where they are sitting. 
Other social norms tell people not to move in certain ways. When people comply 
with such a norm as DON’T JUMP THE QUEUE they refrain from moving in certain 
ways: they typically stop and wait in line after the last person in the queue. This does 
not mean, however, that movements of some type are conceptually required to 
comply with norms. Norm compliance cannot be identified with recurrent patterns of 
movements. 
 
1.1.6 People are Subject to Many Types of Motivations 
People at any given time have multiple types of motivation. Social norms are one of 
such types. Social norm compliance itself has a complex motivational structure 
underlain by many systems as I shall explain in Chapters 1 and 6. Let’s begin to 
consider the claim that people at any given time have multiple sources of 
motivations. 
 Social norms may have significant motivational effects on people who hold 
them, but they are not the only source of motivation. Frey et al.’s (2010) study 
presented above in (E), about the different pattern of behaviour displayed by the 
passengers on the Titanic and on the Lusitania, illustrates this point. Dramatic 
differences in behaviour may have different sources of motivation. One such source 
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is narrow self-interest. People motivated only by self-interest are concerned about 
their own welfare and they don’t care about other people’s preferences or welfare. If 
people are both narrowly self-interested and instrumentally rational, then, given the 
state of their knowledge about the outcomes of their possible actions, they will 
choose action a if a is the action they believe will lead to the outcome they prefer, 
regardless of what A may involve for other people’s welfare. If people are both self-
interested and instrumentally rational, then they would be motivated to comply with 
norms only if there is some clear benefit to themselves. But human motivation is 
complex and does not seem to consist of narrow self-interest only. 
 Instrumental motives can integrate, override, inhibit, compete or interfere 
with other motives such as the motivation to comply with norms of cooperation or 
altruism. Frey et al. (2010) suggest that passengers on the Lusitania were mainly 
motivated by self-interest, whereas on the Titanic people complied with norms for 
non-instrumental, non-selfish motives. People on the Titanic would have followed 
certain norms even though there was no obvious personal benefit to them from doing 
so. This difference in motivation would have led to differences in behaviour aboard 
the sinking ships. 
 Complying with pro-social norms might generally take more time than 
behaving out of self-interest. This might be the reason why self-interest had more 
motivational force than pro-social motives on the Lusitania, which was rapidly 
sinking. Because on the Lusitania, unlike the Titanic, people were under extreme 
time pressure, self-interest might have had more motivational force than pro-social 
motivation there. This is consistent with one of the conclusions that Darley and 
Batson (1973) draw from their famous “Good Samaritan experiment.” 
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 In a nutshell, Darley and Batson found that people in a hurry are less likely to 
help a “shabbily dressed person slumped by the side of the road,” even if they are 
going to speak on the parable of the Good Samaritan. Some literally stepped over the 
seemingly distressed person on their way to the next building, where they had an 
appointment. From their results, Darley and Batson suggest that it would not be 
unreasonable to claim that “ethics become a luxury as the speed of our daily lives 
increases (Darley and Batson 1973, p. 107). A different explanation they consider is 
that their subjects could have been blind to the scene; that is, “because of the time 
pressures, they did not perceive the scene in the alley as an occasion for an ethical 
decision” (Ibid., p. 108). 
 All in all, situational forces such as time constraints seem to have a strong 
influence on people’s motivational dynamics. 
 
1.1.7 Social Norms have Special Motivational Grip 
Many social norms have no obvious instrumental significance. For many social 
norms people don’t comply with them as a means to attain some further goal, for 
example because of the prospects for economic gain, or future reciprocation. 
 There are social norms that regulate behaviour in revenge. Such social norms 
can motivate people to impose suffering to others who have broken a deal or 
dishonored a woman at some cost or risk to themselves. Prima facie, complying with 
such norms is likely to produce suffering, pointless risks and exposure to harm. 
Complying with a norm of revenge involves no independent benefit, that is, no 
benefit independent from not being punished, if you comply with that norm. At least, 
it is dubious whether complying with such norms can be a means to attain some 
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further end (Elster 1990). It is reasonable to hold, therefore, that norms of revenge 
have powerful, non-instrumental, motivational effects on the people who have them. 
The same conclusion can be drawn about norms of tipping. It seems implausible to 
explain tipping at a highway diner that one will never visit again by appealing to 
instrumental rationality. 
 Sripada and Stich (2006) refer to the motivational grip that norms can have on 
people who hold them as “intrinsic motivation.” Their claim is that people “display 
an independent intrinsic source of motivation for norm compliance, and thus that 
people are motivated to comply with norms over and above (and to a substantial 
degree over and above), what would be predicted from instrumental reasons alone” 
(Sripada and Stich 2006, p. 285). This claim is underwritten both by the 
phenomenology of norms and by findings from experimental economics. 
 If we consider the subjective experience that often accompanies norm 
compliance, then it seems that many norms possess the authority to draw us to act in 
accordance with them unconditionally. We often don’t even question the authority of 
the norm; we don’t consider whether to comply or not. We just comply. 
 If we consider experimental evidence, a wealth of results shows that in 
variety of experimental games people comply with norms of fairness and cooperation 
even when that is not the most profitable thing to do (e.g. Camerer 2003). By 
complying with such norms, people behave very differently from the way 
instrumental rationality alone would predict. Once we recognize that many norms 
possess this type of motivational grip on people, we may want to explain the nature 




1.1.8 Complying with Norms is Thoughtless 
Take the case of the blunt smokers described in (A) above. There is ethnographic 
evidence that those who smoke blunts alone tend to behave as if they were smoking 
in a group, where blunts are typically consumed: they have only a couple of puffs 
and then put the blunt out. Or consider the situation where you enter the bank, you 
get in line and you wait for your turn. The behaviour displayed in both cases, it 
seems, is “thoughtless.” 
 If thinking is computing, then the type of behaviour displayed in both cases 
requires little computation. Insofar as automatic and unconscious behaviour requires 
little computational effort, automatic and unconscious behaviour requires little 
thought. For example, we typically wait in queues without a thought, without being 
aware of our beliefs and preferences. Often, given certain cues, we behave 
automatically without conscious deliberation. Most of the time people don’t comply 
with norms such as WAIT FOR YOUR TURN IN LINE AT THE BANK because they 
consciously consider that most people engage in a pattern of behaviour under that 
type of circumstance and that most people expect them to do the same. People, 
instead, tend to thoughtlessly repeat the same patterns of behaviour that they have 
learned both in the case of social norm compliance and, more generally, when certain 
situational cues trigger a determinate behaviour. 
 If norms put uncertainty and confusion under control—as noted with Mary 
Douglas above—then they spare people from a lot of computing about how to 
behave in social circumstances. When people are learning how to behave in social 
situations they are also learning “how much to think about how to behave” (Epstein 
2001, p. 10). It seems, therefore, that another core feature of norm compliance is that 
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“individual thought – or computing – is inversely related to the strength of a social 
norm” (Ibid.). 
 Enforcing norm compliance, it’s important to note, might have the same 
feature: it may require little computational effort. If this is so, then there are grounds 
to resist the objection that norms cannot be sustained only by attitudes of approval or 
disapproval, or, more generally, only by reward and punishment. According to this 
objection there is always a motive not to enforce a norm because sanctioning of 
conformity and deviance is cognitively costly. Social norms—the objection goes 
on—can be sustained by rewards and punishments only if people have a prior, 
sufficiently strong, motive to maintain a system of sanctions. But being motivated to 
maintain such a system is also cognitively costly. Therefore social norms cannot be 
sustained only by people’s attitudes towards certain behaviour. 
 This objection loses its bite if individual thought is inversely related to the 
strength of the motivation that people have to enforce norms by punishing norm-
violators and rewarding compliers. This strength, in turn, might be directly related to 
the strength of the social norm that people are enforcing. Pettit (1990, pp. 739-740) 
makes a similar point. He notes that enforcement of norms doesn’t have to involve 
intentional action. Intentional action may involve much thinking. If intentional action 
was necessary to norm enforcement, then sanctioning deviance would be cognitively 
costly. But the enforcement of social norms doesn’t need to involve much thinking, 
as it need not rely on intentional action. 
 Pettit argues that in order to enforce norm compliance by means of rewards 
and punishments there is no need to go about and identify norm violators. There is no 
need to discipline norm violators intentionally either. It is generally sufficient that 
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enough people are around in a social situation that calls for punishment (or reward). 
The simple presence of a sufficient number of other people, in fact, will be enough to 
(i) make it likely that the norm violator will be noticed by somebody without any 
active, intentional search; (ii) ensure that the norm violator will suffer some 
punishment without the punisher incurring any cognitive cost. It is reasonable to hold 
that (ii) is true: people often get punished (and rewarded) simply by believing that 
others think badly (or well) of them. That norm violators (or norm compliers) have 
this belief can be enough for them to be punished (or rewarded) without others 
engaging in any intentional sanctioning. “Thus—Pettit (1990, p. 741) concludes—
people can be more or less involuntary enforcers of norms, automatically providing 
suitable rewards and punishments for acts of conformity or deviance.” 
 Even if people’s enforcement of social norms had some cognitive costs, there 
is evidence that enforcing social norms might be, in some sense, rewarding in itself. 
If the enforcement of social norms is, in some sense, rewarding in itself, then we 
might quickly and effortlessly overcome possible cognitive costs under the 
motivational pressure of the reward underlying social norm enforcement (Fehr 2009). 
A large number of studies in experimental economics have shown that people often 
punish norm violators even when the revenge brings them no personal gain, or is 
materially costly to them and this cost cannot be compensated in the future (Fehr and 
Gächter 2002). In public goods games, for example, people are willing to spend extra 
money to punish those who do not contribute to the public good. When non-
contributors are detected, people punish them without considering whether that is in 
their monetary self-interest. They do it as though it carried the sweet psychological 
taste of revenge (Knutson 2004). Other experimental games have shown that also 
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mere observers, who are not affected by others’ behaviour in the game, are willing to 
punish others for norm violations at some cost to themselves which will not be 
compensated in the future (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). This type of results suggests 
that people may have an “intrinsic motivation” to punish norm violators. It may be a 
basic feature of people’s cognitive systems that the perception of a situation where a 
norm has been violated is sufficient to produce motivation to punish the violator. 
People may possess some “prior motive” to maintain a system of sanctions. I shall 
return on the motivational structure of norm compliance and on which sense 
enforcement might be rewarding in itself in Chapters 1 and 6 especially. 
 
1.1.9 Socialization is Necessary to the Development of Norm Compliance 
Social norms are found in all human societies. So, norms can be considered “cultural 
universals” (Sripada and Stich 2006, par. 2). This does not entail, however, that what 
is prescribed or proscribed by a norm is invariable across time and space or that the 
capacity to comply with norms is underlain by a dedicated mechanism. Different 
types of behaviours are proscribed or prescribed to different degrees in different 
groups. In the 1960’s, for example, few women in specific countries wore mini-
skirts, and typically they wore them only in specific situations such as in 
ballrooms—and then most of other people disapproved of them. Today, many 
women from many different places in the world wear miniskirts in a variety of 
circumstances—and no one gives it much thought in those places. 
 People of all cultures and heritages acquire the norms prevalent in their group 
in a reliable fashion and relatively early in life unless they already suffer some 
neuropsychological deficit. What seems to be necessary for the acquisition of 
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knowledge about social norms and the development of the ability to comply with 
norms is socialization. The case of Genie, described above in (F), illustrates this 
point. Genie had serious psychopathologies and could not comply with basic social 
norms mainly because she had spent the first years of her life in a socially deprived 
environment. 
 That social deprivation is very likely to produce florid psychopathologies was 
shown by Harry Harlow in a series of controlled experiments on rhesus monkeys in 
the 1950s and 60s (Harlow and Harlow 1962). In Harlow’s studies, the monkeys 
were placed in stainless-steel chambers from a few hours after birth until three, six, 
twelve, or forty-eighth months. The monkeys were raised with no maternal care or 
contact with any other living being, human or non-human; and so they couldn’t 
develop affectional ties with their mothers or peers. When released from their 
isolated chambers after two years, all monkeys showed psychopathological 
behaviour. Two of six monkeys who had been isolated for three months stopped 
eating. One of these died, the other was fed with force. All monkeys behaved as if 
they were under extreme threat in a completely alien environment: they often 
assumed crouching postures with which normal monkeys typically react to extreme 
threat. 
 When paired with other monkeys, they crouched or froze; they fled when 
approached. They made no effort to defend themselves from assaults. Those 
monkeys that raised in total or partial social deprivation for more than six months 
had no interest in social activities such as grooming, playing and mating. They all 
displayed compulsive avoidance of giving or receiving emotional nourishment. 
Socially-deprived monkeys generally showed a specific difficulty in paying attention 
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to other living beings. They behaved as if they could not perceive other monkeys as 
animal beings in their environment, and as if they were maximally uncertain as to 
what to do in those new circumstances. 
 The monkeys that could acquire approximately normal cognitive functions 
and display social behaviour after six months of isolation were the ones exposed to 
three-month old, normal monkeys (Harlow and Suomi 1971). For monkeys, and for 
humans alike, social deprivation is implicated in the development of important 
cognitive and behavioural deficits, and specifically in an inability to interact 
appropriately, or interact at all, with conspecifics. Social therapy consisting in 
interacting with others can facilitate the recovery of social capabilities impaired by 
being reared in isolation. This kind of study with monkeys and stories of “feral 
children” like Genie’s lead us to expect that socialization is essential for the 
development of social cognition in general, and particularly of norm compliance. 
 Note, finally, that the claim that socialization is necessary for the normal 
functioning of people’s cognitive abilities, together with the fact that social norms 
are a “cultural universal” (Sripada and Stich 2006) might suggest that there are innate 
mechanisms specifically dedicated to the acquisition and implementation of norms. 
Yet, current data about dynamics and connectivity of neuronal communication 
underlying social or moral behaviour strongly suggest that moral cognition is not 
identifiable through the activity of any dedicated brain sub-system (Adolphs 2010; 
Casebeer and Churchland 2003). 
 
 Summing up, I have described six cases (A-F) in light of which I identified 
nine seemingly core features of social norms or social norm compliance: 
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 I. Norm compliance depends constitutively on shared, mutual expectations. 
 II. Norm compliance is intimately related to punishments and rewards 
 III. Norm compliance is conditional on having the right kind of 
representations. 
 IV. Norm compliance does not depend on the application of general rules to 
situations. 
 V. Social norms set the boundaries of “appropriate” behaviour. 
 VI. People are subjects to many sources of motivations. 
 VII. Social norms have special motivational grip. 
 VIII. Complying with norms is thoughtless. 
 IX. Socialization is necessary for the development of norm compliance. 
 It is naïve to think that there is a single, unique, simple mechanism of norm 
compliance. So, I don’t claim that by providing a mechanistic model that could 
explain these features we thereby explain all there is to explain about norm 
compliance. Also I don’t claim that an explanation of those features will provide us 
with necessary and sufficient conditions to identify a given behaviour as an instance 
of norm compliance, or to always identify the conditions under which individuals 
will follow a social norm. 
 I hold, nonetheless, that I-IX point to seemingly central aspects of norm 
compliance and can help us to develop a descriptively adequate model of one 
important mechanism of norm compliance. If a mechanistic model explains these 
aspects, then—although incomplete—it is descriptively adequate in that it accounts 
for a large number of observed regularities underlying norm compliance. If a model 
is descriptively adequate, then we have reason to believe that it has counterparts in 
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the world and it can help us to learn about the nature of those counterparts. So when 
a model is descriptively adequate it can enable us to learn new things about the 




The explanatory framework adopted in this work is informed by the thesis that the 
nervous system is a computing system. This is a generic form of computationalism 
according to which neural computation explains cognition and behaviour. This is 
also one type of subpersonal explanation. I now expand on neurocomputationalism, 
contrast personal and subpersonal explanation and explain how 
neurocomputationalism can have a bearing on personal-level explanations. 
 
1. Neurocomputationalism 
Neurocomputational explanations explain how the brain carries out cognitive 
functions and generates behavior. They make reference to brain components—to 
brain areas, populations of neurons, neurons, synaptic connections, chemical 
neurotransmitters—and their activities, but also to the informational transactions 
between neural populations. They describe how neural processes encode, transform 
and decode information carried by patterns of neural activity. In some sense, which 
will be made clear in Chapter 2, nervous systems compute by processing neural 
representations. 
 Neurons’ fundamental activity consists in generating all-or-none events 
known as spikes (or action potentials). Sequences of spikes are called neural spike 
trains. Depending on their biophysical properties and their connections with other 
neurons, neurons generate spiking trains with different properties. Neural spike trains 
are information-carriers and their dynamics can be described by algorithms. A neural 
computation, in the generic sense assumed here, is the transformation of neural spike 
trains according to an algorithm. Neurocomputational explanations consist in 
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specifying how organized brain components and their activities produce neural spike 
trains that carry out cognitive functions and generate behavior (e.g. Churchland and 
Sejnowski 1992; Piccinini 2006; 2007). 
 To further clarify what I take to be neurocomputational explanation, let me 
introduce one of the best-developed neurocomputational explanatory models. 
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter implicated in many aspects of learning and decision-
making. One widely accepted description of the phasic changes of activities in 
neurons that contain dopamine is within the framework of Reinforcement Learning 
(Sutton and Barto 1998). Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a field in computer science 
and machine learning offering a collection of algorithms to address the problem of 
learning what to do in the face of rewards and punishments received by taking 
different actions in an unfamiliar environment. 
 A wealth of evidence indicates that activity of dopaminergic neurons in the 
basal ganglia can be described as implementing a reward prediction-error, which is a 
signal used by some classes of RL-algorithms (Houk et al. 1995; Schultz et al. 1997). 
A reward prediction-error is the difference between obtained and expected reward. 
To say that dopamine neurons activity can be described as implementing a reward 
prediction-error is to say that some neurons can be described as performing 
computations by executing some RL-algorithm. By executing this algorithm, the 
brain would carry out the cognitive task of learning what to do in the face of 
expected rewards and punishments, and generate behavior accordingly. RL 
neurocomputation will be examined in more detail in Chapter 1. We can summarize 
the distinguishing features of neurocomputational explanations thus: 
• Explanatory Targets: 
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Why/How does the brain carry out cognitive functions and produce behavior? 
• Explanatory Patterns: 
Cognitive functions and behavior are explained by identifying and describing 
relevant mechanistic components, their organized activities, the computational 
routines they perform and the informational architecture of the system 
underlying those functions and behavior. 
• Constraints: 
The identification of neurocomputational mechanism is constrained by spatial, 
temporal, structural, functional, informational and causal considerations. 
• Taxonomy: 
The categories employed are extracted from computational cognitive 
neuroscience. 
• Vocabulary: 
‘Neural spiking pattern’, ‘Population of neurons’, ‘Algorithmic transformation 
of informational input’, and the other expressions typically used to refer to the 
brain (or parts thereof), its activities and the computational functions it 
performs. 
 
 It should be clear that this sort of explanation makes no direct reference to 
personal-level states like beliefs and desires and to the principles of rationality that 
govern them. It is explanation at the subpersonal level. In general, explanations that 
deal “with parts, or systems of the cognitive agent, rather than with the agent itself as 
thinking and acting organism” are at the subpersonal level (Bermúdez 2005, p. 28). 
 Note that neurocomputational explanation is just one type of subpersonal 
explanation: subpersonal mechanisms can be described solely in terms of biological 
and chemical functions with no reference to the computational routines performed by 
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neural activations. For example, an event like an action potential occurring at a 
particular time can be explained by citing distinct, antecedent events like the release 
of neurotransmitter molecules by a presynaptic neuron and the binding of these 
neurotransmitters to receptors on the postsynaptic cell. This is a case of subpersonal, 
non-computational explanation. 
 
2. Personal Explanation, the Interface Problem and the Co-evolutionary 
Research Ideology 
Explanation of people’s behavior couched in the vocabulary of folk-psychology (or 
commonsense psychology) is instead the paradigm case of explanation at the 
personal level. The distinguishing features of this type of explanation can be 
summarized thus: 
• Explanatory Targets: 
What are people doing when they behave thus and so? 
Why do people behave the way they do? 
• Explanatory Patterns: 
- Behavior that calls for explanation is redescribed by using concepts that 
make it intelligible so that one now knows what an agent is doing in or by 
behaving thus and so. 
- Propositional attitudes are ascribed to agents to pick out generalizations of 
the form: 
“If agent S in context C desires p and believes that by doing a she will get p, 
then S will, ceteris paribus, do a.” 





The ascription of propositional attitudes is based on the presumption that the 
agent to whom they are ascribed is rational. 
• Taxonomy: 
The categories employed are extracted from people’s everyday, 
“commonsense” psychological explanations, and from facts about people and 
their situation. 
• Vocabulary: 
‘Belief’, ‘Desire’, ‘Intention’, ‘Emotion’, ‘Reason’ and other propositional-
attitude expressions. 
 
 Given the distinction between personal and subpersonal level, the interface 
problem arises. The interface problem asks “how does commonsense psychological 
explanation [which is the prominent form of explanation at the personal level] 
interface with the explanations of cognition and mental operations given by scientific 
psychology, cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience and the other levels in the 
explanatory hierarchy?” (Bermúdez 2005, p. 35). 
 The method endorsed in this thesis makes for a neurocomputationalist co-
evolutionary approach to the interface problem. The co-evolutionary research 
ideology is a centerpiece of the traditional neurocomputational picture of the mind 
(Churchland 1986). According to this position, the concepts and categories we use to 
understand cognition and behavior at any level of explanation “may need to be 
revised, and the revisionary rationales may come from research at any level” 
(Churchland 1993, p. 746). Hence, co-evolution involves explanations and concepts 
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at one level being susceptible to correction and reconceptualization in light of 
discoveries and conceptual refinements at other levels. 
 From this perspective, facts about subpersonal states and events can be 
constitutively (or conceptually) relevant to personal-level phenomena, and therefore 
knowledge of such facts can, and sometimes should, inform personal-level 
explanations. This is because of one central aspect of the ordinary personal-level 
explanatory strategy. We ordinarily explain somebody’s behavior by redescribing it 
employing different concepts. By redescribing somebody’s behavior with different 
concepts, we make intelligible what someone is doing in or by behaving thus and so. 
 If so, explanations of phenomena like social norm compliance at the personal-
level are not constitutively insulated from information yielded by knowledge of 
underlying subpersonal states and events; folk-psychological explanations of norm 
compliance in terms of preferences and expectations don’t enjoy any particular 
autonomy from the explanations in the cognitive sciences. The concepts used in 
explaining human beings and their behavior can be revised under the pressure of 
knowledge of facts about subpersonal states and events. The extent to which this 
kind of knowledge will lead to a revision of the folk-psychological concepts we use 
to explain personal-level phenomena depends on the proper identification of 
neurocomputational mechanisms. If we are to understand how facts about 
subpersonal states and events may lead to conceptual revisions of personal-level 
phenomena, we must attend to the distinctive details of the neurocomputational 
mechanisms we identify. This is one of the burdens of this work. In the conclusion, 
in light of our neurocomputational journey into social norm compliance, I shall put 
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forth some hypotheses about concepts we could use to describe this personal-level 
phenomenon. 
 It should be emphasized, finally, that adopting a neurocomputational 
perspective to the interface problem doesn’t entail an eliminativist stance toward 
folk-psychology. Some advocates of a neurocomputationalist approach to the mind 
have put emphasis on its discontinuities with folk psychology, thereby arguing that 
folk-psychology is radically false and should be replaced with explanations couched 
in terms of our best scientific theories of how the brain works (Churchland 1981; 
1995). Others like Clark (1989) argue for ecumenical views whereby folk-
psychology and neurocomputational approaches to the mind have distinctly different 
explanatory roles, and so can peacefully coexist. Rather than hostility to folk-
psychology, what motivates neurocomputationalism is a co-evolutionary conception 




The Building Blocks of Norm-Hungriness 
This chapter describes and defends the beginning of a neurocomputational 
mechanistic model of social norm compliance. The workings of this mechanism can 
plausibly explain central features of social norm compliance. More precisely, the 
chapter identifies and describes putative neurocomputational building blocks of 
social norm compliance. In order to identify these building blocks, it firstly identifies 
two computational problems, which social cognition must solve to enable cognitive 
agents to comply with social norms. The following argument offers one way to 
identify the nature of such computational problems. 
 
 P1: Adaptive behaviour demands “uncertainty” minimization. 
 P2: Social norm compliance is an instance of adaptive behaviour. 
 Therefore, C: Social norm compliance demands “uncertainty” minimization. 
 
 The first part of the chapter explains each of the premises and the conclusion 
of this argument. In particular, it articulates the relevant notion of ‘uncertainty’ 
minimization. The second part of the chapter draws upon these explanations to 
describe what can be called neurocomputational building blocks of social norm 
compliance. 
 The first part comprises two sections. Section 1 explains the claim that 
adaptive behaviour demands “uncertainty” minimization (P1), by introducing Karl 
Friston’s “free-energy” principle of adaptive behaviour. Section 2 claims that when 
agents comply with social norms they thereby behave co-adaptively (P2). In making 
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this claim, it identifies two computational problems social cognition must solve to 
enable adaptive agents to comply with social norms, namely: 
 (i) To use sensory information to compute representations of social situations. 
 (ii) To consume these representations to determine future movements or 
internal changes in the presence of, and interaction with other agents. 
 The second part comprises three sections. It is suggested that a mechanism 
consisting of Bayesian-Reinforcement Learning systems can solve these problems. 
This suggestion leverages recent advances in (a) neural models of Bayesian inference 
and (b) Reinforcement Learning algorithmic accounts of how neural activity can 
enable learning and decision-making. By minimizing prediction-errors, this 
mechanism enables people to acquire and act upon social norms. On my account, the 
Bayesian system yields social representations, and the Reinforcement Learning 
system draws on social representations to generate actions so as to minimize reward 
prediction-error during social interaction. Sections 3 and 4 describe in detail the two 
systems comprised by this mechanism, and explain how they could ground norm 
compliance. Section 5 concludes by laying out three main arguments for why norm 
compliance is best understood within this Bayesian-Reinforcement Learning model. 
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PART I. Social Norm Compliance and Uncertainty Minimization 
1. Adaptive Behaviour and Uncertainty: A Free-Energy Principle 
What does it mean that adaptive behaviour demands “uncertainty” minimization? 
One way to address this question is by considering one recent proposal articulated by 
Karl Friston, which purports to connect and explain in a single unifying framework 
adaptive biological processes, brain function, and the relationships between cognitive 
functions such as action, perception and learning (Friston 2005, 2009, 2010; Friston 
and Stephan 2007). Uncertainty minimization is the fundamental notion in Friston’s 
framework. So, by introducing and explaining the main tenets of Friston’s 
framework, I hope to clarify and motivate the claim that adaptive behaviour demands 
uncertainty minimization. 
 A couple of caveats before I introduce Friston’s proposal. Friston’s theses are 
both controversial and interesting, partly because of the dramatic claims made for 
their explanatory power. I am not interested, however, in providing a critical 
evaluation of his proposal here (see e.g. Fiorillo 2010; Thornton 2010). Furthermore, 
the claim that brain function and adaptive behaviour are intimately related to 
“uncertainty” is not new (Dayan et al. 1995; Rao et al. 2002; von Helmholtz 1925). 
My choice of explaining premise P1 in the argument above from the angle of 
Friston’s proposal depends on its generality and its explicit reference to adaptive 
behaviour and self-organizing systems. 
 According to Friston, adaptive behaviour and the structure and function of the 
brain can be explained “starting from the very fact that we exist” by appealing to a 
“free-energy” principle (Friston 2009, p. 293). “The free-energy principle says that 
any self-organizing system that is at equilibrium with its environment must minimize 
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its free energy. The principle is essentially a mathematical formulation of how 
adaptive systems (that is, biological agents, like animals or brains) resist a natural 
tendency to disorder” (Friston 2010, p. 127). Let me elaborate. 
 Friston starts from the fact that homeostatic processes ground life. All 
biological, adaptive, self-organizing agents resist a tendency to disorder by 
maintaining their state and gross form in the face of a constantly changing 
environment. All adaptive agents, that is, possess homeostatic properties which 
enable them to maintain their physiological and sensory state within bounds. Without 
these properties, life would not be viable. Warm-blooded animals, for example, could 
not exist without their homeostatic properties, which maintain their temperature 
within a certain range. The repertoire of physiological and sensory states in which 
adaptive, biological systems can be is limited. If a biological system is in some 
physiological or sensory state outside certain bounds, its homeostatic relations will 
break down and it will soon die. Friston restates this fact by employing mathematical 
tools and notions from information theory. 
 The key concepts of his framework are the information-theoretic notions of 
entropy, surprise and free-energy. They are all intimately related to the notion of 
uncertainty, as information theory is precisely the branch of mathematics that 
describes how uncertainty should be quantified, manipulated and represented. 
Information for a system consists in the reduction of uncertainty for that system. So 
the uncertainty of a system decreases as it receives information (Shannon 1948; see 
MacKay 2003 for an advanced textbook treatment of information theory). Let me 
now introduce each notion, and explain how such concepts could bear on explaining 
adaptive behaviour and brain function. 
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 If we describe with a probability distribution all possible physiological and 
sensory states in which an adaptive agent can possibly be, then the point that 
adaptive agents must resist a tendency to disorder can be re-stated by saying that that 
distribution must have low entropy. Entropy, in information theory, measures the 
amount of uncertainty of a random quantity. That a probability distribution has low 
entropy means that the outcomes sampled from that distribution are relatively 
predictable. Conversely, outcomes sampled from distributions with high entropy are 
relatively unpredictable. If the probability distribution of the possible sensory and 
physiological states of an adaptive agent has low entropy, then the agent will occupy 
relatively predictable states. 
 One way to rigorously characterize the informal notion of a predictable state, 
or outcome is in terms of the amount of surprise (or surprisal) associated with that 
state. Surprise quantifies how much information an outcome carries for a system. 
The amount of surprise of a particular outcome is a function of the probability of that 
outcome, such that the less probable the outcome the more surprising the outcome is. 
The amount of surprise of two independent outcomes is the sum of the amount of 
surprise of each outcome. Given these two properties, the surprise of an outcome 
should be the negative log-probability of that outcome. Entropy of a probability 
distribution is just the average amount of surprise of outcomes sampled from it. 
 It should be clear that entropy and surprise are measures relative to a 
probability distribution, or an agent. For example, you may have high uncertainty 
about the result of the match tomorrow, but your teammate may not. This results in 
different entropies, or surprises associated to the same outcome (i.e. the result of the 
match). More on this point in a moment. 
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 Now, suppose that we describe with a probability distribution all possible 
physiological and sensory states in which a fish can possibly be. An improbable 
outcome from such a probability distribution is “fish out of water.” Because it is 
improbable, this outcome is surprising for the fish. Conversely, a probable outcome 
from that probability distribution is “fish in water.” This outcome is not surprising 
for the fish. Because surprising outcomes are those that correspond to a likely 
breakdown of the homeostatic relational properties of the fish, the fish must avoid 
surprising states in order to have highest probability to exist and keep on existing. 
The probability distribution describing its (viable) sensory and physiological states 
must have low entropy. Biological agents ensure that their sensory entropy remains 
low and that they live longer by minimizing the long-term average of surprise of the 
probability distribution describing all their possible states. 
 Three points are worth emphasizing. First, as mentioned above, entropy and 
surprise can only be defined in relation to an agent (or a probabilistic model). When 
applied to adaptive agents, average surprise, or entropy is a function of a sensory 
state and the agent’s internal model of the environmental causes of its sensory state. 
Agents could be thought of as maintaining internal, probabilistic models of the 
relevant variables in their environment causing their sensory states. These models are 
tuned by learning and experience, as the agent interacts with its environment. An 
agent’s model can be understood as corresponding to the agent’s uncertain “beliefs.” 
The next Chapter will distinguish between different senses of “belief” in terms of 
explicit, implicit, tacit, conscious and unconscious representations. For the moment, 
suffices to say that “belief” here does not necessarily refer to an introspectively 
accessible or conscious mental state. Rather it corresponds to an “implicit” 
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probabilistic internal representation, which affects the agent’s behaviour. It should be 
clear then that in function of an agent’s internal model, the same state can be 
surprising for one agent but not for another agent. Even for the same agent, the same 
state may carry different amount of surprise at different times. I shall return on 
“internal models” below in this chapter in relation to how agents acquire social 
representation through the workings of their Bayesian brains. 
 The second point is that “surprise,” in the context of Friston’s framework, 
should be distinguished from the subjective point of view of a conscious agent. The 
two notions are distinct. Avoiding subjective surprise need not imply avoiding 
surprise in the information-theoretic sense. For example, you may consciously judge 
that you are in a surprising situation if you perceive that your cat Piper is speaking to 
you. However, if Friston is right, and cognitive, biological agents are mandated to 
minimize the uncertainty of their sensory and physiological state over their lifetime, 
then this percept is the one that most effectively minimizes the long-term average of 
surprise (or entropy) of your sensory states—regardless of your subjective, conscious 
judgement. 
 Third, it can be considered a tautology to say that agents that are in 
unsurprising states are in those states frequently and they keep existing by being in 
those states. It would amount to a re-description in information-theoretic terms of 
one aspect of biological systems that exist. Information theory provides us with one 
possible quantitative framework whereby we can describe adaptive behaviour and 
cognition, but it is not clear how this would explain or provide special understanding 
on adaptive processes and cognitive phenomena. In other words, what is it that 
Friston brings to the table? 
58 
 
 Friston proposes a principle, which could explain how surprise minimization 
is carried out by computationally-bounded cognitive systems. Computationally-
bounded agents cannot evaluate and minimize surprise directly since this would 
entail that they “know” all the variables of the world causing their possible sensory 
states. Adaptive, computationally-bounded agents are proposed to minimize “free-
energy” instead, which is a quantity that provides an upper bound on surprise and 
can be directly evaluated and minimized by computationally-bounded agents. 
 Free-energy, as characterized by Friston, is an information-theoretic measure 
“that bounds or limits (by being greater than) the surprise on sampling some data 
given a generative model,” where a generative model describes a process assumed to 
give rise to some data (Friston 2009, p. 209; Friston 2010, p. 127). In this context, a 
generative model is defined in terms of both a prior distribution over the 
environmental causes of an agent’s sensory states and the generative distribution (or 
likelihood) of the agent’s sensory states, given the environmental causes of those 
states. The generative model generates sensory states from their causes. 
 Friston shows that free-energy provides a bound on surprise. So, to the extent 
that the bound is tight, minimizing free-energy minimizes the probability that agents 
occupy surprising states. Minimization of surprise via minimization of free-energy is 
a feasible process. The free-energy of an agent would depend only on its sensory 
states and its internal model of the environmental causes of its sensory states. Since 
both sensory state and internal model can be evaluated and manipulated by 
computationally-bounded agents, free-energy can be directly minimized by 
computationally-bounded agents. Since the free-energy of an agent is a function of 
the internal state of the agent’s brain, which embodies a model of relevant 
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environmental variables, and of sensory data, free-energy minimization would 
provide a mechanism by which adaptive agents can avoid surprising states and 
thereby live longer. 
 Summing up. I have explained the claim that adaptive behaviour demands 
uncertainty minimization by introducing the information-theoretic notions underlying 
Karl Friston’s “free-energy” framework. The specific value of Friston’s hypothesis is 
controversial and I have not tried to give a critical assessment of it. What I have 
hoped to have clarified is that we can view the process by which agents adapt and 
interact successfully with their environment as a process by which they reduce their 
uncertainty. Now I illustrate this claim by focusing on a case study and on the notion 
of prediction-error. 
 
1.1 Learning to Play and Uncertainty. Prediction-Error Signals 
TD-Gammon is a neural network that is able to achieve master level skills at the 
game of backgammon (Tesauro 1994; 1995). In backgammon two players take turn 
rolling a pair of dice. Each player has 15 pieces which can be moved on a board of 
24 locations. The roll of dice determines how far players can move their pieces. The 
first player to remove all of her pieces from the board wins. Backgammon is highly 
stochastic and good play requires strategic skills. With each roll of the dice, players 
have to choose from numerous options for moving their pieces. The pieces can 
interact as they pass each other going in different directions, and so players ought to 
anticipate possible moves by the opponent. Although the number of possible 
backgammon configurations is enormous, a complete description of the state of the 
game is available at all times and is given by the configuration of the board. The 
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outcome of the game is easily identifiable and can be treated as a final reward to be 
predicted. 




Figure 1. TD-Gammon: an artificial neural network trained by a form of temporal-difference learning. 
(From Sutton & Barto 1998, Figure11.2) 
 
 It has a layer of input units, a layer of hidden units and a layer yielding 
outputs. Each of the connections between units is parameterized by a real valued 
weight. The weights embody the network’s strategic knowledge of the game. The 
input to the network is a representation of a backgammon board configuration. For 
each input pattern, TD-Gammon yields an output vector indicating the predicted 
probability of winning the game. One strategy TD-Gammon can use to improve its 
game is to learn to make accurate predictions. One way to learn to make accurate 
prediction is by means of a reward prediction-error. To say that a system minimizes 
prediction-error is another way to say that it minimizes its uncertainty. 
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 TD-Gammon started with weights set at random, and so it had no knowledge 
about how to play good backgammon. It was trained by self-play: the same network 
chose the moves of two opposite players during training. At each time step, which 
corresponded to some move made by one side, TD-Gammon executed a non-linear 
form of temporal difference (TD) learning algorithm to minimize reward prediction-
error and change its weights. By executing the TD-algorithm the network learned a 
value function V that evaluated board configurations S. At each time step t, the 
network acquired a representation of the board state st in the game. From this 
representation, it produced a number V (st; w) which specified how good the state 
represented was. The weights w of the network were tuned during learning so that 
the evaluation function V could accurately describe the probability of winning the 
game moving from configuration st. 
 After a million games, TD-Gammon’s knowledge of how to play improved to 
the extent that it could play on a par with the best human players. The key of TD-
Gammon’s success is the reinforcement learning algorithm mentioned above: the 
temporal difference reward prediction-error, which we also encountered in the 
Introduction. 
 Reinforcement Learning (RL) studies the ways natural and artificial agents 
can learn to predict the consequences of their behaviour and optimize it in 
environments where actions lead from one state to the next and can lead to rewards 
and punishments. TD-Gammon illustrates a fundamental insight of RL-models: how 
agents can develop intelligence and flexible behaviour by interacting with other 




 In general, the prediction-error approach consists in using past knowledge and 
current experience to predict what the future holds. A prediction-error is a difference 
between an actual and an expected outcome. This discrepancy is used to update 
expectations in order to make predictions more accurate. A reward prediction-error 
is a difference between two values associated with executing actions in some state. 
The value of a state is the expected sum of future rewards and punishments that can 
be achieved starting to act from that state. In its most simple form, the reward 
prediction error δt is the difference between the predicted value (Vt+1) and the current 
value (Vt) of a given state at time t: 
 [1] δt = Vt+1 - Vt 
 Equation [1] is foundational to many models in cognitive science, from 
conditioning models (Rescorla and Wagner 1972) to more elaborate connectionist 
models of cognition and learning (Rumelhart, McClelland, and the PDP Research 
Group 1986) to the most recent models of brain function (Dayan and Abbott 2001; 
Niv and Schoenbaum 2008). Friston himself claims that the free-energy of a system 
“is just the amount of prediction error” in the system (Friston 2009, p. 293). 
 Let us now ask: How did reward prediction-error minimization enable TD-
Gammon to play at grandmaster level? To reach expert play, TD-Gammon learned 
the value of various positions on the board in terms of the probability to win the 
game moving from that configuration. It learned these values by adjusting its weights 
in function of its predictions-errors: in function of the discrepancy between its 
predictions before and after a move. Given a board configuration st, TD-Gammon 
predicted the probability of winning before making a move from that board position. 
The move selected at each time step was the move with highest probability of 
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winning the game. TD-Gammon observed the actual outcome. If its prediction was 
wrong, the system would update the knowledge-base embodied in its weights to 
make its predictions more accurate. As the predictions became more and more 
accurate with experience, information about the value of making a certain move from 
a given position propagated towards the earlier stages of a game. If its predictions 
were correct, no prediction-error would have occurred because the prediction based 
on the configuration at time t would have been equal to the predicted outcome from 
one time step later t+1 and onward. So, by minimizing prediction-error, TD-
Gammon learned the objective probabilities of winning the game starting from a 
given position. Put differently, by minimizing prediction-error, TD-Gammon built a 
map of objective values for each of the possible configurations on the board. In order 
to be useful, however, this map should be able to influence behaviour that preempts 
the consequences of decisions. How could this happen? 
 Part of the answer is in the functional significance of error signals. Action 
selection can in fact be driven by error signals since they convey information about 
whether a certain action led the agent to a state with higher value than the previous 
state—recall that a state with higher value is a state predictive of more future reward 
(Sutton and Barto 1998, Ch. 6.6). If the prediction-error is positive, then the chosen 
action led the agent to a “better” state, for example a board configuration that 
improved the prospect of winning. Given the goals of the agent, for example winning 
the game, the tendency to select that action should be strengthened for the future. A 
negative prediction-error signals that the tendency to choose that action should be 
weakened since it brought about a state “worse” than the previous one. Thus, the 
agent can build an action plan (or decision policy) π (s, a), according to which the 
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probability Prob (a | s) to perform certain actions a at each state s is increased or 
decreased based on the error signal that follows each action: 
 [2] π (s, a)new = π (s, a)old + ηπδt 
where ηπ is the learning rate of the action plan and δt is the prediction error at time 
step t. Reward prediction-error minimization, therefore, can lead an agent both to 
build an accurate map of the predictive value of each state and to select the action 
that leads to a better state in its environment. 
 The prediction-error approach may be generalized in a number of ways. I 
shall argue that it can be fruitfully extended to the domain of social behaviour. Now I 
turn to explaining the claim that when agents comply with social norms they thereby 
behave (co)adaptively (which is premise P2 in the argument at the beginning of this 
chapter). I identify and explain two problems of prediction-error minimization that 
we face in our social world. By solving these problems, agents satisfy—at least 
partly—the demands for uncertainty minimization posed by social norm compliance 
(as stated in the conclusion C of the argument above). 
 
2. Social Brains and Uncertainty. 
Two Computational Problems for Social Cognition 
Human agents live in a world populated by other people. We are bound to act in the 
presence of others. But we are also bound to interact with others. Human beings are 
essentially social animals. Our interaction with others and the relationships we form 
with other people are enormously important to us, both for our material life and for 
our cognitive functioning. 
 We need to interact with others to fulfill most of our material needs. In 
general, the ways we get to live in a house, acquire food and most of other material 
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goods depend on social interactions. Without interacting with others it would be 
extremely difficult, if possible at all, to satisfy our basic needs for food and shelter. 
Our normal cognitive development, moreover, is dependent on being exposed to 
social stimuli and on caring relationships. Recall the cases of “Genie” and Harlow’s 
monkeys described in the Introduction. They illustrate that solitary confinement is 
the most significant cause of many psychopathological conditions, which can in fact 
be effectively treated with the help of social therapy and caring relationships. Some 
also argue that our cognitive flourishing is itself a socially embedded process (Doris 
and Nichols Forthcoming). If cognitive flourishing is a socially embedded process, 
then optimal cognitive functioning causally depends on and is sustained by sociality. 
Insofar as our cognitive flourishing is sustained by social interaction, we best judge 
and make good decisions when our judgements and decisions are part of a social 
process. Yet, it should be clear that the fact that we are social creatures and sociality 
is so important to us does not entail that interacting with others does not pose 
demanding computational challenges to social cognition. Rather, the importance of 
sociality makes these challenges more pressing. 
 The major computational challenges faced by social cognition are two: 
 
 (i) To use sensory information to recognize, that is, to compute 
representations of, social situations. 
 (ii) To consume these representations to determine future movements, or 




 In a sense, any cognitive system needs to find some way to use sensory 
representations to determine bodily changes or future movements so that it can 
behave adaptively in the world. In a sense, then, (i) and (ii) are not computational 
problems specific to social cognition. In the domain of social interaction, however, 
they are much more complicated because living with others makes our surroundings 
more uncertain, complex, noisy and ambiguous. 
 If challenges (i) and (ii) are not specific to social cognition, then reliable 
computational solutions for perception and motor control might be extended to the 
domain of social interaction. One such solution is prediction-error minimization. 
Prediction-error minimization in a social environment can facilitate agents to adapt 
their behaviour to each other’s, and thereby to interact smoothly. Let me start to 
unpack what I mean by ‘co-adaptation’ and why it is important for sociality. 
 The behaviour of two or more agents is co-adaptive if it contributes to the 
agents’ satisfying their desires, preferences and needs in the environment in which 
they are embedded. Agents are best able to make plans and satisfy their desires when 
they are able to predict what their environment will be like over time. Since human 
agents are embedded in a social environment, they are best able to make plans and 
satisfy their desires when they are able to predict each other’s behaviour and changes 
in their social landscape. It is easier to make plans and satisfy one’s desires when we 
are surrounded by agents who routinely engage in “normal,” expected behaviours. 
By acting on such predictions about each other’s behaviour, agents can adjust their 
behaviour to each other’s. When agents adjust their behaviour to each other’s in this 
way, their predictions about each other become self-fulfilling, and thereby they can 
deal with their surroundings more intelligently and at little computational cost. If we 
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are bound to share the environment and interact with our conspecifics, then people’s 
behaviour must co-adapt to each others’ behaviour. When people behave intelligently 
and adaptively in their social world, they thereby generally interact smoothly with 
each other. 
 Smooth interaction with others is a process involving fluid, thoughtless, 
context-sensitive responses to incoming social stimuli. If, for each of our social 
interactions, we had to negotiate every decision we make by inquiring other people 
about their needs, their desires, their beliefs, their entitlements and so on, we would 
spend most of the time engaged in effortful, time-consuming thinking. We would not 
get much accomplished. We would not have even time to engage actively with 
others: we would just ponder about people rather than act with them. 
 If, for example, we always tried to figure out the distance we should keep 
from each of the people we meet to make them most comfortable, the flow of our 
interactions would be continuously interrupted and we would undergo massive 
cognitive costs. The number of parameters we would need to take into account to 
solve such a trivial problem would be enormous. In order to compute the right 
interpersonal distance for every person we may meet, we would need to sample 
people on the street and identify the right values of parameters such as gender, 
nationality, personal character, social context, and so forth. This kind of thinking 
would hardly facilitate us to navigate our social world. We would be occupied by 
unimportant activities like sampling people to find out what is their right 
interpersonal distance. This would prevent us from engaging in activities necessary 
for our material well-being and cognitive flourishing that require some cognitive 
load. Smooth interaction seems, therefore, to be necessary to navigate intelligently 
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our social surroundings so that we can more easily get those things that we regard as 
important to ourselves accomplished. 
 The prediction-error minimization approach can be used to solve the two 
problems stated above: 
 (i) To use sensory information to compute representations of social situations. 
 (ii) To consume these representations to determine future movements or 
internal changes in the presence of, and interaction with other agents. 
 By meeting these two challenges, prediction-error minimization enables 
people to acquire and act upon social norms. Acting upon social norms facilitates 
people to adapt their behaviour to each other’s, and contributes to make our social 
interactions smooth. The types of prediction errors being minimized to solve those 
challenges are three: 
 - a sensory input prediction-error, 
 - a reward prediction-error and 
 - a state prediction-error.  
 The first type of prediction error helps agents to solve challenge (i); the last 
two types to solve challenge (ii). TD-Gammon illustrates how the reward prediction-
error signal can be used to learn values for action choices that maximize expected 
future reward. Sensory input prediction-errors report discrepancies between the 
expected and the current sensory input. The next sections focus on these three types 
of prediction-error explaining how, by solving challenges (i) and (ii), the systems 
that generate them are building blocks of norm compliance behaviour. 
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PART II. Towards a Neurocomputational Model of Social Norm 
Compliance 
3. Social Representations and Bayesian Brains 
How do we acquire social representations? By minimizing reward prediction-error 
TD-Gammon came to “see,” at least indirectly, features in its world to which it was 
previously insensitive. TD-Gammon acquired a kind of perceptual skill that enabled 
it to play more and more proficiently. I wish to show in this section that people 
acquire a similar perceptual skill courtesy of the computation of richer and richer 
representations of their social situation. The computations of social representations 
are carried out by means of Bayesian inference. 
 The next Chapter focuses on the topic of neural representations and 
characterizes what neural representations could be and why we need them to explain 
norm compliance. To a first approximation, here a representation is understood as a 
neural event that carries information about some state or situation in the world. For 
now, by saying that some neural event encodes some representation I mean that some 
neurons or populations of neurons are the vehicles of some piece of information 
about some state in the world. 
 In general, a state (or a situation) is a set of variables in a process that 
generate sensory data or inputs. States, that is, cause sensory inputs. Typically such 
variables vary rapidly and continuously over time. Hence, states of the world change 
rapidly and continuously over time. In processes generating sensory inputs, some 
variables, however, change discretely and on a slower time scale. Sets of these 
discrete and slowly changing variables can be called contexts. The distinction 
between state and context is important, but for my argument it won’t make a 
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significant difference. For ease of discussion, if not otherwise specified, I use ‘state’ 
to refer to both states and contexts. 
 States in the environment stand in causal relationships between each other. 
Such causal relationships can be referred to as structure. Different relationships 
between states—different structures, that is—can be expressed in mathematical 
equations and depicted by means of graphical models (Vilares and Kording 2011). 
 The only access we have to the world is through our senses which can be 
viewed as sources of information about the states of the world and their structure. 
This information is generally corrupted by random fluctuations, noise and ambiguity. 
The same sensory information can be caused by many different states and the same 
states may cause different types of sensory information. When we act in the world, 
moreover, our motor signals are also corrupted by noise. Since intelligent and 
adaptive behaviour is tied to the ability to survive in a changing and uncertain 
environment, our cognitive system must handle sensory and motor uncertainty in 
order to extract information about which state obtains in the world. The Bayesian 
framework provides one principled way this sensory and motor uncertainty can be 
handled in order for us to behave adaptively in our world. 
 Bayesian inference is a type of statistical inference where data (or new 
information) are used to update the probability that a hypothesis is true. To say that a 
system performs Bayesian inference is to say that it updates the probability that a 
hypothesis H is true given some data D by executing Bayes’ rule: 
 [3] Prob (H|D) = Prob (D|H)Prob (H) / Prob (D) 
 We can read [3] thus: “the probability of the hypothesis given the data 
(P(H|D)) is the probability of the data given the hypothesis (P(D|H)) times the prior 
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probability of the hypothesis (P(H)) divided by the probability of the data (P(D)).” In 
the case of our cognitive system, hypotheses can consist of either structures or states 
of the world, and data correspond to sensory inputs. As our cognitive system receives 
sensory information, the probability distribution over the possible structures or states 
of the world is updated via [3]. 
 Our cognitive system can be described as having top-down and bottom-up 
signals. Top-town signals represent prior expectations about states in the world 
before we receive sensory information, formally: 
 Prob (State). 
Bottom-up signals represent sensory information conditional on prior expectations, 
formally: 
 Prob (Sensory Input | State). 
When the bottom-up signal does not make any difference to our cognitive system, 
then our expectations about the states in the world remain unchanged. No sensory 
prediction-error is generated. When the bottom-up signal makes a difference, then, 
by multiplying the prior by the likelihood and normalizing, our cognitive system can 
compute the posterior probability: 
 Prob (State | Sensory Input). 
This posterior, in turn, becomes the new prior about states obtaining in the world and 
can be further updated based on new sensory input. The execution of this updating is 
carried out by what can be called a sensory input prediction-error. If these errors in 
sensory prediction are systematically translated into changes in synaptic weights, 
then we would have a Bayesian neurocomputational mechanism of perception. The 
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Bayesian framework will be further discussed and put at work in Chapter 4 in 
relation to moral judgement. 
 The problem of how, given a structure in the sense above, our cognitive 
system can infer the hidden cause that generated sensory input is currently a major 
topic of research in computational neuroscience. There are accumulating pieces of 
evidence that indicate that the cortical network might implement Bayesian inference 
(Doya et al. 2007; Knill and Richards 1996; Rao et al. 2002). There are three sources 
of evidence. The most telling comes from psychophysical experiments where 
people’s performance is shown to approximate the Bayesian optimum. Besides 
psychophysical experiments, a number of computational models show how 
approximate Bayesian inference could be implemented in biologically plausible 
neural networks. Finally, broad features of biological sensory systems can be 
explained in a Bayesian framework. Let me expand on this last point. 
 Sensory processing takes place along a cascade of many processing stages 
over cortical areas arranged in a hierarchical structure. This basic structural feature 
would be explained by Hierarchical Bayesian models of sensory processing where 
Bayesian transformations are temporally sparse, with processing time scales getting 
progressively longer as one moves up the layers, and spatially distributed along 
multiple layers of a hierarchy (Lee and Mumford 2003). Moreover, the anatomy and 
physiology of inter-regional connections in the cortical hierarchy point to a 
functional asymmetry between forward and backward connections. Forward 
connections run from lower to higher cortical layers and seem to drive neural 
responses. Backward connections run from higher to lower layers and mainly play a 
modulatory role by affecting neural responsiveness to other inputs. This functional 
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asymmetry can also be explained within Hierarchical Bayesian models of sensory 
processing. According to one model (Friston 2008), cortical hierarchies generate 
sensory data from representations of causes at high-levels. Thus, prior knowledge 
about the causal structure of the environment would be encoded in the backward 
connections. Forward connections would provide feedback by transmitting sensory 
prediction-error up to higher levels. Perception would arise from mutually informed 
top-down and bottom-up transformations distributed along the hierarchy. 
 
3.1 Bayesian Computing of Social Representations 
What could social representations be? And how could a Bayesian mechanism 
compute them? 
 In general, a social state (or situation) is a set of social variables in a process 
that generates sensory input. Variables are social when they concern features of 
agents’ interactions. Social states are highly structured, in that the variables 
constituting a social state can be correlated in complicated ways. The most important 
of social feature is the hidden (mental) state of the other agents with whom we 
interact. The value of agents’ hidden state both affects and is affected by the social 
contexts where the agents interact. Social contexts, recall, are sets of slowly and 
discretely changing parameters. These parameters comprise both slower changing 
variables in the internal state of agents and external variables such as features of the 
physical configuration of the external environment. Examples of these features are 
the physical arrangements of buildings and of their internal spaces. Churches, 
universities, cinemas, houses, parks are all examples of social contexts. 
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 The hidden state of an agent is the most important social feature because it 
determines how that agent will interact with us, and how that agent will react to new 
sensory inputs. If we knew other agents’ state, then we would have a model of their 
behaviour. A model of their behaviour would allow us to predict their reactions to 
inputs that we or the environment provide to their sensory systems. When other 
agents also have a model of our behaviour, we have a means to adjust our behaviour 
to each other by predicting each other’s reactions to new inputs (Wolpert et al. 2003). 
 However, we don’t have direct access to other agents’ state. Our cognitive 
systems need to infer it by relying on information about the social context and about 
other social variables like facial expression, hand gestures, posture, physical 
appearance, dress, speech, tone of voice, and so on. Relying on this type of 
information is necessary for our computationally bounded cognitive system even if 
we had some direct access to other agents’ internal state. Other agents’ internal state, 
in fact, partly depends on their prior expectations about our state. During social 
interaction, their behaviour is both affecting and affected by our state. This would 
lead to an infinite hierarchy of priors in a computationally-unbounded agent. We are 
trying to infer another agent’s state who is trying to infer our state: What I expect 
another agent’s state is; what the other agent expects I expect about her state; what I 
expect another agent expects me to expect about her state, and so on. If we tried to 
infer other agents’ states by using only information about mutual expectations about 
each other’s state, then the infinity of priors about priors would make the 
computation of the state of the other agent unfeasible. 
 The approaches to this complexity can be twofold. On the one hand, our 
cognitive system can be thought of implementing finite rather than infinite prior 
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hierarchies. There is evidence on strategic thinking in economic games suggesting 
that in fact people’s hierarchy of priors about other agents’ state comprises on 
average 1.5 levels (Camerer et al. 2004). On the other hand, the Bayesian system can 
constrain inference about other agents’ state by relying more heavily on external 
social cues. All these cues need be extracted from many modalities, integrated, and 
combined with our prior expectations about the other agent’s state. Relying more 
heavily on this external information can spare the Bayesian system to execute an 
infinite number of iterations on a hierarchy of prior expectations. After we acquire 
familiarity with the structure of external social cues and with the way they correlate 
to other agents’ reactions to a given input, we need not rely on any prior about other 
agents’ prior. The external cues would tell it all. By forming social representations 
from extensive interaction with certain types of external cues, we can arrive to act as 
though we knew the hidden state of other agents. Other people’s reactions to a 
certain action would be predicted by the representation extracted from the cues 
present in the environment. 
 If this is so, then, in general, shared expectations in the form of mutual priors 
may not be constitutive of norm compliance. People’s preference to comply with 
norms would not be dependent on having the right kind of mutual expectations. It 
would rather be dependent on the right “reading” of the cues present in situations of 
social interaction. This reading would in turn depend on one’s acquaintance with 
those cues and ultimately on one’s learning trajectory in the social world. Evidence 




 Autistic people have an impairment in their capacity to “mentalize”: in their 
capacity to reason strategically about what other people think, feel or could do given 
their beliefs (Baron-Cohen 2000). Nonetheless, even though autistic people have 
difficulties in figuring out what other people expect, at least some central aspects of 
their moral knowledge and capacity to comply with norms appear to be spared in 
many circumstances (Blair 1996; Kennett 2002; Leslie et al. 2006, McGeer 2008). 
Just to give an example: Sally and Hill (2006) compared the behaviour of healthy 
children and adults with patients diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorder of the 
same age playing economic games. Games like the Ultimatum Game, where people 
are asked to offer or to accept/refuse a share of a certain amount of money, can be 
used to measure to what extent people comply with norms of fairness. Sally and Hill 
found that in comparison to healthy children autistic children offered significantly 
less in the ultimatum game, with nearly half of them offering zero or a share of one 
out of ten. Autistic adults, instead, showed a pattern of choices similar to that of 
healthy subjects. 
 This suggests that through extensive experience with repeated social 
interactions autistic subjects can build up social representations responsive to 
external contextual cues. The presence of certain external cues is often sufficient to 
activate such social representations, which enable autistic patients to implement the 
type of behaviour “called for” by the situation they are facing. In many situations, 
thus, autistics can comply with social norms, even though their capacity to mentalize 
with other people is impaired. An intact capacity to reason about other people’s 
expectations facilitates our acquisition of knowledge of social norms and of social 
situations that call for certain behaviour. Such a capacity, however, may in general 
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be unnecessary to enable social norm compliance. Therefore, norm compliance 
might in fact not depend constitutively on shared expectations. A statistical 
understanding of external social cues can be sufficient for people to be able to 
comply with social norms. After this detour, let’s go back to the neurocomputational 
account of norm compliance I am putting forward. 
 According to the model I am describing, the task of computing social 
representations from sensory input can be mapped onto a hierarchical Bayesian 
model, where the lowest level represents basic physical features like displacement, 
acceleration, mass, orientation, and wavelength that are combined into increasingly 
complex representations, up to higher levels that represent social states. When the 
value of the prior on state Y depends on other parameters Z at higher levels, given 
perceptual input Sx, the resulting posterior probability is: 
 [4] Prob (Y, Z | Sx) ∝ Prob (Sx | Y) Prob (Y | Z) Prob (Z) 
 This is the simplest example of a hierarchical Bayesian model. Figure 2 
illustrates a three-level hierarchical Bayesian model (modified from Shi and Griffiths 
2009, Figure 2). In the example, the function that our cognitive system would have to 
compute is the posterior probability function Prob [Z | Sx] of a high-level hidden 
state Z given sensory input Sx. In order to carry out this computation, the system 
would have to reverse a generative (or forward) model which describes the causal 
process that gives rise to data assigning a probability distribution to each step in the 
process. Given the generative model used by the cognitive system to determine how 
sensory inputs are generated, the system can infer the hidden state dependent on the 












Figure 2. A Hierarchical Bayesian Model. 
The generative model describes the causal process by which each variable is generated (in ovals). 
The inference process reverses this process (in boxes). Sx is the sensory input to the nervous 
system. X, Y, Z are neural representations at increasing level of abstraction, with X being the 
representation of some simple physical quantity like wavelength, Y the representation of some 
more abstract state like the identity of a person, and Z the representation of some social state like 
“diner in the United States.” 
 
 Now, if representations of basic physical features are encoded by spikes of 
single neurons, more complex and abstract representations are encoded up the 
hierarchy by larger populations of neurons. Thus, as suggested by Eliasmith (2003, p. 
503), we can build a “‘representational hierarchy’ that permits us to move further and 
further away from the neural-level description, while remaining responsible to it.” 
Lower-level representations would systematically depend on neural transformations 
taking place at low-levels in the hierarchy which are directly sensitive to raw sensory 
inputs. Lower-level representations would be combined in a Bayesian fashion to 
compute more and more abstract representations at higher level. The feedback, in the 
form of a sensory prediction-error carried by forward connections in these 
hierarchical Bayesian model, would provide a means to incorporate statistical 
dependencies between representations at different levels of abstractions (e.g. “If the 
person is a waitress and I am in a diner in the Unites States, then she is likely to get 
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angry if I don’t leave a tip”). Ultimately, the dependencies between the 
representations and their weights in the Hierarchical Bayesian model will vary in 
function of one’s personal learning trajectory. By interacting with waitresses in 
diners, for example, we shall learn to weigh certain cues more than others to update 
our model of waitresses’ state in that type of context. While we interact with other 
agents, our nervous system is constantly reorganizing so that the models of the social 
environment it encodes get updated, and can thus serve us as maps we can use to 
smoothly navigate the social world. 
 I conclude this section by acknowledging the speculative nature of my 
proposal. A Bayesian mechanism of sensory perception might be extended to 
account for the computation of social representations. But understanding how exactly 
social representations are learned, encoded and updated through neural activity is 
enormously difficult. The neural bases of Bayesian computations have only recently 
started to be studied for relatively simple problems of visual perception. How exactly 
the brain might perform Bayesian inference and represent uncertainty in these cases 
is poorly understood. The problem of understanding how exactly the brain might 
represent social states involves greater challenges. 
 As noted by Wolpert et al. (2003, p. 596), the degrees of freedom in the state 
space of another agent are enormous. The fact that nervous systems are similar 
across people might constrain the dimension of such state space. For we might 
bootstrap any learning of other people’s internal models by using information about 
the mappings between our actions and our own internal states. Yet it is often 
incorrect “to assign the same set of internal states to action mappings to everyone” 
(Ibid., p. 601). Learning the internal model of another person remains a daunting 
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computational task. In general, we can more easily learn a model of a system by 
identifying its range of responses to a large range of different inputs we provide to it. 
But in the case of people this is typically not feasible. “[Y]ou cannot give an 
arbitrary battery of inputs to another person for system identification purposes, as 
[…] another person has the option to withdraw communication once you have 
provided a ‘bad’ input” (Ibid.). 
 
4. Social Norm Compliance and Reinforcement Learning 
Granted that our cognitive system computes social representations in a Bayesian 
fashion, we need to explain how we use these representations to determine future 
movements or internal changes so as to engage in social norm compliance behaviour. 
We need to explain how our cognitive system tackles challenge (ii): To consume 
these representations to determine future movements or internal changes in the 
presence of, and interaction with other agents. 
 The second piece of neurocomputational machinery that would explain how 
social representations are transformed to enable us to engage in social norm 
compliance is the RL account of cortico-basal ganglia circuit. I already touched upon 
RL when I described TD-Gammon and in the Introduction. Now, I firstly describe in 
some detail the RL approach to cortico-basal ganglia activity. Then I explain how 
social reward prediction-error minimization meets challenge (ii). 
 RL offers models of optimal and approximately-optimal learning and 
decision-making in the face of uncertainty and rewards. The type of problem that RL 




• States: S is the set of states which represents all possible configurations of the 
environment or of a system. 
• Actions: A is the set of actions the agent can execute in the environment or in the 
system. Actions can influence the next state of the environment and have different 
costs and payoffs. 
• State transition function: T: S x A → [0, 1] is the transition function. It specifies the 
likelihood of transitions from one state to the next in the environment. Given the 
current state s and an action a executed by the agent, T(s, a, s’) specifies the 
probability Prob (s’ | s, a) of moving to state s’. Note that the definition of T is 
typically based on the Markov assumption, according to which the transition 
probabilities only depend on the current state and action. 
• Reward function: R: S x A → ℝ is the reward function. It specifies the reward r 
obtained by the agent for executing a certain action in the current state. It models the 
immediate costs (or punishment) and payoffs (positive reward) incurred by 
performing different actions in the environment. 
• Discount factor: γ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount rate which allows a tradeoff between short-
term and long-term rewards. It specifies how much the agent cares about obtaining a 
given reward now rather than later in the future. 
 
 The goal of an agent behaving in the environment defined by S is to learn a 
policy function π which specifies a probability distribution over all available actions 
at each state such that the agent will maximize overall rewards. Goals, in general, can 
be conceived of as maximization of the integrated rewards obtained over many 
interactions within the environment. Given a change in the reward value of the 
choices of an agent in a state, the goal of the agent changes as well. The agent has a 
certain set of actions available in each state of the environment st. Actions give rise 
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to a reinforcement outcome, or reward rt, and cause a stochastic transition from state 
st to a new state st+1. Agents select actions so as to reach their goal, and maximize 
rewards over time. 
 A major problem for RL algorithms is how to balance optimally the 
“exploration” of the environment, to gather knowledge, and the “exploitation” of 
current knowledge to achieve a given goal. This problem is called “exploration-
exploitation” problem. To learn about the possible outcomes of particular actions in 
different states, the agent must try “exploratory” actions, it has not taken yet, to 
expand its knowledge-base. However, the agent must also “exploit” its current 
knowledge to makes choices leading towards its goal. Too much exploration could 
lead the agent to waste time trying to have a complete knowledge of the environment 
instead of accomplishing its task sooner with its current knowledge. Too little 
exploration could lead the agent to implement an inefficient policy. 
 There are two main families of algorithms capable of solving the RL-
problem: model-based and model-free algorithms. They differ in how they draw on 
experience to estimate quantities relevant to make choices and how they transform 
these quantities to reach a decision. Model-based algorithms draw on experience to 
build a model of the state transition and reward structure of the environment. They 
make choices by searching this model to find the most valuable action. Searching the 
model is time-consuming and computationally costly though it usually leads to 
accurate choices. 
 Model-free algorithms draw on experience to learn action values directly, 
without building and searching any model. Model-free algorithms don’t involve 
much computational cost, as they need not build or search a full map of state 
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transitions and reward structure of the environment to learn and select actions. What 
drives learning and action selection in model-free algorithms is a reward prediction-
error of the type we already encountered in the case of TD-Gammon. This signal 
allows the agent to learn the value of each state V(s) or the value of each state-action 
pair Q (s, a) from trial-and-error sampling and select the action with the current 
highest value. Yet much training is needed in order for model-free algorithms to 
learn and act upon accurate value estimates courtesy of reward prediction-error 
minimization. 
 Since model-based algorithms draw upon explicit representations of state 
transitions and reward structure of the environment to select actions, they allow 
action selection to be immediately sensitive to changes in the transition contingencies 
and in the reward structure of the outcomes of actions. For instance, in model-based 
RL the tendency to select actions leading to outcomes whose reward-values have 
decreased is immediately diminished. Model-free algorithms, whose predictions of 
value only change through reward prediction-errors and slow trial-and-error 
experience with the environment, are instead insensitive to changes in circumstances. 
They cannot adapt immediately to changes in contingency and outcome reward-
value. 
 One way to distinguish between model-based and model-free RL is in terms 
of goal-directed and habitual behaviour (Dayan 2009). Model-based RL underlies 
goal-directed behaviour, whereas model-free RL underlies habitual behaviour. These 
two types of behaviour have received a neat operationalization within research in 
animal conditioning (Dickinson 1985; Dickinson and Balleine 2002). Goal-directed 
behaviour “is defined as that is performed because: (a) the subject has appropriate 
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reason to believe it will achieve a particular goal, such as an outcome; and (b) the 
subject has a reason to seek that outcome” (Dayan 2009, p. 213). A hungry agent 
pressing a button in a vending machine to obtain food is an instance of goal-directed 
behaviour. Here the agent has appropriate reason to believe she will get food by 
selecting a certain action because, say, she has experience of the contingency 
between that action in that situation and a certain outcome. Goal-directed behaviour 
is flexible since the propensity of the agent to select a goal-directed action is 
sensitive to manipulation of either (a) or (b). Action selection, that is, is sensitive to 
(a’) changes in the contingency between action and outcome (for example, food is 
available also in the absence of the button press); and to (b’) changes in the 
desirability of the outcome (for example, when food is poisoned, or the agent is 
satiated). If behaviour is not affected by these manipulations, then it is habitual. 
Habitual behaviour is performed repeatedly, on cue, not because of a current or 
future goal. It is performed because of a previous goal and the antecedent trajectory 
of actions that were selected to achieve that goal. Habitual behaviour occurs despite 
of outcome devaluation, that is, despite of the fact that the desirability of a certain 
outcome is reduced so that it is no longer rewarding. 
 RL modelling has had profound impact on neuroscience. It has helped us to 
understand the possible computational function of specific neural signals and 
patterns of brain activity (Niv 2009). In particular, the phasic activity of dopamine 
neurons present many of the properties of the TD reward prediction-error, which is 
the engine of learning and action selection in model-free RL. In the mid ‘90s, in fact, 
it was discovered that the phasic firing of dopamine neurons in the midbrain 
substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and the ventral tegmental area (VTA) can be 
85 
 
described as encoding a reward prediction-error (Houk et al. 1995; Schultz, Dayan 
and Montague 1997). Like reward prediction-errors in TD-learning, the pattern of 




Temporal Difference prediction-error and 
dopamine activity. 
The plots show the neural activity of 
dopaminergic neurons of monkey during a 
conditioning task. The monkeys in the 
experiment were trained to learn that a 
conditioned stimulus (CS) led to a juice 
reward (R) a few seconds later. 
On the top, is displayed a phasic burst of 
activity during the release of the unexpected 
reward (R) early in training. 
On the middle, after conditioning with a cue 
which predicted the juice reward, the phasic 
burst of activity occurred at the presentation 
of the cue (CS) instead of the reward. 
On the bottom, a dip of dopamine release when the reward was unexpectedly omitted. (Figure from 
Schultz et al. 1997) 
 
 “Dopamine neurons are […] excellent detectors of the ‘goodness’ of 
environmental events relative to learned predictions about those events” (Schultz et 
al. 1997, p. 1595). Bursts of activity in dopamine neurons occur when an agent 
receives an unexpected reward. In this case, dopamine activity would encode a 
positive reward prediction-error. After some training, once the agent has learned the 
association between a certain cue and the reward, bursts of dopamine activity occur 
when the agent is presented with the cue, as if the cue had acquired predictive value. 
Put differently, after a cue comes to predict a reward, it is the unexpected cue that 
informs you that the state in the environment is better than expected. If, at the time 
the reward obtains, the activity of dopaminergic neurons stays at baseline, then the 
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predicted reward occurred as expected, and hence no prediction-error is to occur. 
Finally, after training in the case of a cue followed by no reward, the activity 
decreases thereby signaling an error in the estimate of the value of the state following 
the cue. This dip of dopaminergic activity might translate into a negative reward 
prediction-error. Since the evidence indicates that positive reward prediction-errors 
change dopamine firing rates more than negative reward prediction-errors (Schultz et 
al. 1997), it is possible that positive and negative reward prediction-errors are 
encoded differentially in the dopamine neurons (Bayer and Glimcher 2005); another 
possibility is that dopamine codes positive and negative reward prediction-errors by 
working together with some other system (Daw et al. 2002). 
 If dopamine encodes reward prediction-errors, then the input to the basal 
ganglia received from many diverse afferents—including the medial prefrontal 
cortex, the central nucleus of the amygdala, lateral hypothalamus, the serotoninergic 
raphe—would convey information about the outcome of a given action and the 
motivational significance of the current state, respectively in terms of the reward 
yielded by the action and the value of the current state. Dopamine neurons would 
transform this information to compute a reward prediction-error that is passed on to 
striatal target areas to facilitate prediction learning and action learning by 
systematically gating synaptic plasticity. 
 Evidence that this “cartoon picture” of the computational function of 
dopamine neurons might describe some aspects of the cortico-basal ganglia circuit 
comes both from physiology and computational neuroscience (Glimcher 2011). 
Plasticity in the synapses between the cortex and the striatum seems to be in fact 
dependent on dopamine signaling from the basal ganglia (Reynolds and Wickens 
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2002). Actor-Critic RL architectures, where a “Critic” supplies an “Actor” with 
predictions of value so that it can guide action selection, capture some known basic 
aspects of the basal ganglia-striatal circuits such as the phasic activity of dopamine 
neurons and dopamine-dependent plasticity in the striatum (see e.g. Joel et al. 2002). 
According to this type of architecture, dopaminergic activity in the ventral tegmental 
area targeting the ventral striatum (or nucleus accumbens) and frontal areas (like the 
orbitofrontal cortex) are used to train predictions, whereas dopaminergic signaling in 
the subtsantia nigra pars compacta that targets dorsal striatal areas (like the putamen) 
is used to learn an action selection policy. 
 Not all forms of learning and action selection, as modeled in RL, are 
dependent on dopamine however. There is both behavioural and neural evidence for 
a multiplicity of mechanisms of decision-making, each with computational properties 
suitable to different features of real-world situations, and some that do not involve 
dopaminergic activity. For example, Daw et al. (2005) have suggested that the 
central neural system might implement not only model-free RL algorithms, but also 
model-based algorithms. They propose that activity in the prefrontal cortex is 
responsible for implementing model-based strategies (thereby supporting goal-
directed behaviour), whereas the dorsolateral striatum and its dopaminergic afferents 
would implement model-free strategies such as TD-learning (thereby supporting 
habitual behaviour). These two systems would represent “opposite extremes in a 
trade-off between the statistically efficient use of experience and computational 
tractability” (Daw et al. 2005, p. 1704). When the model-based and model-free 
strategies are in disagreement in recommending different courses of actions—Daw 
and colleagues argue—the criterion of arbitration used by the nervous system is 
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based on the relative accuracy of the evaluations of the two strategies. The relative 
accuracy of the evaluations of the two strategies depends on such factors as the 
amount of training (which increases accuracy in the model-free system) and the 
depth of search in the model (which increases computational noise, and consequently 
inaccuracy in the model-base system). 
 
4.1 RL Social Norm Compliance 
I now explain how social reward prediction-error minimization meets challenge (ii), 
and I articulate the claim that prediction-error minimization carried out by cortico-
basal ganglia circuits is a crucial component of the mechanism of norm compliance 
behaviour. 
 Prediction-error minimization of sensory input enables us to acquire social 
representations. But social representations, by themselves, do not motivate us to take 
a certain action. I suggest that the RL system bootstraps us into social behaviour and 
culture by transforming social representations so as to determine future movements 
or internal changes in the presence of, and interaction with, other people. When the 
RL system taps into social representations that concern the hidden state of other 
people, then RL system enables us to learn to comply with social norms by 
minimizing social reward prediction-error. An example can help me unpack these 
claims. 
 Imagine that you arrive in some foreign country. You have certain beliefs, or 
priors, about how situations of type Z look like and about how people typically 
behave in Z: you have priors concerning a social state. In particular, you have a prior 
over the hidden state of other people in Z. Yet you are uncertain about what 
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“grammar” governs situations of type Z in that country, as you have a low degree of 
confidence about the mapping between sensory input and social representation of Z 
in that country, you are uncertain about the state transition T (z, a, z’) and you are 
uncertain about the reward contingencies R: Z x A → ℝ. If you want to interact 
adaptively with other people in that country in the environment Z, then you must 
learn and use the “grammar” people live by in Z in that country. 
 The first task that your cognitive system has to carry out in order to learn that 
“grammar” is to update your prior over the social environment Z in light of the 
information provided by the data generated by states in that environment. This task—
I suggest—can be carried out courtesy of the Bayesian system described above. Let’s 
assume that you arrive to represent Z as a “diner” with high confidence. By relying 
on this representation, you expect that people in that environment behave in specific 
ways since Z typically correlates in specific ways to the hidden states of people in Z. 
So by relying on your social representation of Z, you expect that the environment has 
a certain causal structure. Because you are not confident about the state transition 
function, and about the reward contingencies in Z in that new country, you have to 
learn them if you wish to behave co-adaptively. Assumptions about the structure of 
the environment can reduce the space of states and actions to a learnable subset 
(Gershman and Niv 2010). More generally, your expectation about the structure 
inherent in that environment can greatly simplify your learning and decision-making 
(Kemp and Tenenbaum 2009). 
 Now, to learn these pieces of “social grammar” your cognitive system can 
rely on model-based and model-free RL systems. Given limited experience with that 
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new environment, initially you need to rely completely on an estimated model of the 
environment of the form: 
 Prob (new state | state, action). 
This estimated model of the environment can be constrained with information about 
the structure associated with your social representation of Z. Using this model you 
can perform a simulation of the consequences of your actions given current state z: If 
you take action at from current state z, then it’s likely that you will end up in state z’. 
You utilize experience with state transitions to update an estimated state transition 
function T (z, a, z’). Upon each of your choices, a state prediction-error is computed: 
 [5] δspe = 1 - T (z, a, z’). 
This state prediction-error is used to update the probability of the observed transition 
thus: 
 [6] T (z, a, z’) = T (z, a, z’) + ηδspe 
where η is a parameter controlling your learning rate. 
 Behaviour shaped by this model-based system reflects a goal-directed process 
in which a particular desired outcome, like getting along or avoiding frictions with 
other people in Z, is used to flexibly determine any complex sequence of actions 
needed to achieve it. Action selection is carried out by searching your model of the 
environment: you work out the consequences of each action available to you in z, and 
select the action that is more likely to lead you towards your desired outcome. This 
allows action selection to be sensitive to changes in the structure of the environment 
and in your motivational state. If, for example, you notice that people suddenly react 
differently than usual given z, or your motivational state is abnormal, you can 
immediately adjust your behaviour accordingly. 
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 Let’s assume that the service in that diner was good and you have to pay your 
bill. You are in state z and, by relying on your prior about the structure of the 
environment Z you believe that most people leave a certain amount of money as a tip 
after their meals in a diner. You also believe that others expect you to leave a tip 
after your meal, as you remember that people considered you miserly when you had 
failed to leave a tip in a restaurant somewhere else in the past. You wish to get along 
with people over there, or at least to avoid frictions between you and others. You 
have a number of different actions available corresponding to different amounts you 
may leave as a tip. But money is also important to you, so the number of actions you 
are willing to take into account is limited. Before choosing an action, you take into 
consideration the likely reactions of waitresses and other diners in that state. After 
your choice, you observe the new state of the environment and a state prediction 
error is computed as in [5]. This prediction-error measures the surprise in the new 
state given the current estimate of the state-action-state transition probabilities. By 
keeping track of the specific consequences of that action as well as the causal 
relationship between the action and your desired outcomes, you can learn a map of 
the environment Z. For example, by observing others—by observing what most other 
diners do in Z and how waitresses react to certain actions of diners—you learn that 
waitresses and owners of diners over there tend to get angry when your tip is lower 
than a certain amount. In this case frictions between people over there ensue. Thus 
you can arrive to understand that people expect others to take a particular action a 
when they are in state z. By taking this action, it is most likely that you will satisfy 
your desires, thereby avoiding frictions with other people. By learning a map of Z 
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and acting upon it courtesy of a model-based system, you have just learned to 
comply with a social norm. 
 Model-based socio-normative learning is supported by a distributed neural 
mechanism. “The behavioral neuroscience of such goal-directed actions suggests a 
key role in model-based RL (or at least in its components such as outcome 
evaluation) for the dorsomedial striatum (or its primate homologue, the caudate 
nucleus), prelimbic prefrontal cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex, the medial prefrontal 
cortex, and parts of the amygdala” (Dayan and Niv 2008, p. 186). Specifically, using 
functional magnetic resonance in humans, Gläscher et al. (2010) found a neural 
correlate of a state prediction-error in the intraparietal sulcus and lateral prefrontal 
cortex. This finding supports the existence of a unique learning signal in the brain, 
which, apart from guiding model-based learning and action selection, seems to drive 
learning of causal relationships between cues and consequences as well. The 
minimization of state prediction-errors in social situation Z is what drives your 
learning to comply with a social norm in Z. 
 Activity in the neural structures just singled out support “effortful” 
computational processes. Searching and updating your “map” of the environment is 
in fact computationally demanding both for working memory and for your 
“mentalizing competence.” You need to remember situations you encountered in the 
past similar to the one at hand, you need to work out what other people’s 
expectations may be, you have to consider many different actions and outcomes, and 
work out which is the best to achieve your goals. This can reduce the capacity for 
alternative computations and the smoothness of interaction, as the model-based 
system would engage valuable cognitive resources to identify which action you 
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should implement given your state and your goals. By relying on a model-based 
controller, learning and complying with social norms can be effortful and time 
consuming. 
 One crucial aspect of social-decision problems is that they typically recur. So 
with more experience with situation Z in that country, you need not to rely on the 
model-based system. After you have regularly encountered situations of type Z, the 
sensory data generated by Z have led your representation of Z to be more and more 
accurate. Thus your prior about the structure of that environment can impose further 
constraints on the state and action space, on which your learning and decision-
making systems tap. Now you can rely on a model-free system which drives learning 
and decision making by means of social reward prediction-errors encoded by 
dopamine activity. The reward is social because it is brought about by other people’s 
reactions to your behaviour: they may openly or more subtly approve or disapprove 
of your behaviour. By picking up on these rewards, you acquire ways of evaluating 
or predicting the long-term consequences associated with executing a particular 
action. You need not “mentalize” with others or search any map of the environment. 
You can come to comply with social norms automatically, quickly and at little 
computational costs. 
 The model-free system can operate effectively with little computational 
demands in familiar situations. This system operates on “cached” values that store 
experience about the overall future worth of a particular action. Such values can be 
used to implement certain behavioural responses in the face of stimuli that were 
consistently associated to a rewarding outcome in the past. Given reliable co-
variation between situational cues and certain behavioural patterns of people in Z, the 
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reward values of the behavioural responses become conditioned onto the cues. 
Features of the environment become to encode information about the reward 
structure of the environment, and you can outsource behavioural control on them. 
The cues present in the environment signal opportunities to perform particular 
“rewarding” actions. In this way, as your training with social situation Z proceeds, 
goal-directed behaviour becomes habitual and cue-driven. The representation of Z 
itself can drive behaviour with no need to work out what other people expect you to 
do in Z or to keep track of state transitions underlying Z. Features of Z, that is, 
acquire the capacity to motivate you to directly act upon your social representation of 
Z. Norm compliance in this case becomes perceptually-based. 
 Note, however, that the shift from model-based to model-free control is not 
sequential nor instantaneous, but highly parallel and dynamic. The early phase of 
model-free learning processes take place while behaviour still appear to be controlled 
by a model-based system. Tricomi et al. (2009) provide evidence of the dynamic 
recruitment of both model-based and model-free controllers during human decision-
making. In their imaging experiment they found that the dorsolateral striatum—
which is thought to support habit-learning—increases gradually, and not suddenly, 
over training in a task that initially calls for model-based control. Furthermore, 
activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex—which is thought to support goal-
directed behaviour by representing the value of action outcomes—was observed 
throughout all training sessions in their experiment in anticipation of reward 
outcomes. Habitual behaviour then seems to result not from repetition of a certain 
action per se, nor from a decrease in the anticipation of reward outcomes, but rather 
from the fact that extensive experience with a certain environment enhances the 
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sensitivity to cues associated with a particular behavioural response. Perception of 
environmental cues may thus directly drive us to comply with social norms. And 
complying with social norms by acting upon our perception of environmental cues 
facilitates us to behave smoothly and adaptively in the presence of others. 
 In sum: Our acquisition of the grammar that governs social situations can 
then be driven by minimization of three types of prediction-error: a sensory 
prediction-error that is produced and minimized by a Bayesian system, which gives 
rise to social representations; a state prediction-error that is produced and minimized 
by a model-based RL system; and a social reward prediction-error that is produced 
and minimized by a model-free RL system. These two RL systems enable us to act 
on our social representations so that we comply with social norms. Bayesian and RL 
algorithms may be implemented by cortico basal-ganglia circuits, where dopamine 
plays a central role in both learning and acting upon certain representations. 
 By working in concert, such a Bayesian-RL neurocomputational system 
ensures that our predictions about people’s behaviour become self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Our complying with norms is one trick we use to make these predictions 
come true in social environments. It ensures that our prior expectations about social 
sensory input are met and social uncertainty is avoided. When norm compliance 
becomes a habit, governed by a model-free system, social interaction becomes a 
fluid, flexible, context-specific, inferential response to incoming sensory input and 
their values. It enables co-adaptive, smooth interaction without access to hidden 




5. Bayesian-RL Neural Computing as Building Blocks of Norm 
Compliance. Three arguments 
I conclude this chapter by laying down three arguments for why the type of 
neurocomputational model I put forward should be used as a framework for 
understanding norm compliance behaviour. First, such neurocomputational model is 
supported by evidence from the neuroscience of social decision-making. Second, my 
neurocomputational model explains the nine core features of norm compliance 
identified in the Introduction. Third, understanding social norm compliance within a 
Bayesian-RL framework has an advantage over competing, non-computational, 
accounts since it a) warrants us from arbitrary descriptions and predictions of 
phenomena, and b) fosters integration of individual findings about social norm 
compliance from different disciplines. These three reasons are articulated in turn. 
 
5.1 Neural Evidence for a Bayesian-RL mechanism of norm compliance 
There is a substantial body of evidence that the neural circuits of the Bayesian-RL 
system I described are not only involved, but they also might be essential for the 
acquisition of and compliance with social norms (Fehr and Camerer 2007; Lee 
2008). In this section I illustrate this claim with two examples. 
 Game theory is the most widely used formal framework for studying social 
interactions. Recently, games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Trust Game and 
the Ultimatum Game have begun to be combined with technologies and methods 
from the cognitive neurosciences like brain imaging. From these studies, the theme 
common to social decision-making is the basal ganglia-based circuit. This circuit has 
widespread connections with limbic and sensorimotor mechanism. As pointed out by 
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Fehr and Camerer (2007, p.422), there is an apparent overlap between the areas like 
the orbitofrontal cortex and other prefrontal regions, and the dorsal and ventral 
striatum activated in tasks where social norms shape subjects’ behaviour, and 
activations observed in studies of reinforcement and habit learning. 
 Spitzer et al. (2007), for example, asked how the brain may process the threat 
of punishment when we decide whether or not to comply with a social norm. To 
answer this question they used fMRI while their subjects played a trust game where 
norm violation could be punished. In this game, player A (in the fMRI scanner) was 
given a sum of money which he could distribute between himself and player B who 
was anonymous. In the control condition, player B was a passive recipient of A’s 
offer. In the “punishment threat condition” player B could punish A after A’s offer 
was revealed. Player B had a monetary endowment which he could spend to reduce 
A’s payoff. The threat of punishment made people act more fairly. In the 
“punishment threat condition” people split the money close to equally. When player 
B had no recourse, the people who were given the money acted differently and gave 
away, on average, less than 10 percent of the money. 
 Individuals’ increase in norm compliance under the “punishment threat 
condition” correlated with activations in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and caudate. Lateral orbitofrontal cortex activity was 
also found to be correlated with “Machiavellian personality traits” which were 
previously measured with a questionnaire. This questionnaire aimed to measure each 
subject’s combination of selfishness and opportunism. Notice that subjects with high 
Machiavellism scores gave less money in the control condition and were best at 
avoiding punishment in the “punishment threat condition”. The orbitofrontal cortex, 
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then, was most activated in the more selfish and opportunistic subjects. These results 
suggest that the role of the orbitofrontal cortex is to enable people to detect and 
evaluate social cues such as the threat of a punishment. 
 This type of result can receive a natural interpretation by appealing to 
computations of reward prediction-errors. Because BOLD signals may not directly 
reflect firing activity in a certain region, it is more appropriate to consider imaging results as 
reflecting the information that that region is receiving and processing, rather than the 
information transmitted to downstream targets (Niv and Schoenbamum 2008). So BOLD 
signals found in striatal and prefrontal cortical areas, which are primary target of 
dopamine neurons, may encode the information carried by prediction errors 
computed in the basal ganglia. 
 When target areas of reward prediction-errors are damaged from early age, 
our cognitive system might have difficulties in acquiring and acting upon social 
representations. Hence social behaviour and our capacity to comply with norms can 
be compromised. Anderson et al. (1999) studied two adult subjects whose ventral, 
medial and dorsal regions in the prefrontal cortex were damaged before sixteen 
months of age. These two patients exhibited an inability to interact adequately with 
other people and they could not retrieve explicit socio-normative knowledge. 
Because of dysfunction in cortical areas that might be necessary for Bayesian 
computation of social representation, the two subjects might never have acquired 
socially relevant knowledge in spite of extensive exposure to a variety of social 
information in their home and school environments. Treatment with social programs 
aimed at correcting their inappropriate behaviour during adolescence was 
unsuccessful. So their incapacity to comply with norms might have depended on 
incapacity to perceive and respond adequately to cues present in a given situation, 
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and this incapacity might ultimately depend on an inability to compute social 
representations. 
 
5.2 Nine features of norm compliance explained 
The Introduction identified nine seemingly core features of social norms or social 
norm compliance: 
  
 I. Norm compliance depends constitutively on shared, mutual expectations. 
 II. Norm compliance is intimately related to punishments and rewards. 
 III. Norm compliance is conditional on having the right kind of representations. 
 IV. Norm compliance does not depend on a supply of invariant general principles. 
 V. Social norms set the boundaries of “appropriate” behaviour. 
 VI. People are subject to many sources of motivations. 
 VII. Social norms have special motivational grip. 
 VIII. Complying with norms is thoughtless. 
 IX. Socialization is necessary for the development of norm compliance. 
 
A Bayesian RL model of norm compliance behaviour would explain, or explain 
away, all these features. Let me briefly consider each feature in turn. 
 
5.2.1 Why does norm compliance seem to depend constitutively on shared, 
mutual expectations? 
A person’s expectations can be described as the hidden state of that person. People’s 
hidden states are the most important social representations, as they directly determine 
how those people will interact with us and how they will react to new sensory inputs. 
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If in a given social situation we have reliable expectations about other people’s 
expectations, and other people have reliable expectations about our expectations, and 
these mutual expectations are common knowledge, this information can be used to 
behave co-adaptively. Therefore, norm compliance seems to be constitutively 
dependant on mutual, shared expectations. 
 However, as I argued in section 4.3, norm compliance is probably not 
constitutively dependent on mutual, shared expectations. We need not directly infer 
other people’s hidden state—which would be a computationally daunting task. The 
same type of information can be outsourced on external cues. By computing social 
representations from these cues, we can behave as though we acted upon each 
other’s expectations. 
 
5.2.2 Why is norm compliance intimately related to punishments and 
rewards? 
Because the capacity to act upon social representations depends on the workings of 
RL systems and model-free of RL systems. Such systems bootstrap us into a world of 
culture courtesy of social reward-prediction errors. At the level of RL systems, 
rewards and punishments are units of information which may not be identical to 
positive or negative feelings. These units of information colour by association 
otherwise neutral states in our social environment as states to be approached or 
avoided, states we care or care not about. The stamping-in of reward values to states 
in our environments is driven by prediction-errors and is ultimately a function of the 




5.2.3 Why is norm compliance conditional on having the right kind of 
representations? 
Because norm compliance depends on perceptual skills. We acquire social 
representations courtesy of a Bayesian system. That we have representations of the 
“right” kind means that the perception of a given social situation yielded by the 
Bayesian system is such that co-adaptive, fluid behaviour is likely to ensue if we act 
upon this perception. When we misperceive a given situation, the probability of 
social misbehaviour arises. Failing to correctly perceive a social situation is likely to 
cause a failure in norm compliance thereby engendering frictions with other people. 
Ultimately, in a given situation, a social representation is “accurate,” or “right” in so 
far as the information it encodes reliably correlates with other people’s hidden states 
in that situation. 
 
5.2.4 Why does social norm compliance not depend on a supply of invariant 
general principles? 
Because our social world is a dynamic, complex system. Features which function as 
drives of social norm compliance in one situation at a time need not function as 
drives of norm compliance at all in another situation or at another time. The way 
these features function at a given place and time can be described by means of a 
general principle. But this does not mean that people are always motivated to comply 
with a social norm at a given time and place because of that general principle. Two 
classes of rules by which we navigate this world consist in Bayesian inference and 
RL algorithms. These rules enable us to perceive certain social patterns at a given 
time and constrain the ways our social world changes over time because of the way 
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we perceive each other and act in the social world. Note that in general changes of 
our social world, or cultural evolution, can occur as effect of many factors: we may 
experiment with new behaviour; we may consciously start to imitate somebody else; 
we may instruct our children in certain ways; there may be random fluctuations of 
people’s beliefs and expectations; by migrating and meeting other people certain 
beliefs and expectations may be introduce or eliminated in a given place and time. 
 
5.2.5 Why do social norms set the boundaries of “appropriate” behaviour? 
The basal ganglia-based reward system is a device for leading agents to approach 
certain things rather than others. It estimates the reward value of acting upon one 
stimulus-representation rather than another, and thus it prepares a certain motor 
response. The reward value of a given representation is in function of the goal of co-
adaptive behaviour. Pursuing rewarding social states is one way we come to comply 
with norms and thereby we can behave co-adaptively and fluidly. So by pursuing 
rewarding social states, we behave “appropriately.” When we fail to pursue social 
states with high reward value, it is likely that we fail to comply with social norms. 
Thus we may behave “inappropriately.” Social norms and appropriate (inappropriate) 
behaviour can be described in function of the reward-value of social states in a given 
environment. 
 
5.2.6 Why are people subjects to many sources of motivations? 
Because our learning and decision-making are driven by multiple systems with 
different computational properties, and different types of circumstances favour 
different systems. Combining different systems can thus be advantageous given the 
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characteristics of the diverse environments where we behave. I have described two 
systems for learning and decision-making: model-based and model-free RL. The 
circumstances that favour model-based system are typically those in which we do not 
have sufficient experience such as when we face a new social situation in a foreign 
country. Because social-decision problems recur, when we are familiar with a certain 
situation, behaviour tends to be driven by model-free evaluations. 
 
5.2.7 Why do social norms have special motivational grip? 
Our social nature compels us to pursue co-adaptive, frictionless, fluid behaviour with 
other people. This goal has high-value to us. Because complying with norms is one 
prominent way we have devised to pursue this, social norms have special 
motivational grip. Furthermore, norm compliance serves best the goal of co-adaptive, 
frictionless social behaviour when it becomes a kind of habit. Habits have special 
motivational grip in that they are resistant to devaluation. So when norm compliance 
becomes a habit, it acquires extra-motivational grip in that it is resistant to 
devaluation. 
 
5.2.8 Why is norm compliance thoughtless? 
Because norm compliance is paradigmatically governed by a model-free, habitual 
system that involves little computational cost in terms of neural resources and time. 
When norm compliance becomes a cue-triggered, habitual response, action-selection 
is computationally cheap and automatic. In this sense norm compliance becomes 




6.2.9 Why is socialization necessary for the development of norm 
compliance? 
Because social information is necessary for the Bayesian system to yield social 
representations and for the RL systems to implement certain actions so that we can 
comply with social norms. Malfunctioning of the Bayesian system or development in 
situations of social deprivation can engender incapacity to acquire complex social 
representations on which we have to rely to comply with social norms. 
Malfunctioning of the RL systems or being raised with a lack of caring relationships 
can engender incapacity to being sensitive to the reward values of the social states of 
a certain environment. Thus, although we may still have a data-base of social 
knowledge, we may fail to act upon it, as we may fail to attach any reward value to 
social representations thereby becoming motivationally insensitive to social 
representations. 
 
5.3 Virtues of a Neurocomputational Perspective 
There are already empirically informed models of social norms and social norm 
compliance. Both Bicchieri (2006) and Sripada and Stich (2006)—just to name two 
works on social norms carried out by philosophers—develop frameworks for the 
study of norms and norm compliance by relying on findings from social psychology, 
experimental economics, cognitive neuroscience and anthropology. 
 Sripada and Stich’s (2006) model is a “boxological” model of the mechanism 
underlying the acquisition and implementation of norms. Their model describes a set 
of functionally individuated components (black boxes) underlying such mechanisms, 
the processes they go through, and their organization. Bicchieri (2006) proposes a 
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model of norm compliance as the product of expected utility maximization by 
socialized, boundedly rational agents. Some concerns can be raised about both 
approaches. For example, it is controversial whether a boxological approach can in 
fact yield genuine explanations, as the boxes it postulates are not identified with 
concrete structures and internal states of a system; moreover it is not obvious to what 
extent “rational reconstructions” such as Bicchieri’s accurately model the psychology 
of individuals, as it is unclear to what extent the parameters posited in their utility 
functions pick out features of people’s psychological make-up. 
 These models, nonetheless, remain valuable tools for further research on 
norms. For at least they offer us with frameworks that can be used to understand 
known phenomena about social norms and to test new hypotheses about norm 
compliance behaviour. What would a neurocomputational model of norm 
compliance bring to the table? 
 There are several advantages of expressing a model of norm compliance in 
equations which aim to provide approximate descriptions of some of the features of 
its neurobiological mechanism. I focus on two virtues of neurocomputational models. 
First, the inferences we draw about the target system represented by the model are 
typically non-arbitrary. Second, neurocomputational models foster integration of 
disparate phenomena studied in different disciplines. 
 If the inferences drawn from a model about its target system are arbitrary, 
then that model cannot reliably be used to describe, predict or explain certain 
phenomena concerning the target system. Self-consistency is a warrant against 
arbitrariness. Inconsistent models cannot be (approximately) true descriptions of 
some features of a mechanism. So if neurocomputational models are used to extract 
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non-arbitrary descriptions of some features of their target systems, they must be self-
consistent. Neurocomputational models are expressed in equations which require a 
precise, quantitative, self-consistent formulation. So neurocomputational models can 
be used to extract non-arbitrary descriptions of some features of a mechanism 
(Abbott 2008). 
 It might be difficult to extract non-arbitrary, quantitative predictions about the 
outcomes of a mechanism in different situations from boxological models or 
“rational reconstructions” of norm compliance. In comparison to these two 
approaches, neurocomputational models are more explicit and precise in their 
commitments. The mathematical formulation of some ideas about the functions 
carried out by neural circuits underlying norm compliance behaviour allows us to 
completely work out the consequences of the model. It allows us to formulate 
quantitative predictions that can shed light on the neural or the informational 
constraints of the mechanism of norm compliance that the model represents. By 
incorporating knowledge of such constraints and of mechanistic details, 
neurocomputational models can make informative predictions that generalize across 
situations. This is one way neurocomputational models of norm compliance can 
become genuinely explanatory in that they can come to describe the relationship 
between neural responses and the stimuli that evoke them on the basis of known 
physiological features of our cognitive systems. These types of descriptions 
correspond to mechanistic explanations which allow us to identify which organized 
structures and processes are essential for norm compliance behaviour. 
 With their search for basic principles that could guide us through the 
complexity of the neural circuits and cognitive functions of social norm compliance, 
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neurocomputational models foster integration of disparate phenomena and theories 
in different fields. Linking various phenomena studied in different disciplines in the 
behavioural sciences can constitute a fruitful discovery heuristic and a force towards 
inter-theoretic coherence. 
 The basic principles used to account for a given set of phenomena can be 
used to understand a distinct set of phenomena by suggesting concepts to make sense 
of those phenomena, and new hypotheses that could be tested empirically. If the 
same basic principles account for two distinct sets of phenomena studied in different 
fields, then those two sets might not be disjoint and information about one set could 
be used to inform, constrain, reconfigure and displace existing taxonomies used in 
both fields. A neurocomputational model of norm compliance could rely on the same 
basic principles used to account for solutions in cognitive domains such as 
perception, motor control and learning (Wolpert, Doya and Kawato 2003; Behrens et 
al. 2009). By relying on basic computational principles such as Bayesian inference, 
scientists can use related research in one field to stimulate discovery at another. The 
use of the same computational principles can generate research that leads to the 
development of hypotheses about the connections between particular models 
employed to account for distinct phenomena like motor control and social 
interaction. Uncovering and developing connections between different phenomena 
studied in different fields amount to carrying forward a co-evolutionary research 
ideology, whereby research in one field can draw on concepts, empirical findings, 
and methodological tools from another field (Churchland 1986, Ch. 5). 
 Findings relevant to norm compliance from behavioural economics, social 
psychology, social neuroscience, biology, anthropology and artificial intelligence 
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could be understood within one explanatory framework grounded in “basic 
principles” like efficient coding, Bayesian inference, adaptive optimal control, and 
generative models (Abbott 2008). Such an explanatory framework could serve as a 
bridge between models and micro-theories of the various disciplines. Cross-
disciplinary links will force overlapping theories and models to cohere with each 
other (on the value of unification in the behavioural sciences see e.g. Gintis 2007). 
As explained by Pat Churchland, “[t]he unity of science is advocated as a working 
hypothesis not for to sake of puritanical neatness or ideological hegemony or hold 
positivistic tub thumping, but because theoretical coherence is the ‘principal criterion 
of belief-worthiness for epistemic units of all sizes from sentences on up’ (Paul M. 
Churchland 1980). Once a theory is exempt from having to cohere with the rest of 
science its confirmation ledger is suspect and its credibility plummets. To excuse a 




A Plea for Neural Representations 
 
NICE GUY EDDIE 
Okay, everybody cough up green for 
the little lady. 
Everybody whips out a buck, and throws it on the table. 
Everybody, that is, except Mr. Pink. 
NICE GUY EDDIE 
C'mon, throw in a buck. 
MR. PINK 
Uh-uh. I don't tip. 
NICE GUY EDDIE 
Whaddaya mean you don't tip? 
MR. PINK 
I don't believe in it. 
NICE GUY EDDIE 
You don't believe in tipping? 
 
Both philosophical and ordinary explanations of social norm compliance generally 
make fundamental reference to beliefs and preferences (or desires).1 But how should 
we understand the claim that people comply with a norm because they possess the 
right kinds of beliefs and preferences? The previous Chapter articulated a 
subpersonal explanatory framework and claimed that neural representations are an 
essential ingredient of explanations of norm compliance. Does this mean that we 
should understand beliefs and preferences in terms of neural representations? This 
chapter defends two claims: 
 1) The explanation of paradigmatic cases of norm compliance behaviour 
requires the appeal to representations. Hence, if computation requires representation, 
we would have independent support for explaining norm compliance from a 
                                                 
1 Decision theorists tend to talk of ‘preferences’ instead of ‘desires.’ In what follows I use ‘preference’ 
and ‘desire’ interchangeably, as my argument does not hinge on any distinction between them. 
Chapter 6 will further elaborate on the notions of preference and desire. 
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neurocomputational perspective since both explanation of norm compliance and 
neurocomputational explanations would require representations. 
 2) The appeal to belief and preference (or desire) in explanations of norm 
compliance is more fruitfully understood as an appeal to neural representations rather 
than to behavioural dispositions. In this sense, people comply with norms because 
they possess the right kinds of neural representations. 
 It is important to clarify at the outset the dialectic underlying this chapter. I do 
not presuppose the existence of beliefs and preferences (or desires) as folk-
psychological states. Rather, I explicate how the notions of belief and preference are 
employed in computational neuroscience in terms of neural representations, and 
examine their explanatory purchase. My argument is as follows: If beliefs and 
preferences are fruitfully understood in terms of neural representations, and positing 
neural representations gives non-trivial explanatory purchase with respect to norm 
compliance, then there is reason to appeal to neural representations in explanations of 
norm compliance. The argument presupposes that “explanatory relationships are 
relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and 
control” (Woodward 2003, v). Accordingly, I presuppose that the adequacy of the 
explanatory relationship between belief-preference and norm compliance can be 
assessed in terms of the type of control and manipulations of norm compliance that 
such a relationship can facilitate. 
 There are five sections in this chapter. Section 1 sets the stage by rehearsing 
Cristina Bicchieri’s (2006) theory of norms. Bicchieri extends the seminal 
contributions of David Lewis, Philip Pettit and Bob Sugden in analyzing social 
norms by using the tools of belief-preference rational choice theory. In order to 
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explain norm compliance, Bicchieri conceives of beliefs and preferences as 
behavioural dispositions. Her account is useful to introduce different views about 
what it takes to have a belief or a preference. In particular, her account is useful to 
highlight the explanatory relationships between norm compliance behaviour and 
different ways to conceive of belief and preference. 
 Section 2 starts to put into focus the second claim defended in the chapter: it 
describes a case-study from computational neuroscience, and explicates the notions 
of belief and preference as neural representations typically assumed in computational 
neuroscience. 
 Section 3 puts forward a first argument for a version of representationalism. 
This argument relies on Clark and Toribio’s (1994) notion of “representation-
hungry” problem domain, and aims to show that explanation of paradigmatic cases of 
norm compliance behaviour requires the appeal to representations. 
 Section 4 tackles the objection that norm compliance does not consist in 
behaviour in representation-hungry domains by engaging with some aspects of 
Hubert Dreyfus’s anti-representationalism. 
 Section 5 articulates an independent argument for neural representationalism. 
If to have a belief or a desire is to have some neural representations rather than 
certain behavioural dispositions, then belief-desire explanations of norm compliance 
are especially apt to facilitate control, manipulation or prediction. Hence there is 
reason to prefer representationalism over certain versions of dispositionalism as an 
account of the beliefs and preferences featuring in explanations of norm compliance. 
 A few caveats before getting started: my target is neither Bicchieri’s account 
of social norms nor belief-desire “folk” psychology. For, on the one hand, Bicchieri’s 
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account remains silent about representations. On the other hand, the issue here does 
not concern the folk concepts of ‘belief’ and ‘desire;’ it concerns actual mental states 
and their explanatory relationship with norm compliance. My target is not any 
dispositionalist account of belief/desire either. I do not claim that any type of 
dispositionalist view of belief and desire is inconsistent with (neural) 
representationalism. I construe dispositionalism so as to better highlight the 
explanatory fruits of neural representationalism as a way to understand belief and 
desire. My general target is any anti-representationalist view according to which 
cognition and behaviour need not, and sometimes are not, to be explained in terms of 
representational structures and transformations over such structures. 
 
1. Belief, Preference and Norm Compliance 
As already noticed, Cristina Bicchieri offers a “constructivist” account of social 
norms, “one that explains norms in terms of the expectations and preferences of 
those who follow them” (Bicchieri 2006, p. 2). The basic idea is that “the very 
existence of a social norm depends on a sufficient number of people believing that it 
exists and pertains to a given type of situation, and expecting that enough other 
people are following it in those kinds of situations” (Ibid.). Social norms are social, 
for Bicchieri, because we prefer to comply with them only if we believe that most 
members of our society will do the same and we believe that most members of our 
society expects us to follow that norm. 
 What is important for my purposes is her claim that “the belief/desire model 
of choice […] does not commit us to avow that we always engage in conscious 
deliberation to decide whether to follow a norm. We may follow a norm 
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automatically and thoughtlessly and yet be able to explain our actions in terms of 
beliefs and desires” (Ibid., p. 3). Bicchieri’s argument for this claim is the following. 
 
 P1. Norm compliance behaviour does not generally involve deliberation. 
 P2. Deliberation involves “beliefs and desires of which we are aware” (p. 6). 
 C1. Norm compliance behaviour does not generally involve beliefs and desires of 
which we are aware. 
 C2. If beliefs and desires feature in the explanation of norm compliance behaviour, 
then they do not generally feature as conscious mental states (i.e. states of which we are 
aware). 
 P3. A dispositionalist account of beliefs and desires does not conceive of beliefs and 
desires as conscious mental states. 
 C3. If beliefs and desires feature in the explanation of norm compliance behaviour, 
then they can be conceived of as “dispositions to act in certain way in the appropriate 
circumstance” (p. 6). 
 
 Bicchieri begins by pointing out that most of the time we follow norms 
thoughtlessly, by relying on heuristics of which we are unaware. Heuristics are rules 
of thumb that can solve cognitive problems in little time and with little information. 
Heuristics, for Bicchieri, can underlie norm compliance by activating default rules 
cued by contextual stimuli. From this perspective, “norm compliance is an automatic 
response to situational cues that focus our attention on a particular norm, rather than 
a conscious decision to give priority to normative considerations” (Ibid., p. 5). 
 Bicchieri then contrasts the heuristic route to behaviour with deliberation. 
“Deliberation—Bicchieri writes—is the process of consciously choosing what we 
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most desire according to our beliefs” (Ibid., p. 6). If beliefs and desires are conscious 
mental states, then—Bicchieri goes on—they cannot play a role in the heuristic route 
to norm compliance, and they cannot generally play an explanatory role in norm 
compliance, as norm compliance is generally automatic, effortless and unconscious. 
Beliefs and desires, however, need not be conscious states. Therefore they can 
feature in our explanation of norm compliance even when behaviour is guided by 
heuristics. To motivate her position, Bicchieri embraces a dispositional account of 
belief and desire according to which beliefs and desires are dispositions to act in 
certain ways under appropriate circumstances. She characterizes what is to believe 
and to prefer thus: “to say that someone has a belief or preference implies that we 
expect such motives to manifest themselves in the relevant circumstances” (Ibid.). 
 Dispositionalism allows us to rely on preferences and beliefs for the 
explanation of norm compliance both when norm compliance is the outcome of 
deliberation and when it comes from the “heuristic route.” So, the fact that beliefs 
and desires should often feature as unconscious mental states in the explanation of 
norm compliance suggests that we can conceive of them as behavioural dispositions, 
since a dispositionalist account of belief and desire does not commit us to see belief 
and desire as mental states of which we are aware. Note that Bicchieri doesn’t claim 
that we should embrace dispositionalism; she doesn’t claim that what is essential to 
believing and preferring is the disposition to act in certain ways under certain 
circumstances. All she claims is that this type of dispositionalism is a natural way to 
conceive of beliefs and desires as unconscious states. 
 But, if dispositionalism is not the only available option to make room for 
unconscious beliefs and desires in the explanation of norm compliance, then we may 
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consider independent explanatory payoffs of alternative accounts of what it is to 
believe and desire something. The remainder of this section argues that a 
dispositional account of what is to believe is not needed to explain norm compliance. 
 
1.1. Dispositions and Representations 
For a dispositionalist what is essential to belief and preference is a certain pattern of 
potential and actual, verbal and nonverbal behaviour under appropriate 
circumstances. “For someone to believe some proposition P is for that person to 
possess one or more particular behavioral dispositions pertaining to P” 
(Schwitzgebel 2006/2010). In this sense, to say that Mr. Pink believes that P or 
desires that Q is on a par with saying that salt is soluble, or that your supervisor is 
irascible, or that glass is fragile. Dispositionalists are committed to the claim that 
having internal representations is not what is essential to possess mental states. 
Internal representations are only relevant to the extent that they underwrite 
behavioural dispositions; they do not ground explanations of behaviour in terms of 
belief and preferences. 
 Dispositionalism, in comparison to the view that believing (and preferring) is 
to having internal representations, seems to have a difficulty in distinguishing 
between those cognitions that are explicit, those that are implicit and those that are 
tacit (Haugeland 1998, Ch. 7). Appealing to representations, instead, provides a 
useful way to put into focus such distinctions. 
 One cognitive system has the explicit belief that P (or desire that Q) if it 
explicitly possesses cognitive states that carry the right sort of information tokened in 
it. If beliefs and desires are understood as representations, then one has the explicit 
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belief that P (or desire that Q) if some representational structure with the right sort of 
content is stored in the cognitive system. For example, Mr. Pink has the explicit 
belief that everybody is leaving a dollar on the table at the restaurant if a 
representation with that content is tokened in his cognitive system in the right way. 
 Beliefs and desires are implicit if they are not actually tokened in the system, 
but are swiftly derivable from explicit beliefs and desires in the cognitive system. In 
terms of representations, the distinction between explicit and implicit belief depends 
on whether the right representation is tokened in the system or not. Yet, as swiftness 
is a matter of degree, “there will not be a sharp line between what one believes 
implicitly and what, though derivable from one’s beliefs, one does not actually 
believe” even implicitly (Schwitzgebel 2006/2010). For example,2 Mr. Pink may 
want to leave a big tip for the waitress and believe that big tips impress waitresses. 
Mr. Pink held those mental states explicitly, but he doesn’t draw any logical 
implication—though his system could swiftly draw it. Thus, we can say that Mr. 
Pink also wants, implicitly, to impress the waitress. 
 ‘Tacit’ is used differently by different authors (Cf. Dennett 1982; Engel 2005; 
Fodor 1968). Here, by ‘tacit cognitions’ I refer to a kind of competence built into the 
system and evinced from the behaviour emerging from the workings of the whole 
cognitive system. Tacit cognitions are neither explicitly tokened nor implied by 
explicit representations. For example, if people’s performance in a number of 
perceptual tasks approximates Bayesian inference, it can be said that those people are 
sometimes tacit Bayesian observers. Any one component of their cognitive system 
                                                 
2 The following parallels an example in Haugeland (1998, p. 143). 
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need not map onto a single component of the Bayesian model. Instead, it is the 
cognitive system as a whole that performs Bayesian inference. 
 ‘Tacit,’ ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ are to be distinguished from ‘conscious’ and 
‘unconscious.’ Conscious beliefs are those that occur when people consciously 
entertain them. In representational terms, when Mr. Pink is asked to leave one dollar 
for tip, he accesses and retrieves some of the relevant representations stored in his 
cognitive system. He then consciously entertains the belief that all the other guys are 
leaving a dollar for tip. Thus, we can become conscious of beliefs and desires of 
which we were previously unaware. In a different sense, some mental states or 
processes are unconscious just in case they cannot be accessed. Thus, even if Mr. 
Pink tried to uncover the types of algorithms implemented by his brain activity when 
he learns a new social norm, he wouldn’t be able to have access to them. Identifying 
such processes would take deep, systematic investigation at both the personal and the 
subpersonal level. 
 There can be explicit beliefs that are inaccessible to consciousness. In 
representational terms, one has explicit beliefs that are inaccessible to consciousness 
if there are representations tokened in the system carrying the right sort of 
information, but that cannot be accessed or retrieved. Chomsky (1980), for example, 
argues for this possibility when he talks about the representation of a grammar in our 
head. In the sense employed here, these types of unconscious, inaccessible beliefs are 
not tacit since they are actually tokened in the system. 
 One last important distinction, which can be drawn in terms of 
representations, is between occurrent and dispositional mental states. We may say 
that Mr. Pink dispositionally believes that most people leave a tip in restaurants if he 
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has a representation with that content stored in his head but that representation has 
currently not been retrieved for active deployment for reasoning or decision-making. 
When, given eliciting circumstances, that representation is accessed and retrieved for 
active thinking and decision-making, Mr. Pink occurrently believes that most people 
leave a tip in restaurants. It should be clear then that “one needn’t adopt a 
dispositional approach to belief in general to regard some beliefs as dispositional in 
the sense here described” (Schwitzgebel 2006/2010). Bicchieri’s argument seems to 
understand beliefs and desires as behavioural dispositions. But to have beliefs and 
desires as behavioural dispositions is distinct from having representations that are 
dispositional viz. non-occurrent. To say that most of our beliefs and desires are 
dispositional does not entail a dispositionalist view of what it takes to believe and 
desire. One can maintain that representations of some sort are essential to believe and 
desire and still acknowledge that most of these representations are unconscious or 
dispositional. 
 Bicchieri suggests that a dispositionalist account of belief and desire fits 
nicely with the heuristic route to norm compliance. But “the heuristic way to 
behaviour” fits nicely also with a representationalist account of belief and desire 
since representationalism can also account for unconscious beliefs and desires. 
Furthermore, unlike dispositionalism, it seems that representationalism can make 
good sense of the distinctions between explicit, implicit and tacit cognitions. 
Therefore, a dispositionalist account of belief and desire is not required to allow for 
the fact that we are not aware of most of our beliefs and desires; and, in comparison 
to representationalism, it has probably more difficulty in drawing important 




2. Beliefs and Preferences in Computational Neuroscience 
Nice Guy Eddie’s decision to leave a tip after his meal is an example that involves a 
social preference. Mr. Pink’s decision to not leave a tip is also an example that 
involves a social preference. Theories of social preferences are concerned with how 
people make decisions when the outcomes of those decisions impact the outcomes of 
other people. In the last decade, a wealth of behavioural and neural data has been 
collected about how people make social decisions. Such data, together with the ideas 
of social preference and bounded rationality, are beginning to be modeled and put at 
work in computational neuroscience. I now describe a case study from this field in 
order to explicate one way to understand beliefs and preferences. 
 Ray et al. (2009) used a Bayesian framework to model important aspects of 
social decision-making. They focused on a multi-round, sequential Trust Game. In 
each round of a Trust Game, an agent (the investor) decides how much money out of 
an initial endowment to send to another agent (the trustee). This amount is multiplied 
by some factor—e.g. three—and then the trustee decides how much of the money 
received to send back to the investor. Both investor and trustee know that the game 
terminates after a certain number of rounds. The standard game-theoretic prediction 
for a single, anonymous interaction between two narrowly self-interested, rational 
agents is for the investor to send nothing since the investor should anticipate that the 
trustee will not reciprocate. Experimental results, however, are inconsistent with this 
prediction. The average investor sends a significant amount of the initial endowment, 
and most trustees reciprocate (Camerer 2003). 
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 Ray and colleagues accounted for these results by building a generative 
model of agents’ behaviour in the Trust Game. Recall that generative models 
describe processes that are assumed to give rise to some data. With a generative 
model in hand, one can compute the probability distribution of some quantity that 
depends on the data. The data, in Ray and colleagues’ study, consist in the other 
agent’s decisions about how much money to send. The quantity dependent on such 
data is the agent’s own decision policy. 
 Ray et al.’s model is informed by two facts about agents’ cognitive profile. 
First, people don’t have knowledge of the outcomes of the alternatives open to them: 
people may have some expectations about how a certain game may evolve, but they 
are typically uncertain as to whether such expectations will turn out to be true. 
Second, people lack knowledge about the types of people they are dealing with: 
people don’t know whether others with whom they have only some acquaintance are 
trustworthy. Ray and colleagues’ model assumes that agents have initial beliefs about 
the type of other agents; all players have prior beliefs about other players’ initial type 
and update their beliefs by implementing Bayesian inference as choices take place. 
 The types of agents in this model are defined by (i) to what extent they are 
averse to unequal outcomes and (ii) their level of strategic thinking. The idea of 
inequality aversion is that people often dislike inequality even when they benefit 
from the unequal distribution (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). So a type of agent in Ray 
and colleagues’ model is partly defined by how much the agent dislikes 
disadvantageous inequality (how much she feels envy when somebody else gets a 
payoff greater than hers) and by how much she dislikes advantageous inequality 
(how much she feels guilty when she gets a payoff greater than others). The agent’s 
121 
 
level of strategic thinking together with inequality aversion fully defines the agent’s 
type. Strategizing about what others will do involves thinking about what they think 
you will do. This sort of thinking can be iterated—so one can think about what others 
think she thinks others think … and so on. Zero-level players choose completely at 
random. One-level players think that other players are zero-level, and thereby choose 
randomly in response to them. Players with two-level strategic thinking think that 
others are one- and zero- level players, and thereby choose accordingly, and so forth. 
As explained in chapter 1, people seem to do only a few steps of iterated thinking; 
usually they just make one step: they decide as though others are choosing randomly. 
A few make two steps and decide as though others think that they are choosing 
randomly (Camerer et al. 2004). 
 On Ray and colleagues’ model each agent makes some initial guess about the 
other agent. The model generates an estimate of what the decisions in the game 
should be given incoming data: it generates a decision policy. Each player can then 
compare actual and expected decisions and, if the fit is good, infer that her 
assumptions were probably right. Each player is seeking to maximize her expected 
pay-off, given their preferences and beliefs about other players’ types and her level 
of strategic thinking. 
 One of the important features of Ray and colleagues’ model is the separation 
between a “utility (or value) signal” and the signal underlying the inferences 
generated by the model. As Ray and colleagues (2009) explain, “these distinct 
signals as to the inner workings of the algorithm […] can be extremely useful to 
capture neural findings.” This separation into distinct signals naturally lends itself to 
an interpretation in terms of preferences about payoffs in the game and beliefs-
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dynamics about other agents. The integration of such signals enables the agents to 
track changes in their social world and behave adaptively. So, given these details, 
how are beliefs and preferences understood in Ray and colleagues’ computational 
model? 
 If neurocomputational models such as the one built by Ray and colleagues 
describe the mechanism (or some aspect of the mechanism) of social decision-
making, beliefs and preferences just are probability distributions. Social interactions, 
as typically understood in computational neuroscience, consist in the transmission of 
messages between agents about their hidden states. Such messages influence the 
beliefs and preferences of other agents; they affect, that is, the probability 
distributions encoded by an agent’s nervous system. Agents’ beliefs and preferences 
change as they gather more data given rise by the unfolding of the social interaction. 
 In Ray and colleagues’ model, agents’ beliefs are probability distributions 
over the possible types of other players. Agents’ preferences are probability 
distributions over actions given the state obtaining in the world, which in this case is 
determined by the agent’s type and the sequence of plays in the game. If one’s 
beliefs are probability distributions over the possible types of the other agent, then 
they become more peaked as more observations are made about the other agent’s 
behaviour. One’s confidence in some particular hypothesis correspondingly 
increases. If one’ preferences depend on her type, her beliefs about other’s types and 
on the state of the game, and preferences are probability distributions over possible 
actions, then such distributions become more peaked as more observations are made 
about the other player’s decisions and about the history of the game. One will 
correspondingly be more likely to select a certain action. 
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 If neural systems deal with uncertainty and encode probability distributions, 
then my neural representations of your type and of the kind of game we are playing 
causally affect my neural representation about the utility (or value) of different 
payoffs distributions in the game. Such neural representations will be used to 
generate behaviour. 
 
2.1 What Could Neural Representations Be? 
Neurons carry information by generating patterns of action potentials, or spikes. 
Spike patterns carry information about internal and external variables. Cognitive 
capacities, including the capacity to comply with norms, are enabled by 
transformations of such patterns of neural activity. 
 If information is understood in terms of the statistical dependency between a 
source and receiver (Shannon 1948), then to say that neural spike trains carry 
information is to say that neural signals are statistically dependent on internal and 
external variables. Neural signals not only are statistically dependent on some source, 
but they also reliably correlate with their sources: neural signals and the variables 
with which they correlate seem to constitute a code. 
 “A neural code is a system of rules and mechanisms by which a signal carries 
information” (deCharms and Zador 2000, p. 614). This code specifies functional 
relationships between properties of neural activity and properties of internal or 
external variables. Although it is controversial what the precise rules and 
mechanisms underlying neural coding are (deCharms and Zador 2000; Dayan and 
Abbott 2001, Ch. 1), neural representations could be individuated as the constituents 
of the neural code. More precisely, neural representations could be individuated by 
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encoding and decoding mappings between two “alphabets” (Eliasmith 2003). And 
neural representing could be described as a two-stage encoding and decoding 
process. 
 Neural encoding refers to the mapping of some variable s onto the response of 
one or more neurons, r. It specifies the functional dependence of some neural 
property on some property of a stimulus. Action potentials are the basic units of the 
encoding alphabet. Neural decoding refers to the estimation of some property of 
some stimulus from some property of some neural response. It specifies how some 
value of some physical variable s can be readout from a neural response pattern r. 
Physical properties are plausibly the basic units of the decoding alphabet. The 
estimate ŝ yielded by the decoder is used by the system to generate behaviour. 
 To get to grips with the concept of neural representation as encoding-
decoding mappings, consider perceptual visual beliefs. Visual neurons code physical 
properties with their activity in response to stimuli. The action-potential firing rates 
of neurons in the primary visual cortex reliably co-varies with and selectively 
responds to properties such as spatial location, orientation, and direction of motion of 
visual stimuli (Hubel and Wiesel 1962). Neural encoding provides a mapping from 
stimulus to neural response. Given a stimulus, neural encoding determines how 
neural activation in a certain brain area transduces the stimulus in function of some 
non-neural variable or parameter. The standard tool to describe how neural activity 
depends on some physical property is the neural tuning curve: a plot of the average 
firing rate of the neuron in function of relevant stimulus values. 
 Neural decoding provides a mapping from neural response to stimulus. From 
neural tuning curves, it is possible to extract an estimate of which property is coded 
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by a particular neural activation. The tuning curve to a feature of a stimulus—e.g. the 
orientation of a bar—is the curve describing the average response of a neuron in 
function of the values of the feature. A decoder determines how the information 
carried by neural activity population is used by the rest of the system. Given a certain 
neural activation, the study of neural decoding amounts to estimating how likely it is 
that a certain stimulus is in the environment—e.g. amounts to determining the 
orientation of a bar of light given a pattern of activation in the primary visual cortex. 
The decoding corresponds to the task performed by neurons downstream when they 
read off the spike trains that are their inputs. 
 As Chapter 1 suggested, the neural code might comprise a “representational 
hierarchy”: complex, abstract representations might be encoded at higher levels in 
the hierarchy computed in function of low-level representations and some generative 
model. Transformations of some variable s to certain behavioural responses or 
internal changes—possibly driven by Bayesian inference—might be implemented 
along an encoding-decoding cascade. Provided that structural and mathematical 
relationships between levels in the hierarchy are defined, it might be possible to 
systematically relate higher-level neural representations to their lower level 
components (Cf. Eliasmith 2003). 
 In light of Ray et al’s (2009) work, when agents play a trust game, some of 
their high-level neural representations carry information about other players’ types, 
some carry information about the action to implement given the current state of the 
game. With their concerted activations and transformations, these neural 
representations lead to adaptive behaviour in response to other agents’ behaviour. 
Provided one player’s pattern of neural response, neural decoding can yield 
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probabilities for each value of s—where s spans over types of opponents—that such 
value has led to the observed firing pattern r, and then selects one appropriate value 
ŝ. How exactly the decoder estimates the stimulus that has led to a certain firing 
pattern and which value ŝ it yields depend on the information available to the system 
(e.g. on the detail of the generative model it could use) and on how the overall 
estimation errors are weighted (i.e. the type of loss function used by the system). 
 For example, under conditions of minimal information, if s is a parameter 
spanning over types of opponents, r is a spike train, and we only know the encoding 
mapping Prob (r|s), then one possible way to readout the spike trains is by means of 
maximum-likelihood decoding. The maximum-likelihood estimate ŝ is the stimulus 
that has maximal probability of having caused the response r, that is ŝ = argmaxs 
Prob (r|s). 
 Note that a probabilistic way to characterize the decoder underwrites the fact 
that neurons are noisy, have graded responses to stimuli, and that might also encode 
the uncertainty associated with a stimulus with their firing rates. In a sense, it is 
misleading then to say that neurons are detectors that determine, for example, that 
either one agent is trustworthy or not: “Neurons don’t ‘detect’ things (i.e. they don’t 
determine that there is an edge or there isn’t one), they respond selectively to input, 
the more similar the input, the more similar the response” (Eliasmith 2005, p. 118). 
 Having hinted at what neural representations could be, I now argue that norm 
compliance should be explained by appealing to representations; then I turn to argue 




3. The Indispensability of (Neural) Representation. Or “Representational 
Hunger” Strikes Again! 
The argument for why norm compliance should be explained by appeal to 
representations has two premises. 
 
 P1. Internal representations give us unique explanatory leverage regarding 
agents’ behaviour in “representational-hungry” problem domains. 
 P2. Paradigm cases of social norm compliance consist in behaviour in 
“representational-hungry” problem domains. 
 C. Therefore internal representations give us unique explanatory leverage 
regarding paradigm cases of social norm compliance. 
 
 The argument is deductively valid. Premise 1 involves the notion of 
“representational hungry” problem domain. This notion is elaborated by Clark and 
Toribio (1994). As Clark and Toribio define it, a problem domain is 
“representational-hungry” just in case “one or both of the following conditions apply: 
 1. The problem involves reasoning about absent, non-existent, or 
counterfactual states of affairs. 
 2. The problem requires the agent to be selectively sensitive to parameters 
whose ambient physical manifestations are complex and unruly (for example, open-
endedly disjunctive)” (Ibid., p. 419). 
 Clark and Toribio argue persuasively—I think—that internal stands-in, or 
representations, are necessary to successfully tackle representational-hungry problem 
domains, and hence representations give us unique explanatory leverage regarding 
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agents’ behaviour in such domains. Here I take P1 for granted, and focus on P2 
which is more controversial. I argue that conditions 1 and 2 apply to paradigm cases 
of norm compliance, and therefore paradigm cases of norm compliance consist in 
behaviour in “representational-hungry” problem domains. As paradigm cases I focus 
on the type of trust game modeled by Ray and colleagues, and on a more ordinary 
case. If norm compliance paradigmatically takes place in representation-hungry 
problem domains, then internal representations give us unique explanatory leverage 
regarding paradigm cases of social norm compliance. Let’s consider the trust game. 
 To trust someone implies some degree of uncertainty: You take the risk of 
betrayal. You repay another’s trust even though that may go against your interest to 
maximize your profit. When you trust strangers you don’t know whether they are 
motivated only by a selfish desire to maximize their own profit. Finding out the type 
and beliefs of other agents in a trust game requires an ability to anticipate their 
actions and to reason counterfactually. Condition 1 then applies to this case. 
Anticipation and counterfactual reasoning, as argued by Clark and Toribio, seem to 
require the use of inner resources. Ray and colleagues’ generative model is one type 
of inner resource which enables an agent to behave appropriately even in absence of 
explicit inputs specific to other players’ type. Hence Trust Game- types of situations 
are “representational-hungry.” 
 Consider this other situation. There is this social norm in football: When a 
player goes down injured, the ball is usually kicked out of play to allow the player to 
receive treatment. If the ball is kicked out of play by the opponents, a further norm is 
to return the ball to them. These norms have never been formalized in the rules of the 
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game, but furious reactions are likely to ensue if somebody fails to comply with 
them. 
 Imagine now that you are playing an important football game. You notice that 
a football player from the opponent team looks as though he is injured. You have the 
ball and you can set up a team-mate for a goal. Should you put the ball out of play? 
The decision to pass the ball to your team mate or to throw it out to allow the 
opponent player to receive treatment takes fractions of seconds. It is very likely to be 
unconscious and driven by heuristics. Nonetheless, counterfactual reasoning and 
anticipation seem to play an important role in this occasion as well. You need make 
a rapid judgement concerning the actual state of the opponent. You need find out 
whether the opponent is in fact injured. You need judge what could happen if you 
played on and the opponent was in fact injured; you need anticipate the reactions of 
the opponents if he failed to put the ball out of play. Therefore, abilities for 
counterfactual reasoning and anticipation—if probably unconscious and driven by 
heuristics—seem essential to your decision to comply with the norm. 
 The same problem domain in football requires that the player who is to make 
a decision is “selectively sensitive to parameters whose ambient physical 
manifestations are complex and unruly” (Ibid.). Imagine that the ball has been kicked 
out of play because a player went down injured. It is time for a throw-in. It is known 
that you give the ball back, if an opponent player deliberately kicked the ball out of 
play because a team-mate of yours was injured. One condition for the player to 
comply with this norm is that he is sensitive to abstract, relational properties such as 
the value of “fair-play,” “reciprocity,” or “cheating.” The physical manifestation of 
such relational properties as “fair-play” is typically “complex” and “unruly,” since in 
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general whether a pattern of physical features in a social situation counts as “fair-
play” depends on other features obtaining or failing to obtain in that situation, and on 
the learning trajectory of the agents involved. So, people do not seem to rely on 
invariant general rules when they need to identify a certain pattern as “fair-play.” 
 In order to track such types of properties, one needs to rely on internal 
representations. Given his previous experience in the world of football, the football 
player has developed a capacity to track those abstract properties across situations. 
Clark (2000b) calls this capacity representational re-coding, whereby complex, 
abstract relations are re-coded into simple, usable objects—more on representational 
recoding in Chapter 5. Given a diverse array of perceptual inputs, courtesy of 
representational re-coding one can compress that array into an item whose content 
corresponds to an abstract property. The item can be stored in memory and retrieved 
for further processing without the need to store and retrieve all of the diverse 
perceptual inputs underlying it. Before the throw-in under those circumstances the 
player’s sensitivity to such properties as “fair-play” is important to explain his 
behaviour. Such sensitivity depends on representational re-coding. Since the idea of 
internal representation is essential to this kind of re-coding, it follows that the idea of 
internal representation is essential to explaining the player’s behaviour. The problem 
domain that our football player faces is an instance of “representational-hungry” 
problem. 
 If my accounts of the Trust Game and of two social norms of fair-play in 
football are correct, then paradigm cases of social norm compliance consist in 
behaviour in “representational-hungry” problem domains (P2). It follows from the 
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argument stated at the beginning of this section that internal representations give us 
unique explanatory leverage regarding paradigm cases of social norm compliance. 
 
4. Representational-Hungry? On Dreyfus’s Anti-Representationalist 
Contrary to what I just argued, according to Hubert Dreyfus, paradigm cases of 
social norm compliance do not consist in behaviour in “representational-hungry” 
problem domains. 
 Dreyfus claims that “some central cases of intelligent behavior do not involve 
mental representation” (Dreyfus 2002b, p. 414). And social norm compliance, most 
of the time, falls among those “central cases of intelligent behaviour.” Paradigmatic 
cases of social norm compliance, for Dreyfus, consist in non-representational hungry 
behaviour. If Dreyfus is right, then the argument laid down in section 3.1 is unsound. 
 Dreyfus (Ibid., p. 417-418) asks us to consider a situation in the elevator. The 
elevator stops at the seventh floor and two people step in. The people already in the 
elevator shuffle and move around until they are at appropriate distance from the 
others. This is a paradigmatic case of social norm compliance. According to Dreyfus, 
the situation just described is not hungry for representation. Rather, it is an instance 
of “skillful coping” which amounts to a spontaneous responsiveness to the demands 
of a situation. Skillful coping does not require either deliberation or attention, and 
importantly does not involve the representation of goals. If norm compliance is 
typically an instance of “absorbed skillful coping,” then we need and should not 
explain norm compliance with recourse to representations. 
 Dreyfus draws on Merleau-Ponty’s work to account for paradigm cases of 
norm compliance in terms of the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve maximal 
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grip. In order to give flesh to these two notions, he borrows from certain features of 
neural networks modelling and from Walter Freeman’s (1991) attractor theory of the 
brain dynamics underlying perception and action. For Dreyfus, “neural networks 
exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc,” and Freeman’s account 
might underlie maximal grip (Dreyfus 2002a, p. 413). The resulting explanatory 
framework is one where representation plays no role. 
 Dreyfus’s argument assumes a particular concept of representation, which is 
not the one I put forward. Now, after having introduced the notions of the intentional 
arc and of maximal grip, I explain why representational hungry domains need not 
involve representations as conceived of by Dreyfus. 
 
4.1 Representations After All? 
“The intentional arc—Dreyfus explains—names the tight connection between body 
and world” (2002a, p. 367). The intentional arc describes a relationship between 
agent’s skills and the world: when agents acquire a skill, becoming experts in doing 
something, the skill manifests itself spontaneously given certain solicitations of a 
situation. The intentional arc does not depend on representations stored in the head: 
skills underlain by the intentional arc are finer and finer dispositions to respond to 
cues in the world. This kind of body-world relationship grows via extensive 
interaction with other agents and by “dealing with things and situations.” 
 “Maximal grip names the body’s tendency to respond to these solicitations in 
such a way as to bring the current situation closer to the agent’s sense of an optimal 
gestalt” (Ibid., pp. 367-368). Maximal grip describes the process whereby the agent 
comes to “see” how to be drawn by environmental solicitations to realize a particular 
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goal without representing the goal. Dreyfus argues that the way neural networks 
learn vindicates the notion of intentional arc, and that Freeman’s attractor theory 
might be one way to flesh out the sub-personal mechanism of getting a maximal grip 
on a situation. 
 Dreyfus’s reliance on neural networks and dynamical system theory is 
indicative of how he conceives of representation. Dreyfus associates the notion of 
representation with the “classicist” idea of strings of symbols tokened in a system, 
which are isomorphic to propositional attitudes (e.g. Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; 
Newell and Simon 1972). But such data structures are only one way of understanding 
representation. Representational hungry problem domains need not require this type 
of data structure. 
 Both connectionists and Freeman (1991) speak in fact of representations 
although they don’t have in mind the classicist notion. Andy Clark (2002b) 
commenting on Dreyfus raises exactly this worry: attractor states in dynamical 
systems and high-dimensional weight spaces of neural networks can be understood 
“as new powerful kinds of internal representations” (p. 386). The way I characterized 
neural representations in terms of encoding-decoding mappings fits with the way 
neural networks learn and with the way brain uses attractors. If this is so, then social 
situations like the one in the elevator described by Dreyfus can still be hungry for 
representations, although non-classicist representations. In order to establish this 
point, I consider Dreyfus’s response to Clark’s worry. 
 Dreyfus (2002b) has two complaints. He claims that the use of representation 
in neural networks and dynamical system theory is unwarranted. In those contexts 
the notion of representation is too weak “to do the job of showing that particular 
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brain states are correlated with particular items in the world, let alone that they have 
content, that is, that they represent such particular items under an aspect” (p. 420). 
The first complaint has to do with the quality of the correlation between neural 
activation and physical features in the world. The second has to do with how neural 
activations can represent external stimuli under an aspect—e.g. seeing a carrot under 
the aspect nourishment. 
 A characterization of neural representation in terms of encoding-decoding 
provides us with an answer to Dreyfus’s first concern. The input to a neural network 
is encoded by a certain pattern of activation. From a given neural activation, the 
system decodes information about the input. Although neural networks do not store 
particular rules for dealing with particular inputs, they give the same or similar 
outputs to same or similar inputs after training. Encoding-decoding mappings can be 
formalized as probability distributions, which can reliably specify correlations 
between particular neural activations and particular physical features in the world. 
Hence, the notion of representation I put forward is strong enough “to show that 
particular brain states are correlated with particular items in the world” (Ibid.). The 
same argument applies in the context of brain dynamics. 
 Dreyfus (2002b, p. 420) recognizes that Freeman himself claims that the brain 
uses attractors to represent causes in the sensorium (but see Freeman and Skarda 
1990). Dreyfus, however, asks us to resist representation-talk in this case. He points 
out that “when the rabbit smells and successfully eats a carrot, it forms a new 
attractor, and that attractor, in an appropriate context, will henceforth cause the rabbit 
to go for a carrot, this is just a complex physical event” (Ibid.). But here Dreyfus is 
describing an example where a particular brain state may be correlated with a 
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particular feature of the world. At a minimum, the attractor in the rabbit’s brain is 
capable to stand-in for the carrot, say when the carrot is not here and now, the rabbit 
is hungry and is directed towards carrots. In light of this, “[w]hat makes one want to 
use representation talk” is not as Dreyfus’s claim “that the complex event of the 
system relaxing into an attractor basin is isomorphic with the agent’s experience of 
being drawn towards an equilibrium” (Ibid.). Rather, it is the fact that appeal to 
representation is justified, minimally, when an entity stands-in for some possible 
state of affairs. Since the attractor in the rabbit’s brain stands-in for the carrot and is 
consumed by the system via decoding processes, we want to use representation talk 
also in the context of systems dynamics. 
 Dreyfus’s second complaint has to do with content. He wonders how 
representations in neural networks and system dynamics can represent “particular 
items under an aspect.” For example, can the attractor in the rabbit’s brain represent 
carrots under the aspect nourishment? Understanding neural representations as 
encoding-decoding mappings suggests one way in which the attractor in the rabbit’s 
brain does represent carrots as nourishment. Decoding determines the relevance of 
the encoding for the system. It specifies how neural activations are used by the 
system to produce behaviour. Particular activations decode certain features of the 
world in a larger system of encodings and decodings. Within this larger system, 
along an encoding-decoding cascade the representation of the carrot is probably 
associated with the representation of a high-level property like nourishment. 
Properties such as edible and dangerous may also be encoded in neural activity. 
Encodings of such properties might depend on encodings-decodings of “low-level” 
properties like “displacement,” “mass,” and “orientation” (Eliasmith 2003, p. 502). 
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There is no reason why the attractor in the rabbit’s brain cannot represent carrots 
under the aspect nourishment. Representation as encoding-decoding, therefore, might 
also do the job of showing that particular items are represented under an aspect. 
 Dreyfus has not established that the mechanisms that might underlie the 
intentional arc and maximal grip are representation-free. Even if the intentional arc 
and maximal grip are in place in situations where people comply with norms, those 
situations can still be representational-hungry. Let me expand on this point by 
reconsidering the situation in the elevator where a person steps in. 
 
4.2 Shuffling in the Elevator. Systemic Dynamics and Causal Couplings 
Why do people in the elevator shuffle until they get to an appropriate distance? For 
Dreyfus this is an example of “spontaneous absorbed coping.” Dreyfus’s explanation 
is that after repeated interaction with others in elevators, people have acquired a 
disposition to respond to the solicitations of that kind of situations by getting to an 
appropriate distance. Nobody can specify that distance. Nobody is trying to get to 
that distance. People in the elevator are drawn to get there by responding to the 
whole [elevator-person A-person B- person C- etc] situation. They do not respond to 
particular features. They do not represent the person who is stepping in as a separate 
feature of the situation. “The embodied agent—Dreyfus explains (2002b, p. 420)—
doesn’t think of doing what is solicited either. He just let himself be drawn to lower a 
tension and straightway finds his body doing what feels appropriate, without needing 
to, or being able to, represent some desired goal.” Dreyfus’s explanation is couched 
in terms of a perception-based fine-grained disposition in an extended body-
environment system. This explanatory framework has two features: (i) embodied 
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agents respond to the whole situation, (ii) embodied agents coping with their 
situation do not have any representation of their goal. 
 The main motivation for (i) is causal coupling. That agents are coupled with 
their surroundings means that the agents continuously both affect and are affected by 
what surrounds them. Coupling is usually taken as reason in support of the 
arbitrariness of distinguishing brain-centered cognitive systems from the 
environment where they are embedded (Beer 2008). Causal coupling would 
constitute a reason to doubt that the situation in the elevator is representational-
hungry. 
 To understand the interactive complexity underlying skilful coping—runs 
Dreyfus’s argument—we should adopt a “wholist” perspective. According to this 
argument, the situation in the elevator is best explained in terms of dynamics of the 
whole system [elevator-person A stepping in-other persons in the elevator] evolving 
towards an adaptive equilibrium. The bottom line is that paradigmatic cases of norm 
compliance may not involve either a behavioural or a neural ability, but systemic 
dynamics. If they essentially involve systemic dynamics, then it is mistaken to view 
such situations as involving specific representational components. 
 However, in cases of skillful coping we still have good, independent reason to 
ask about information-processing components representing specific features of a 
situation. A brain mechanism underlying the capacity to respond to certain external 
solicitations—e.g. a person stepping in the elevator—is taken to be coupled to the 
whole body-environment because we have a representational pre-understanding of its 
role: we have a pre-understanding of the type of information the mechanism could 
carry and manipulate. Without this kind of understanding it would be problematic to 
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identify where to apply the dynamicist analysis—whether at the level of brain-body-
environment system, or of body-neuromechanical interactions, or neural interactions. 
For there wouldn’t be an independent rationale to understanding why we should 
(de)couple possible components of the system in certain ways rather than others. 
 The second feature of Dreyfus’s account of the elevator case is (ii) that the 
embodied agent coping with her situation does not have any representation of her 
goal. Dreyfus starts with a puzzle. During skill-acquisition agents modify their 
behaviour in function of their results. When the action results in a failure, then 
something needs to be revised. But in order to adjust one’s behaviour in function of 
failure and success, some representation of a goal seems to be necessary. Such a 
representation specifies a target-state that determines appropriate adjustment in the 
agent’s behaviour. If this is so, then it seems that all skilful action requires goal-
representation. If one is acting skillfully, then there is something she is trying to do. 
If there is something she is trying to do, then she is pursuing a goal. Therefore, goal-
representations seem to be necessary for skillful action. 
 Dreyfus resolves the puzzle by rejecting the first conditional. It is not always 
the case that if one is acting skillfully, there is something she is trying to do. As 
mentioned above, Dreyfus claims that “[i]n general, we don’t have to try to comport 
ourselves in socially acceptable ways” (Dreyfus 2002b, p. 418). His argument is that 
we experience such kinds of situations “as drawing the movements out of us” 
(Dreyfus 2002a, p. 380). In “the experience of acting” the direction of causation is 
not from a represented goal to the world. It is the world itself that initiates certain of 
our bodily movements drawing us towards appropriate actions: No goal-state is 
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pursued in norm compliance. Success in complying with a social norm is assessed as 
experience of optimal gestalt. 
 In essence, Dreyfus’s argument is this: For some skillful action like some 
cases of norm compliance we experience the situation as drawing the appropriate 
action out of us. If this is so, then for some skillful action we do not experience our 
goals as causing our action. We experience that the direction of causation goes from 
the situation to the action itself. Hence we do not experience our goals. Therefore, 
the representation of goals is not involved in some skillful actions like certain 
instances of norm compliance. 
 I think this argument is a non-sequitur. Assume that we do not experience 
norm compliance as caused by the pursuit of a goal. Assume also that sometimes we 
cannot formulate the goal that we may pursue in certain contexts. For example, we 
cannot tell what is the socially appropriate distance to maintain in an elevator. From 
these, it does not follow that the representation of a goal is not involved in norm-
compliance. It only follows that the representation of a goal in certain instances of 
norm compliance is not explicit and conscious. In such cases, the representation of 
the goal may be tacit, unconscious, or dispositional as characterized in Section 1. 
 The explanatory leverage given by goal-representations in the case of norm 
compliance has to do with both the anticipatory and evaluative nature of goals. On 
the one hand, goals indicate potential future states of affairs towards which we are 
driven. They govern our behaviour towards the realization of that state. On the other 
hand, goals indicate valuable states of affairs. They allow us to evaluate the current 
state of affairs in function of the target-state. When a person steps in a crowded 
elevator, goal-representations provide us with a natural explanation of why people 
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start to shuffle until they reach a certain position. Each agent may have the goal of 
keeping a socially appropriate distance from the others. The current state is 
confronted with that goal. If the state fails to fit the goal, a prediction-error ensues 
and some adjustment is required. The goal-representation enables the agent both to 
anticipate what might happen if the target state fails to be reached and to evaluate 
that certain possible states are “bad” whereas others are “good.” 
 
5. Explanatory Virtues of Neural Representations 
Ramsey (2007) argues that it is always possible to treat a system as representational, 
but it is never necessary. Ramsey puts forward the challenge to specify what the 
positing of representations could give us in terms of non-trivial explanatory 
purchase. I now address this challenge by comparing representationalism with 
dispositionalism and focusing on the manipulation and control afforded by neural 
representations over behaviour. 
 Suppose that dispositionalism is the right way to think about belief and 
desire. Suppose that beliefs and desires understood as behavioural dispositions enter 
an explanatory, causal relationship with norm compliance behaviour. What is the 
type of control and manipulations of norm compliance behaviour that such a 
relationship can facilitate? To what extent understanding beliefs and desires as 
behavioural dispositions facilitates us to control, manipulate, and predict norm 
compliance? 
 There are two distinct questions here. The first has to do with metaphysics 
and asks whether beliefs as behavioural dispositions can be causes. The second has 
to do with explanation and asks whether beliefs understood as behavioural 
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dispositions carry extra explanatory value in a complete causal explanation of norm-
compliance behaviour. After some brief considerations on the first issue, my focus 
will be on the second question which is related to Ramsey’s challenge. 
 
5.1 Dispositions as Causes? 
Let’s distinguish between dispositions and their categorical bases. Fragility, 
irascibility, and perhaps expectations are examples of dispositions. The categorical 
basis of the fragility of a glass is its physico-chemical structure. If expectations are 
dispositions, then their categorical bases are certain brain states. Granted such a 
distinction, the argument for why dispositions cannot cause behaviour is analogous 
to Kim’s causal exclusion argument about mental causation (Kim 1998). If all 
physical effects have sufficient physical causes and no physical effects are caused 
twice (that is, there are no overdetermining causes) by distinct categorical and 
dispositional causes, then there cannot be dispositional causes. 
 Pursuing this line of argument, Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982) argued 
that dispositions do nothing. It is the categorical basis of a disposition that causes 
things. If this argument is sound and if beliefs are just dispositions, then beliefs do 
nothing. In one note Schwitzgebel (2002, note 18, p. 273)—who describes and 
defends a dispositional account of belief—acknowledges that one may be concerned 
that a dispositionalist view “doesn’t allow for beliefs to cause behaviour.” He 
suggests that one way to deal with the problem is to identify “believing with being in 
a certain categorical state.” Hence belief would cause behaviour. However, by 
following this strategy, it seems that believing will have more to do with having the 
right kind of internal categorical basis than with being disposed to do certain kinds of 
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things. Still, even if dispositions are not causes, and hence beliefs understood as 
dispositions are not causes, it does not follow that beliefs as dispositions would not 
give us some leverage in causal explanations. 
 
5.2 Manipulation and Control. Representations’ Explanatory Purchase 
There is good evidence that social norm compliance can be affected by what an agent 
expects others would do in a similar situation. An agent’s tendency towards norm 
compliance is also affected by other kinds of expectations: by what one believes 
others think she ought to do in that type of situation. Agents’ beliefs and expectations 
in some social situation can be manipulated by providing them with information 
about other agents’ judgements and behaviour in the same type of situation. By 
manipulating their beliefs and expectations, agents’ tendency to comply with a given 
norm in that situation can change (e.g. Bicchieri and Xiao 2009). 
 Assume that belief and preference are just dispositions to behave in certain 
ways under appropriate circumstances. Suppose that in a Trust Game the information 
provided to the players causally affect their disposition to reciprocate. Since 
preferences are dependent on beliefs in Ray et al.’s (2009) model3 (recall that in their 
model beliefs about your type influences my preferences about payoffs in the game), 
the provision of a certain type of information about the type of trustee causes the 
investor to be disposed to prefer, for example, to invest nothing. The investor’s 
beliefs are manipulated by the provision of a certain type of information, which 
affects the investor’s preferences about payoffs. If to prefer something to something 
                                                 
3 Also in Bicchieri’s (2006) account of norm compliance preferences are dependent on beliefs. On her 
model, an agent’s preferences are conditional on his or her own beliefs regarding other people’s 




else is just the disposition to do what realizes the former thing rather than the latter, 
we should say that information about the trustee’s type causes the investor “to be 
disposed to have a disposition” to invest nothing. This last expression sounds 
strange, as it seems that one cannot be “disposed to have a disposition.” But on a 
dispositionalist understanding of beliefs and preferences that is the way we should 
explain the investor’s decision to invest nothing under certain circumstances. The 
investor’s preferences would be second-order mental states elicited by beliefs. Here 
is a possible explanation of the investor’s behaviour. 
 The investor prefers to invest nothing in the game because she expects that 
the trustee will not reciprocate. She expects that the trustee will not reciprocate 
because she has received a certain type of information about her type. The ‘because’ 
is causal in both statements. The first ‘because’ connects two dispositions: an 
expectation and a preference. The second connects a type of disposition viz. an 
expectation, and a piece of information. In the second statement we can individuate 
the cause as a physical process viz. the transmission of messages about the trustee’s 
history of plays. This way of individuating the cause enables us to manipulate it: for 
example we can destroy the message before it reaches the investor or we can modify 
it by adding noise. 
 There are two questions that this explanation leaves unanswered. Why, or in 
virtue of what, does that message about the history of the game cause the investor to 
have a certain expectation? Why, or in virtue of what, does the expectation cause the 
investor to have a certain preference? The answers to these questions are important if 
we want to intervene causally on the investor’s expectations and preferences. 
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 To make the point stick, think about this question: “Why did your mug break 
when Courtney dropped it?” You can answer: “Because it was fragile and Courtney 
dropped it.” The problem with this explanation is analogous to that of the 
explanation above: it doesn’t tell us what we should do if we wanted to prevent the 
mug from breaking when dropped. It doesn’t facilitate us to individuate how we 
should intervene if we wanted to manipulate or control the effects of dropping the 
mug. Another possible answer to the question above is: “The mug broke because it 
has such and such atomic structure and Courtney dropped it.” This explanation 
places us in a better position to manipulate and control the effects of dropping the 
mug. For example, we can manipulate the atomic structure of the mug in order to 
control the effects of dropping the mug. There is no appeal to fragility here. Still we 
have provided a satisfactory explanation that can also facilitate manipulations and 
predictions regarding the behaviour of the mug. 
 It may be complained that routinely when ordinary people wish to control the 
effects of dropping a mug they intervene on fragility by protecting the mug with 
some packaging material. People don’t intervene on its micro-structure. Hence, when 
it comes to intervention the disposition-free explanation given above is irrelevant. 
This complaint, however, is misguided. 
 Mugs and other fragile objects are ordinarily protected with packaging 
material when they are shipped or transported. Under those circumstances we cannot 
use mugs as drinking cups. We have to unwrap them to use them as drinking cups. 
Mugs routinely break when they are used as drinking cups. Thus, if we intervene on 
the fragility of the cup by wrapping it with packaging material, the mug is useless as 
a drinking cup. That kind of intervention would prevent us from using the mug as a 
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mug. Instead, by intervening directly on the micro-structure of mugs, not only they 
could be shipped safely, they could also be used as drinking cups. The bottom line is 
that by explaining something we want to understand mechanisms. One of the reasons 
we want to understand mechanisms is that we should intervene on mechanisms, if we 
wish to control and manipulate effectively certain phenomena. 
 We ascribe dispositions as global properties of a whole system. So, the 
fragility of a glass is not localized in any distinct part of the glass. A glass is fragile 
throughout all its parts. The atomic microstructure of the glass instead can be 
inhomogeneous. It is because of the microstructure of the glass that we can say that 
the stem of a wine glass is more fragile than the bowl. By individuating where the 
glass has a certain structure, we can say that that part is more fragile than another and 
we can intervene locally on that part. To say that beliefs and desires are global 
dispositions of a whole system our belief-desire explanations would not facilitate us 
to identify where we should intervene in a cognitive system to make a difference in 
its behaviour. This is not to claim that beliefs and desires must be localized in some 
particular part of the system. To have a belief or a desire is to have some neural 
representation which typically arises from the activity of distributed, and yet 
identifiable, populations of neurons. 
 If we wanted to intervene causally on an agent’s mental states, would an 
explanation couched in terms of neural representations be a better guide than an 
explanation couched in terms of dispositions? Ray and colleagues’ case helps us 
answer this question in an affirmative way. The social utility function that they 
implemented represents the agent’s mental states in a way that “mandate probing, 
belief manipulation and the like” (Ray et al. 2009). An explanation couched in terms 
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of dispositions has difficulties, in comparison to an explanation couched in terms of 
neural representations, to provide us with an answer to the question why, or in virtue 
of what, a player manipulates another player’s beliefs. The ‘why’ here is causal. An 
answer to this question will enable us to individuate where and how to intervene to 
cause certain effects. 
 Suppose that two human subjects are playing a Trust Game. Some neural 
representations encode preferences in the form of utility (or value) signals. Other 
neural representations encode beliefs; neural computations might underlie belief-
dynamics in the form of inferential schemes embedded in a generative model. 
Assume that we appeal to these neural representations to explain why a player is 
playing fair. The two separate signals of utility and inference in the algorithm 
underlying Ray and colleagues’ model map onto the activity of identifiable neural 
populations. Suppose that Ray and colleagues’ model enables us to estimate in real 
time brain activity and to decode the information therein represented. The 
information encoded in neural representations can then be extracted and manipulated 
by altering some parameters of the algorithm carried out by the system. After 
manipulation the information can be fed back to the players’ brain courtesy of 
appropriate techniques. If successful, the manipulation would lead to changes in 
brain activity and behaviour. 
 Research in computational neuroscience and brain machine interface is 
beginning to make the scenario just described less science fiction than it can seem. 
Kawato (2008a) illustrates how the combination of computational models, brain-
network interfaces –which non-invasively estimate neural activity and read out the 
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information carried by neural activity—and decoding algorithms can foster what he 
calls manipulative neuroscience. 
 Kawato (2008b) reports on a project where a monkey’s brain activity could 
control a humanoid robot across the Pacific Ocean. In this project the pattern of 
activity of certain populations of neurons encoded in a monkey’s motor cortex were 
recorded while the monkey was engaging in a motor task in a lab in the United 
States. The kinematic features of the monkey’s motions were decoded from neural 
firing rates and sent via an internet connection in real time to a robot located in 
Japan. Courtesy of this signal, the robot could execute locomotion-like movements 
similar to those performed by the monkey. Another instance of manipulative 
neuroscience is the remote radio control of insect flight. Sato and Maharbiz (2010) 
review studies where insects in free flight are controlled courtesy of implantable 
interfaces. Courtesy of an implant for neural stimulation of an insect’s brain coupled 
with low power radio systems, the insect can be put into motion, stopped and 
controlled while it is in flight. In light of this type of research, manipulative 
neuroscience “has already moved beyond mere science-fiction fantasy in the domain 
of sensory reconstruction and central control repair as exemplified by artificial 
cochlear and deep brain stimulation” (Kawato 2008b, p. 139). It does not seem to be 
a mere whim of fantasy to expect that non-trivial choice behaviour in social contexts 
might be manipulated in similar ways. One of the reasons behind this type of 
research is to show that we do understand some aspects of behaviour well enough to 
carefully manipulate it. 
 The notion of a neural representation, it seems, yields non-trivial 
understanding here. To begin with, if behaviour depends on generative models, then 
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agents rely on assumptions—that is, on representations—about how cues concerning 
e.g. other agents’ types and decisions are generated. Agents transform these 
assumptions so as to determine which behaviour they should implement if they want 
to behave adaptively. For example, if the goal of the nervous system of agents 
playing the Trust game is to estimate the hidden variable “opponent’s type,” then, 
assuming that a particular opponent’s type generated the observed cues, the agent has 
to invert her generative model, and estimate the hidden variable other player’s type 
by combining the cues she observed. 
 Secondly, all the successful cases of manipulative neuroscience involve some 
aspect of the notion of a neural representation. Manipulations and control of agents’ 
behaviour, in fact, leverages encoding-decoding mappings between a neural alphabet 
and a physical alphabet. Identification of neural representations enables one to 
dissect them into components at lower-levels or to recombine them in ways sensitive 
to the information they carry. Furthermore, identification of neural representations 
could facilitate us to guide agents’ behaviour in the absence of the properties those 
representations are about. The notion of a neural representation, therefore, seems to 
be necessary to all successful cases of manipulative neuroscience. 
 Explanations of norm compliance couched in terms of neural representations, 
in comparison to explanations couched in terms of dispositions, may facilitate the 
direct manipulation of information carried by neural activity. They may provide 
information about where one should intervene in order to cause certain effects. 
Although the appeal to neural representation may lead one to think that the only 
types of manipulation facilitated by this framework are neurobiological, this is not 
the case. Emphasis is put on the informational content of neural activation. If we had 
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a better understanding of the precise nature of the neural code, there would be more 
reliable grounds to identify what kind of information causes certain changes in neural 
activations, which ultimately causes one to comply with a norm. 
 
Conclusion 
In so far as computationalism is bound up with representation, this chapter has 
provided independent reason in support of a neurocomputational approach to 
explanation of norm compliance. After having distinguished between 
dispositionalism and representationalism as ways to understand what it is to have a 
belief or a preference, the chapter has argued that the explanation of paradigmatic 
cases of norm compliance requires the appeal to neural representations. Furthermore, 
if we wish to control and manipulate effectively behaviours like norm compliance, 








On the Representational Format of Social Norms: A Map 
If the mechanism of norm compliance implements inductive inferences and deals 
with representations, then a question to be addressed for a Bayesian-RL model of 
norm compliance is this: What is the format of the background knowledge4 that 
supports such inferences? This chapter explores this issue. Specifically, it addresses 
how social representations, on which norm compliance would depend, could be 
stored in memory. This topic is important because a thorough assessment of 
arguments for or against a given account of the mechanism of social norm 
compliance requires that we have some grip on the representational format in which 
social representations could be stored in memory. 
 The aims of this chapter are neither to develop a theory of concepts nor to 
explain how exactly the content and identity of social representation are fixed. Some 
of the studies I consider appeal to the notion of “concept” (Murphy 2002 provides a 
review on the psychology of concepts), but I do not appeal to such a notion. I limit 
myself to the notion of a social (neural) representation as characterized in Chapters 1 
and 2. This is because the appeal to the notion of “concept” may engender confusion 
and give rise to problematic issues, like the issue of content invariance, which go 
beyond my aims here. 
 The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, the chapter aims at drawing a map 
of the main options for the format of social representations. Second, starting from the 
assumption that social representations need not be in one single format, the chapter 
urges that a probabilistic approach to social cognition is especially fruitful for 
                                                 
4  My use of ‘knowledge’ here is akin to the cognitive scientists’ use, as “body of information.” This 
use is noncommittal to truth or justification. 
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evaluating proposals about the different forms that social knowledge can take across 
different domains and tasks. 
 The chapter is in three sections. The first section begins by focusing on one of 
the functions of social representations, namely: categorization. The cognitive science 
of categorization will help me to sketch a map of the main possibilities to account for 
how social representations may be stored. 
 Note that I do not consider the view that social representations are stored as 
rules in a sentence-like format possibly regimented with deontic logic. This is for 
two reasons. First, the relationships between social norm compliance and linguaform 
rules will be considered in Chapters 4 and 5. Second, philosophers have lavished a 
great deal of attention on the relationship between rules and moral thought, while 
they have overlooked other possible formats in which moral knowledge can be 
represented (Stich 1993). Here, I consider three such alternative formats: prototypes, 
exemplars and scripts (for a similar, more nuanced map of “concepts” see Machery 
2009, Ch. 5). 
 The second section draws some of the empirical consequences of each 
alternative, and motivates what type of evidence could count for or against them. 
Although I don’t assess the evidence in greater detail, the last section notes that much 
of the contemporary research in the cognitive science of categorization assumes that 
there is telling evidence that we use representations stored in multiple formats. 
 Starting from this assumption—namely that social knowledge relevant to 
social norm compliance may well be stored in multiple representational formats—the 
last section presents a general probabilistic approach that can be useful to explore 
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how inductive inferences underlying social categorization and norm compliance can 
draw on knowledge in multiple formats. 
 
1. How Can Social Representations Be Stored? Three Formats 
The Godfather (1972, directed by Francis Ford Coppola) opens with a puzzling 
situation. Don Vito Corleone (Marlon Brando) is listening to pleas for favors in his 
office, while guests are celebrating his daughter’s wedding reception in the sunny 
outdoor veranda. Don Vito’s behaviour can appear to be socially inappropriate: Why 
is he not partying with her daughter and the other guests? Tom Hagen (Robert 
Duvall), family lawyer and Don Vito’s “consigliere,” explains: “It’s part of the 
wedding. No Sicilian can refuse any request on his daughter’s wedding day.” Tom 
appeals to a social norm in order to explain Don Vito’s behaviour. 
 Don Vito’s case illustrates one interesting aspect of social norms. In order to 
make sense of a social situation so that we can see what type of behaviour is 
appropriate or inappropriate in it, we rely on categorization. The activation of social 
norms requires that we categorize events, individuals, and objects in some specific 
ways. To make sense of Don Vito’s behaviour, a social situation has to be 
understood as a wedding reception, Don Vito must be seen as a Sicilian “padrino” 
(as a Sicilian godfather), and so forth. 
 Categorization can employ social representations. Social representations 
function as categorization devices by enabling the agent who possesses them to 
assign instances of events, individuals, objects and situations to their categories, and 
to make inferences about newly encountered events, individuals, objects and 
situations on the basis of stored knowledge about those categories. In what follows 
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the expressions ‘social representations’ and ‘categorical knowledge underlying norm 
compliance’ are used interchangeably. 
 The problem of categorization is to classify an item (e.g. some event, 
individual or object) as belonging to a particular category. Categories are knowledge 
structures corresponding to non-arbitrary classes of events, individuals or objects. 
This classification can be used in different ways for different purposes. Drawing 
upon our categorization of an item as belonging to a certain category, we can infer, 
for example, unobserved properties of the item based on common properties within 
the category. Socially appropriate behaviour requires an ability to learn social 
categories and to use them correctly across situations. By relying on our categories 
and categorization, we can recognize that a situation is such that it calls for certain 
actions rather than others—e.g. to kiss a Sicilian padrino’s hand after a meeting; not 
to kiss your teacher after class. 
 Categorization can in general be thought as two-step process. For some item 
and some set of categories, the similarity of the item to each category is firstly 
computed. Then, these similarity ratings are transformed to determine the category to 
which the item belongs. “In general, a model of categorization specifies three things: 
(1) the content and format of the internal categorical knowledge representation, (2) 
the process of matching a to-be-classified stimulus to that knowledge, and (3) a 
process of selecting a category based on the results of the matching process” 
(Kruschke 2008a, p. 269). 
 The focus here is (1): what is the format, or formats, of the categorical 
knowledge representations underlying social norm compliance? I begin to tackle this 





Exemplars are bodies of knowledge about individual members of a category (Medin 
and Schaffer 1978). The wedding of Don Vito’s daughter is an exemplar of the 
category “Sicilian wedding.” Exemplars correspond to particular, actually 
experienced instances which we recall when we need to classify a novel item. Thus if 
we rely on exemplars to categorize Don Vito as a Sicilian “padrino,” we retrieve the 
features of particular people we have encountered in the same type of situation, and 
compute for each person his similarity to Don Vito. I now consider how we come to 
acquire and use exemplars when we comply with a social norm by presenting 
Sripada and Stich’s (2006) suggestion that norms may be stored as exemplars. 
 
1.1.1 Sripada & Stich on Social Exemplars 
Sripada and Stich (2006) suggest that social knowledge may be stored as exemplars. 
Norm compliance would depend on the representations of particular cases of norm 
abidance and norm breaking behaviour. These representations would contain 
contextual information about particular people behaving in situations at a given place 
and time. 
 On this account, when we face a new social situation—say the wedding of 
Don Vito Corleone’s daughter—we judge which behaviour is (in)appropriate by 
retrieving stored wedding-exemplars—say your schoolmate’s wedding in Vegas, 
Diana and Prince Charles’s wedding, your Italian cousin’s wedding, and so forth—
and by evaluating their similarity to the current instance. If the current situation is 
mostly similar to a stored exemplar where behaviour of type A is inappropriate, then 
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the current instance of A is likely to be judged to be inappropriate in the situation at 
hand. 
 People may search exhaustively through all their stored relevant exemplars 
and compare each of them to the behaviour to be evaluated. There may be no 
constraint on the exemplars-space to be searched: People would search and evaluate 
all of their stored exemplars in judging whether certain behaviour is appropriate in 
the current social situation. More plausibly, the set of exemplars taken into 
consideration may be constrained. One’s cognitive and emotional history may prime 
a certain subset of stored exemplars which are used to categorize a new social 
situation and to generate judgements about which behaviour is appropriate. In fact 
we tend to recall more easily the first or the last few exemplars of a category we have 
encountered; emotionally charged exemplars are likely to be recalled more often, 
vividly and with more details than emotionally-neutral exemplars. As Sripada and 
Stich (2006, sec. 5.3) surmise, people may make different judgements about the same 
type of situation on different occasions in function of the subset of their stored 
exemplars primed by current circumstances and their cognitive and emotional 
history. 
 Sripada and Stich’s (2006) acknowledge that their proposal is not backed by 
telling evidence. The type of argument in support of their suggestion is similar to the 
one sketched by Stich (1993). It has the form of an inference to the best explanation: 
Were social knowledge concerning norms stored as exemplars instead of tacitly 
known rules, some facts about social normativity would be plausibly explained. Stich 
(1993) indicates a number of explanatory payoffs that an exemplars-based account of 
social knowledge would have. 
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 If social representations consist of clusters of stored exemplars, then the fact 
that some instances of social situations are easier to categorize and easier to recall 
would be easily explained because exemplar-based categorization is sensitive to 
situational factors that may prime one or another stored exemplar. Such sensitivity 
would also explain much of the variability of normative judgements concerning 
appropriate behaviour in a given situation. The same type of behaviour in the same 
type of situation can be judged differently in function of the subset of exemplars 
more vivid in memory and easier to retrieve. Finally, Stich (1993) emphasizes the 
pedagogical importance of myths, parables and fables. If the preferred format in 
which our social representations are stored is that of exemplars, then social and 
moral knowledge cast in the form of rules may be ineffective since social 
representations in this format would not be easy to build and use. Fables, stories and 
myths, instead, would be particularly effective, since they would furnish our memory 
with a rich stock of social and moral exemplars which can be more readily used to 
judge and act appropriately in new social situations. 
 Sripada and Stich (2006) leave open the (likely) possibility that people use a 
variety of representational formats to store and recall knowledge important to 
categorize new social situations and comply with social norms. Social prototypes, 
exemplars, theories and narratives might be activated in function of different 
contexts. For example, Sripada and Stich speculate, exemplar-based processes might 
be primarily involved for categorization of socially appropriate behaviour “in the 
context of day-to-day norm-related cognition, especially when such judgement are 





Prototypes are knowledge summaries extracted from information about the 
individual members of a category (Rosch 1978). Such summaries could be bodies of 
statistical knowledge about the features that are typical or diagnostic of events, 
individuals, and objects in a category. They describe a central tendency that can be 
expressed as an average of the category. This average need not correspond to any 
particular actually experienced instance. 
 If we use prototypes when we categorize Don Vito as a Sicilian “padrino,” we 
need not retrieve the features of any particular Sicilian godfather we have ever met. 
We may retrieve instead the standard, average, typical Sicilian godfather and 
compute his similarity to Don Vito. Plausibly, this prototype is the result of an 
average from the sample of all the Sicilian godfathers we have encountered. How 
could we come to acquire and use prototypes when we comply with a social norm? I 
answer this question by considering Paul Churchland’s account of social prototypes. 
 
1.2.1 Churchland on Social Prototypes 
Paul Churchland (1995, Ch. 6; 1998) defends the idea that knowledge of our social 
and moral world is represented as a family of prototypes embodied in the specific 
configurations of the many synaptic connections between neuronal layers. Chapter 5 
will expand on Churchland on moral thought, for the moment let’s focus on his 
argument concerning the representation of social and moral knowledge. On his 
account, social representations are stored as clusters of prototypes that carry 
information about especially typical examples of actions that are required or 
prohibited by the relevant social norm. Churchland makes two claims: first, social 
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and moral knowledge is stored in the nervous system as learned prototypes; second, 
prototypes are vectors (i.e. order sets of numerical values) that describe the structure 
of connections between neurons. 
 One example used by Churchland to explain and support these claims is 
EMPATH: an unsupervised neural network that can recognize emotions from human 
facial expressions (Cottrell and Metcalfe 1991). After a training session where the 
network was presented with twenty pictures of faces each displaying eight different 
emotions (160 pictures of faces in all), EMPATH could develop prototypical patterns 
of activation associated to facial expressions. Drawing on its prototype-style body of 
knowledge, EMPATH could achieve near perfect rate of successful discrimination 
between male and female faces; it could also successfully identify five out of the 
eight types of emotional expression. EMPATH had some limitations as well. In 
particular, its capacity for generalization to new faces was poor. Churchland 
maintains that, all in all, EMPATH provides an “existence proof” that nervous 
systems can learn to generate behaviourally appropriate outputs in social contexts by 
using knowledge stored in a “library of social prototypes” (Churchland 1995, p. 127). 
 Churchland’s connectionist account of social and moral knowledge has a 
number of interesting consequences that can help us to understand to what extent our 
knowledge of social norms is represented in prototypes. First, if we store social 
representations as prototypes, then social learning involves extensive training with 
numerous, distinct situations that display a variety of social features. We acquire 
social prototypes by repeated exposure to and practice with various examples of a 
given category. The training leading to the acquisition of prototypes constitutes a 
learning history which causes internal changes in certain populations of neurons. 
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Learning histories in social environments can in fact cause changes in synaptic 
connectivity between neurons. These changes can consist in the growth of new 
synapses on existing neurons or in chemical alterations in existing synapses. For an 
artificial neural network like EMPATH, the learning history causes particular sets of 
weights between processing units to become more stable. Each set of weights can be 
described with an ordered set of numerical values, that is, as a vector. The values in 
each vector correspond to variable social features; they may correspond, for example, 
to variable features of an action or to variable features of one’s facial expression like 
mouth width, eyebrow position, eye gaze direction, and so on. When, as a 
consequence of one’s learning history in a type of social situations, the features 
common to those situations become strongly associated courtesy of the formation of 
mutually excitatory links across some units of the network. The connection weights 
between these units tend to be stronger and encode specific, more stable values. The 
weight structure of the net thus becomes a background condition that enables the 
reliable detection of prototypical social features across situations of that type. Such 
prototypical social features can be used to categorize and to know what to expect 
from future social situations. 
 By categorizing a given social situation as a “tutorial class,” for example, we 
know what to expect from others and what others expect from us. If you mistakenly 
categorize a tutorial class as a “punk concert” and start to scream and to jump up and 
down, the people around may stare at you baffled. 
 Second, social prototypes need not correspond to any particular example of a 
category. When you categorize a social situation by relying on prototypes, the 
specific examples from which the prototypes were extracted need not to be internally 
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represented. During the processes of abstraction and storing over your learning 
history, much of the information concerning specific instances is discarded. A 
“Sicilian wedding party” prototype might include features such as pictures of Saints 
or statues, a lavish feast with one large family, a big meal outdoor, traditional music 
and dancing. It need not contain contextual information about particular people, 
places or times. 
 Third, the processes supporting the encoding of a social prototype are not 
specific to morality or social normativity. The difference between different kinds of 
prototypes depends on the type of set of training instances taken as input by the 
learning network. In the case of social normativity, this set comprises social features, 
whereas in other cases the training instances are purely physical features that may not 
concern any aspect of social behaviour. This suggests that there is no specific 
function computed by the activity of some neural circuit dedicated to the acquisition 
and storage of social knowledge. 
 Fourth, if social normative knowledge is encoded in prototypes, then fables, 
cartoons and parental example play an important causal role in building a stored 
library of “learned prototypes.” Fables, myths, cartoons and daily examples of 
appropriate social behaviour would be our main sources of moral and social 
prototypes. Social education would strongly rely on such sources because our 
cognitive system would be best suited to learn and use information in the form of 
prototypes. 
 Finally, Churchland’s account suggests that socially virtuous people are those 
who possess a bundle of perceptual and behavioural skills. Such skills depend upon 
the acquisition of a rich library of diverse social prototypes which can be used to 
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comprehend one’s and other’s social situation. By relying on their prototypes, 
virtuous people can see the same social situation from different angles, and correctly 
evaluate the appropriateness of different ways to interact with other people. Virtuous 
people, that is, can swiftly and successfully navigate the high-dimensional social 
space by recognizing their and other people’s position in it. Social misbehavior 
instead would primarily depend on a socially deprived or highly biased learning 
history. If the sample of training examples one is exposed to during learning is very 
small or highly skewed, then the resulting library of social prototypes will be 
excessively scant and unvarying. The lack of a rich and diverse library of social 
prototypes may cause a kind of perceptual failure which consists in an incapacity to 
appreciate the full range of dimensions and structure of the social domain. One likely 




Scripts (or schemata) are rich bodies of causal, functional, and nomological 
knowledge about categories of complex situations. Scripts specify sequences of 
events and actions that characterize the typical structure of well-known situations 
such as “a lecture,” “a birthday party,” or “a wedding reception” (Schank and 
Abelson 1977). For example, a script of some wedding reception may consist of a 
rundown of a typical sequence of events like toasting, cheering and dancing; it may 
comprise information about cakes, dresses, music, guests, family and friends. Scripts 
capture background knowledge about a given type of situation, enable us to make 
sense of it and behave appropriately. If we use scripts when we make sense of Don 
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Vito’s behaviour during his daughter’s wedding, then we do not compute a similarity 
rating between the current situation and past situations we have encountered, as we 
would do if we used exemplars or prototypes. The use of scripts relies on pattern 
completion functions. The activation of a subset of a stored pattern of events 
corresponding to a “Sicilian wedding reception” script triggers the filling in or 
completion of the remaining portion of the pattern. More on this in a moment. 
 Scripts appear to be knowledge structures more complex and more 
computationally expensive than exemplars and prototypes. Apart from early script-
based approaches to categorization and knowledge representation (Minsky 1974; 
Schank and Abelson 1977), more recent theories of categorization based on scripts 
have had limited formalization, partly because of the difficulty to formally specify all 
the relevant details of a complex knowledge structure (Kruschke 2008a). 
 Although we may doubt that our cognitive system employs such rich and 
computationally heavy bodies of knowledge, we should consider that scripts or 
schemata need not be explicitly stored neither need they cover all possible 
contingencies of a situation. Scripts can be modelled as knowledge structures 
emergent from the activity of a neural network that responds to the presence or 
absence of relevant microfeatures (Clark 1989, Ch. 5.4). From this perspective, 
“[t]here is no representational object which is a schema. Rather, schemata emerge at 
the moment they are needed from the interaction of large numbers of much simpler 
elements all working in concert with one another” (McClelland, Rumelhart, and the 
PDP Research Group 1986, p. 20). 
 I mentioned that the type of processes underlying the learning and application 
of scripts (or schemata) in neural network involve pattern completion functions. The 
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input pattern in this case spans rundowns of sequences of events instead of simple 
examples. Such sequences of events consist of ordered patterns of microfeatures. 
Given repeated exposure to complex patterns underlying a given type of situation, 
neural networks can learn a schema by settling on certain connectivity weights.  The 
connectivity weights learned by the network are such that they respect as far as 
possible the possible relationships and constraints associated to the ordered 
microfeatures corresponding to the sequence of events. Once a script has been 
learned, the presence or absence of some microfeatures activates a subset of a 
“known” pattern in the network. Such activation can be sufficient for the network to 
fill in or complete the remaining portion of the pattern in a way maximally coherent 
to its connectivity weight structure. Thus the network settles on a particular 
activation pattern from which the properties of the script emerge. Let us now focus 
on how clusters of social representations can be understood as scripts or schemata. 
 
1.3.1 Bicchieri on Scripts and Social Norms 
Bicchieri (2006, p. 96) argues that “social norms are embedded into scripts.” She 
understands schemata and scripts in terms of “theories of the way social situations 
and people work” (p. 81). Such theories enable us to navigate our social world 
because they support inductive inferences and predictions about people’s behaviour. 
 Bicchieri distinguishes categorization from script activation. Categories are 
knowledge structures that contain information about instances of the items of a class 
(e.g. the class of “waitresses”). Categorization, for Bicchieri, activates scripts which 
are knowledge structures that contain information about the attributes and 
relationships among categories (e.g. the script “dinner at a restaurant in Japan”). 
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Knowledge directly relevant to social norm compliance would be stored in scripts or 
schemata that “contain social roles and expected sequences of behaviours that help 
us to behave appropriately (and know what to expect) in specific settings” (p. 82). 
Bicchieri emphasizes that scripts and schemata need not be explicitly stored and need 
not be accessible to consciousness. 
 Like Sripada and Stich (2006), Bicchieri does not provide direct support for 
her claim by drawing on some particular experimental finding. The form of her 
argument is an inference to the best explanation with the following form: There are a 
number of facts related to social normativity. If norms are embedded into scripts, 
then many facts related to social normativity would be explained. Therefore, it is 
plausible that social norms are embedded into scripts. 
 It is noteworthy that while Sripada and Stich point to linguaform rules as 
prima facie rival hypothesis to exemplar-based social representations, Bicchieri does 
not point to any relevant alternative hypothesis to scripts. But the validity of 
inference to the best explanation is sensitive to the pool of explanations under 
consideration. The introduction of some relevant alternative explanation can 
invalidate the validity of a plausible inference to the best explanation even when the 
empirical evidence has remained unchanged. 
 This said, what are the explananda that scripts-based norm compliance would 
explain? Bicchieri singles out at least three explananda. The first fact recalled by 
Bicchieri is the difficulty in defining “general principles of fairness, or justice” (Ibid., 
p. 95). If we reason through schemata and scripts, then it is plausible that the 
meaning of e.g. “fair division” is understood by means of sequences of events in 
familiar situations involving certain divisions of a good. What is taken to be “fair” 
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would depend on knowledge about clusters of categories of particular people, events, 
and objects. Given the variety of the categories activated in a social exchange that we 
describe as “fair,” and given that the particular members of those categories may be 
very different from each other along many dimensions, there may be no context-
invariant features captured by general principles of fairness. 
 For Bicchieri, two other explananda would be explained if social knowledge 
is mainly embedded into scripts: what grounds the projectibility of certain 
behavioural patterns and what it is that confers legitimacy to other people’s 
expectations in certain social interactions (Ibid. 95-6). Consider Don Vito receiving 
pleas for favors in his private office during his daughter’s wedding. Why do his 
guests and his family perceive his behaviour as appropriate and legitimate? Why is 
that behavioural pattern taken to be projectible to future situations? We can answer 
both questions by appealing to scripts and considering that social interactions 
embedded in scripts tend to be regarded as “natural kinds”—classes that represent 
some real distinction in nature and that support inductive inferences. 
 If script-based social interactions are regarded as natural kinds, then scripts 
would ground people’s expectations concerning social situations. We would believe 
and expect certain things in a situation in function of the script we have activated. 
Since social norms, according to Bicchieri, are sets of mutual expectations, when 
particular expectations come to be prompted by the activation of a script, the 
behavioural regularity underlain by those expectations is automatically projected: 
“It’s part of the wedding” explains Tom Hagen. 
 The attribution of legitimacy to the expectations underlying that behaviour 
would also be explained by our propensity to regard scripted social interactions as 
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natural kinds. The existence of a script that represents knowledge about a type of 
situation is the source of legitimacy. If receiving quests for favors during your 
daughter’s wedding is embedded into a script, then the guests will believe it 
legitimate to ask for favors and to obtain them; and they will be angry if their 
expectations are frustrated. 
 
2. Exemplars, Prototypes or Scripts. What Difference Does It Make? 
Do people store social representations in a single format? To address this issue I 
review evidence from the cognitive neuroscience of categorization and category 
learning. Much of the results I present involve non-social, non-moral information. 
This is for two reasons. On the one hand “the empirical study of the representational 
format of norms has barely begun” (Sripada and Stich 2006, p. 293). On the other 
hand, the stimuli used in experimental tasks of categorization and category learning 
often consist of artificial objects characterized only by their perceptual properties. 
This is mainly to control for the effects that knowledge possessed by subjects about a 
domain may have on learning and categorization. 
 
2.1 Category-Learning and Categorization Tasks 
Imagine that you barely know Don Vito Corleone, yet you happen to be at his 
daughter’s wedding party and you must judge whether that particular circumstance is 
an instance of the category “Sicilian wedding.” 
 As a consequence of having participated to many weddings, you may have 
abstracted from particular instances a prototypical general tendency of various 
wedding categories—for example, based on the types of religious signs, music, and 
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food you have encountered in each wedding you have participated to. You note that 
the current situation is most similar to the prototype of a “Sicilian wedding” rather 
than “Jewish wedding” or “Polish wedding.” On this basis, you categorize the 
current situation as an instance of “Sicilian wedding.” This is, in a nutshell, the 
sequence of processes involved in categorization based on prototypes. 
 Categorization based on exemplars involves different processes. Because you 
have participated to many weddings, you may have stored many wedding exemplars 
in your long term memory. You notice that the current situation is most similar to the 
stored exemplar of “Angelica’s Sicilian wedding.” Drawing on such a similarity, you 
conclude that the wedding of Don Vito’s daughter is an instance of “Sicilian 
wedding” and thereby you can make sense of the situation and understand which 
behaviour is appropriate. 
 In relation to scripts, Bicchieri (2006) argues that people interpret and 
categorize a given context in function of the situational cues, or microfeatures, that 
spark their attention. The processes underlying script-based judgement rely on 
spreading activation and pattern-completion. The activation of the representation of 
a certain complex situation spreads to representations of situations related to it. 
Social categorization activates scripts that enable us to understand social situations, 
to predict others’ behaviour and to respond appropriately to their actions. Scripts—
recall—are theories that represent generic knowledge about well-known classes of 
situations. According to this theory-based approach, you judge whether the wedding 
reception of Don Vito’s daughter belongs to the category “Sicilian wedding” by 
determining whether the features of that instance are best accounted by the theory 
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underlying that category. Let’s now leave real-world, intuitive cases, and enter the 
lab. 
 In typical categorization and category-learning tasks, experimental subjects 
are required to learn and use some category. The task is generally in three phases. In 
a learning phase, the subjects are presented a number of items and are 
informed under which category each item falls. During this category-learning phase, 
the task of the subjects is to acquire some body of categorical knowledge from 
encountering some members of the extension of the relevant category. In a test 
phase, the subjects are presented both with items they had already encountered 
during the learning phase and with new ones. This is, strictly speaking, the 
categorization task which consists in judging whether certain items belong to a given 
category or whether some classes are included in a given category. Finally, a 
recognition memory task may follow. The subjects are asked to discriminate between 
“old,” already encountered items, and new ones. What may this type of task tell us 
about prototypes exemplars and scripts? 
 
2.2 Exemplars 
If we use exemplars instead of prototypes, then at least four empirical predictions 
follow with respect to people’s performance and its underlying mechanisms in 
category learning and categorization tasks. 
 First, the learnability of a category measured in terms of the time needed to 
learn that an item belongs to the category will not depend on the typicality of the 
item. It will depend on its similarity to known members of the category. In 
comparison to a typical item that is not similar to previously encountered category 
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members, we would learn more quickly that a less typical item belongs to a certain 
category, if this item is similar to previously encountered category members. It 
would be quicker to learn to categorize a woman pastor as a pastor than a man pastor 
because your sister is a pastor (on this effect see e.g. Medin and Schaffer 1978). 
 Second, the same would apply to categorization performance measured in 
terms of reaction time and accuracy. The time employed by people to categorize an 
item and their accuracy would not depend on the similarity of the item to the 
prototype of the category. Less typical items would be categorized more easily and 
accurately if they are similar to already stored exemplars. 
 Third, during a recognition task, old items would have an advantage over 
equally typical but new items. It would be easier to categorize your friend Don Vito 
as a Sicilian godfather than an unknown Sicilian godfather that is an equally typical 
Sicilian godfather (on this type of old-item advantage see e.g. Nosofsky 1992). 
 These effects suggest a fourth neuropsychological prediction. The same 
representations that enter the process of categorization would also be involved in 
recognition memory tasks. If categorization is exemplar-based and relies on the same 
representations involved in recognition tasks, then amnesic patients will exhibit 
abnormal performance in categorization. Let us expand on this type of prediction by 
presenting a famous case study. 
 Amnesic patients are impaired both in the ability to store new representations 
in declarative memory and in the ability to verbalize knowledge of exemplars already 
encountered. They typically display severe injuries in the medial temporal lobes in 
both hemispheres. Squire and Knowlton (1995) tested the hypothesis that no 
category learning should take place without the capacity to store exemplars (see also 
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Knowlton and Squire 1993). They examined the performance of a severely 
anterograde and retrograde amnesic patient, E.P., in a learning and categorization 
task. E.P. couldn’t recognize previously encountered objects, which suggests that he 
couldn’t acquire and store representations of new objects. Squire and Knowlton 
found that in spite of such impairment E.P. could perform normally in a dot-
distortion category task. In this task subjects are typically presented with patterns of 
nine dots generated by randomly distorting one of a number of prototype-patterns 
which define different categories (Posner and Keele 1968). In the test phase subjects 
are asked to classify both new patterns and patterns they had already encountered. 
Squire and Knowlton’s (1995) subject exhibited zero ability to recognize whether a 
given item was a new or an old, already encountered, exemplar. However, E.P. 
performed normally on the categorization task: E.P.’s categorization judgements 
were a function of the typicality of the target pattern. 
 E.P.’s performance is hard to explain by appealing to knowledge stored in 
declarative long term memory since the patient had no declarative memory abilities 
whatsoever. The patient must have used a categorization procedure different from an 
exemplar-based procedure. During training, E.P. could have learned a prototype of 
the category of dot patterns and retrieved this representation to categorize new 
patterns. Squire and Knowlton conclude: “These findings demonstrate that the ability 
to classify novel items, after experience with other items in the same category, is a 
separate and parallel memory function of the brain, independent of the limbic and 
diencephalic structures essential for remembering individual stimulus items 
(declarative memory)” (Squire and Knowlton 1995, p. 12470). 
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 This conclusion is coherent with the results found by Kolodny (1994). In this 
study, amnesic subjects were tested in the dot-pattern task, but also in a task designed 
to elicit exemplar-based processes. In this latter task, paintings of three Italian 
Renaissance artists were presented to the subjects who were required to learn which 
paintings were made by the same artist. The exemplars of each category lack obvious 
stylistic relations that could facilitate the acquisition of a prototype for each artist. 
Hence, it is plausible that such categories are learned courtesy of explicit 
memorization by storing exemplars after extensive experience. Amnesics’ 
performance in both learning and categorizing paintings was at chance. 
Unsurprisingly, they also performed poorly in the memory recognition task. 
 From these behavioural and neuropsychological results the following 
predictions might be extracted about social cognition. If people store social 
knowledge relevant to norm compliance in a single exemplar-based format, then 
judging which social context one is facing and whether an action is appropriate in 
that context will engage long term declarative memory. If structures supporting long 
term declarative memory are impaired, as in amnesic patients, we may expect 
inappropriate social behaviours also in situations already encountered. 
 
2.3 Prototypes 
Let’s now consider prototypes. If we use prototypes instead of exemplars, then at 
least four empirical predictions follow with respect to people’s performance and its 
underlying mechanisms in category learning and categorization tasks. 
 First, the learnability of a category will not depend on whether the item 
members are similar to some already encountered items. It will depend on their 
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similarity to the typical member of the category. We would learn more easily and 
quickly to classify a typical member of a category that has not been encountered 
during training than other non-typical members seen during training (on this effect 
see Posner and Keele 1968). 
 Second, categorization performance would depend on the similarity of the 
item to the prototype of the category. Most typical items would be categorized more 
accurately than other typical items even if they have not been already seen (Smith 
2002). The prototypical central tendency shared by the items we have encountered 
may give rise to a kind of “perceptual fluency.” After some experience, people may 
experience a sensation of fluency in categorizing exemplars that are most similar to a 
prototype. 
 Third, during a recognition task, old items would not have an advantage over 
equally typical but new items. The recognition of an item would depend more on its 
typicality than on the fact that it has been previously encountered. Because 
perceptual fluency may be based on perceptual inaccessible processes, people often 
cannot do any better than recalling general features defining a prototypical tendency 
to justify the basis of their categorizations and recollections. 
 Fourth, prototypes would engage declarative memory storage less than 
exemplars, as they need not contain any contextual information. A prototype might 
be abstracted and used by relying on knowledge that cannot be easily verbalizable. 
This would explain why amnesic patients are successful in dot-pattern categorization 
tasks but not in recognition which requires explicit, declarative memory. Retrieving 
representations with contextual associations requires an intact medial-temporal-
diencephalic system (Smith 2008). 
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 In light of these considerations, if people store social knowledge relevant to 
norm compliance in a single, prototype-based format, then they will perform poorly 
in unstructured situations such as the painting task where exemplars don’t share any 
obvious feature. If the social situations that one encounters don’t share any apparent 
pattern, it may be difficult to classify them by using a prototype. If amnesic patients 
can acquire and use prototypes and their social knowledge is stored as prototypes 
then they are not likely to behave inappropriately in typical social situations. 
 
2.4 Scripts 
A script-based account of social categorization has barely been investigated in 
cognitive neuroscience. This may be because scripts are complex knowledge 
structures of difficult computational formalization (Kruschke 2008a). Scripts (or 
schemata) contain information organized in large clusters that serve to generate 
inferences. Their activation is likely to depend on a number of mechanisms that 
support such functions as semantic knowledge, declarative and “implicit” memory, 
cognitive control, evaluation and information integration. It seems hard to isolate 
precise empirical predictions from the hypothesis that norms and social knowledge 
are embedded into scripts. Given the diversity of the cognitive functions that are 
likely to be involved in script-activation, it is probable that the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) is essential for storing and using script-based social knowledge relevant to 
norm compliance. 
 Krueger et al. (2009) offer a framework to understand how complex 
knowledge structures akin to scripts and schemata are supported by brain activity in 
the PFC (see also Grafman 2002; Wood and Grafman 2003). They argue that “the 
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[medial prefrontal cortex] mPFC represents ‘event simulators’ (elators) that give rise 
to social event knowledge via structural and temporal binding with regions in the 
posterior cerebral cortex and limbic structures” (Krueger et al. 2009, p. 103). Before 
examining Krueger and colleagues’ proposal, it is worth repeating a theme that will 
be reiterated in Chapter 5: the precise computational architecture of the PFC is 
poorly understood. The mPFC comprises distinct, functionally diverse regions—the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex—which have been found to be involved in many different social and non-
social tasks whose solutions may require the computation of distinct functions (see 
e.g. Fuster 2008; Miller et al. 2002). We should be wary about claiming that the PFC 
is engaged in particular tasks and computes particular functions. 
 For Krueger and colleagues, elators are abstracted from experience with 
multiple exemplars of social situations. Given the complexity of such knowledge 
structures, it is likely that acquiring and using elators engage various mnemonic 
abilities. Information about a social situation might be first stored as an exemplar 
associated with a specific place and time. With repetition and experience, such 
information might be involving semantic memory which stores our knowledge of the 
world, and procedural memory which store “implicit” knowledge of skills like 
driving a car. It is not clear whether elators’ formation relies on implicit prototypes, 
on exemplars or on both. In default of a detailed account, it remains difficult to 
assess what kind of evidence would count against the claim that “elators are 
abstracted from experience.” 
 Krueger and colleagues define “abstractions” as “dynamic summary 
representations,” which are also called “structured event complex” (Forbes and 
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Grafman 2010, p. 311; see also Wood and Grafman 2003). These abstractions, or 
structured event complexes, are set of events linked together to form a script or 
schema. They embody general knowledge about how situations unfold. More 
precisely, they can encode goal- or outcome-oriented set of events ordered 
sequentially around thematic activities such as “Checking in at the airport” or 
“Attending a lecture.” Goal-oriented knowledge, according to Krueger and 
colleagues, is about the likely actions that agent will take when they desire to 
accomplish a task or reach a certain aim. Outcome-oriented knowledge mainly 
concerns the likely affective response to goal attainment. 
 According to Krueger and colleagues, these types of knowledge structures 
guide our behaviour and perceptions by embodying information about social groups 
and norms. Knowledge about social norms and social groups would be localized in 
the left anterior ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), related to outcome-
oriented events. Forbes and Grafman (2010, pp. 312-3) claim that “the VMPFC 
stores structured event complexes specific to social norms and scripts.” The evidence 
they provide for this claim is from studies that point to the involvement of the 
VMPFC in stereotype-based judgment. In particular, compared to healthy subjects 
and patients with damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, patients with VMPFC 
damage show reduced levels of stereotyping when gender-bias is assessed through an 
implicit association task (Milne and Grafman 2001). This indicates that the VMPFC 
may be necessary to automatically retrieving some aspects of (implicit) social 
knowledge, but does not give us strong reason to believe that VMPFC is the circuit 
where scripts embedding social norms are stored. Milne and Grafman’s VMPFC 
patients displayed normal explicit knowledge of gender stereotypes, moreover the 
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authors are careful in pointing out that their evidence is insufficient to distinguishing 
whether VMPFC patients’ deficit is “specific to social knowledge (versus other 
forms of stimulus-response compatibility)” (Milne and Grafman 2001, p. 5). Finally, 
it is likely that the cortical representation of scripts embedding social norms is 
distributed across several neural networks comprising the amygdala and the 
orbitofrontal cortex besides the VMPFC (e.g. Casebeer and Churchland 2003). 
 VMPFC might be necessary to respond smoothly to some contextual social 
cues and prime certain structured event complexes. The presence of particular people 
in some types of situations might prime scripts associated to those cues. Impairment 
in the capacity to automatically retrieve certain scripts—as in the case of VMPFC 
patients who seem to be insensitive to cues leading to implicit gender bias—may lead 
to inappropriate behaviour. Patients with VMPFC lesions often display a lack of 
compliance to social norms (see e.g. Dimitrov et al. 1999). “It may be—as Milne and 
Grafman (2001, p. 6) conclude—that a contributing factor to that social conduct 
impairment is the inability of those patients to automatically and rapidly associate 
differing aspects of social knowledge—a form of social agnosia.” 
 In light of these considerations, if people store social knowledge relevant to 
norm compliance in a single, script-based format supported by the activity of 
VMPFC, then we can draw at least four predictions. First, patients with ventromedial 
damage will show deficits in storing and retrieving social information that supports 
social norm compliance. Second, because of damage in the VMPFC, subjects will 
display poor performance in social tasks that require the activations of social 
knowledge structures that are goal- or outcome-oriented and temporally ordered. 
Third, they won’t be able to learn new social norms embedded in social scripts. 
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Fourth, they will have troubles in being sensitive to cues in situations that call for 
appropriate behaviour. 
 
3. Representational Pluralism from a Probabilistic Approach 
Research on categorization and human category learning has entered a “second 
generation” (Ashby and Maddox 2011). During the first generation, from the 1990s 
to the early 2000s, research in cognitive neuroscience addressed the question of 
whether there are multiple systems for categorization and category learning. Many 
researchers are now persuaded that there is telling evidence for multiple category-
learning systems (Smith and Grossman 2008, for a review). As a result, according to 
Ashby and Maddox (2011), “second-generation questions” have begun to be tackled. 
These questions start with the assumption that humans store and use bodies of 
knowledge in multiple formats for categorization and category-learning. This chapter 
concludes by making the same assumption. I argue for an approach that can be 
fruitful to explore how inductive inference underlying social categorization and norm 
compliance can draw on bodies of knowledge that can take a plurality of formats. I 
start by elaborating on the nature of the problems of categorization and category 
learning. 
 Categorization and category learning are problems that require uncertain 
conjecture from partial, noisy and ambiguous information. They can be understood 
as inductive inferences that we draw about the organizing structure of a dataset. 
Inductive inferences can be understood as computations on uncertain sensory input 
data. In the social case, categorization and category learning can be understood as 
computations on uncertain sensory input data that lead to the discovery of 
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relationships between agents, objects and events in our social landscape. The 
organizing structure of a dataset is provided by such relationships. These 
relationships can correspond to structured, non-arbitrary classes of agents, objects 
and events, or to structured classes of classes. They can correspond, that is, to social 
categories or to systems of categories. Information about these relationships allows 
us to build complex systems of knowledge about our social world and its underlying 
regularities. From this perspective, one of the deepest challenges in understanding 
social categorization and social category learning as types of inductive problems is 
this: How can we build complex systems of social knowledge from the sparse data 
yielded by our sensory systems? 
 This challenge can be addressed with the probabilistic approach we have 
already encountered when I explained the Bayesian mechanism that might underlie 
the acquisition of social representations. By focusing on the notion of structural form 
I now explain how this approach emphasizes the importance of representational 
diversity (Griffiths et al. 2010; Tenenbaum et al. 2011). I suggest that a probabilistic 
approach is particularly fruitful for evaluating proposals about the different forms 
social knowledge can take across different domains and tasks. Consider once again 
the case of the wedding reception of Don Vito’s daughter. 
 This situation generates a stream of sensory input data. Given the data set of 
your sensory inputs in that situation, you need to infer what type of situation you are 
facing so that you can understand what types of actions are appropriate there. The 
problem is that “any finite set of data is consistent with an infinite number of 
inductive hypotheses” (Holyoak 2008, p. 10637). Different hypotheses about the 
situation at hand are available to you—you can interpret it as a barbeque party in 
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fancy dress, as a Jewish wedding, or as a Sicilian wedding reception. The dynamics 
of our navigation in that situation will depend on the hypothesis we select. 
 The selection of one hypothesis rather than another might be carried out by a 
Bayesian mechanism. Chapter 1 made the suggestion that the acquisition of social 
representation might depend on a Bayesian mechanism. This mechanism would be a 
statistical inference engine that integrates abstract knowledge encoded in a 
probabilistic generative model with data from different sensory sources. The abstract 
knowledge supporting the inferences drawn by such a Bayesian machine can take 
multiple forms. The Bayesian machinery, that is, is not committed to process 
representations in a particular format. It works on probability distributions over 
observable data which can take any form. Before articulating this last point, let me 
clarify the role of abstract knowledge in the probabilistic approach I am describing. 
 The body of knowledge that guides social categorization, social category 
learning and social norm compliance needs not be specific to the particular situation 
at hand. It concerns whole classes of situations over which experience gained in a 
particular case can be used to make predictions and take appropriate actions. This 
body of knowledge captures the essential structural form of situations giving rise to 
the agent’s sensory input data. More precisely, knowledge about the essential 
structure of the situations we encounter is embodied in a constrained space of 
hypotheses that could explain the sensory data generated by a given situation. Each 
hypothesis comes with a certain probability distribution. The probability distribution 
specifies the agent’s degree of belief in a specific hypothesis about a structural form 
underlying a situation prior to the observation of sensory data. By combining prior 
hypotheses and sensory data in a Bayesian fashion, agents can come to identify the 
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hypothesis that account best for the data: the hypothesis that has highest probability 
conditional on the data. Identifying the structure underlying a situation provides us 
with significant constraints on our inductive inferences. Granted that bodies of 
abstract knowledge encoded in a probabilistic generative model constrain and guide 
social categorization and category learning, what does it mean that they ‘capture the 
essential structural form of a situation’? And what is the form of these bodies of 
knowledge? 
 In Chapter 1 I mentioned that states in the environment stand in causal 
relationships and that these causal relationships can be referred to as structure. 
Different relationships between states, different structures, can be depicted by means 
of graphical models. More generally, the structure of a situation consists in its 
underlying regularities. These regularities need not be causal. They can be 
conceptual, temporal, or spatial, for example. Hence, in a general sense, the structure 
of a situation needs not be causal. Different structures—either causal or non-causal—
underlying a situation can be depicted by means of graphical models, for example: 
partitions, chains, trees, grids and cylinders. So, to say that a body of knowledge 
captures the essential structure of a situation is to say that they contain information 
about the causal or non-causal relationships between the individuals, events and 
objects that constitute that situation. Such relationships can be represented as a tree, 
for example, with nodes and edges constituting a particular structural form. 
 Griffiths et al (2010, p. 358) claim that “connectionism makes strong pre-
commitments about the nature of people’s representations and inductive biases based 
on a certain view of neural mechanisms and development: representations are 
graded, continuous vector spaces, lacking explicit structure, and are shaped almost 
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exclusively by experience through gradual error-driven learning algorithms.” In a 
purely bottom-up, connectionist approach, that is, background knowledge is encoded 
in continuous vector spaces which lack explicit structure. These vector spaces 
describe the connectivity weight structure of the network which can embody social 
representations typically in the form of prototypes or schemata. At best the 
connectivity structure weight of a network can only approximate in an implicit 
fashion representational forms like trees or hierarchies that people appear to know 
and use explicitly (Griffiths et al. 2010, pp. 359-360; Gopnik et al. 2010). 
 In comparison to a purely bottom-up connectionist approach, the probabilistic 
approach makes no a priori assumptions about the form of social representations. 
Probabilistic models are apt to explore a larger space of representational possibilities. 
Representations in different formats can in fact be needed for different types of 
inferences underlying different cognitive functions. Kemp and Tenenbaum (2008), 
for example, showed how qualitatively different representations can explain human 
inferences in many different real-world domains. Inductive inference about different 
real-world domains seems to be best explained by appealing to representations with 
different structural forms (Kemp and Tenenbaum 2009). In a probabilistic approach, 
the fact that background knowledge is encoded in probabilistic generative models 
does not mean that the hypotheses constituting the background knowledge must be in 
a single particular representational form. The format that hypotheses and background 
knowledge can take span from weights in a neural network to structured symbolic 
representations. Now, how should we assess the claim that a probabilistic approach is 
fruitful to understand what is the representational format of the background 
knowledge that supports the inductive inferences underlying norm compliance? 
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 By operating on a broad range of candidate representational formats, 
probabilistic models can generate interesting empirical research also in the social and 
moral domain. We are interested in understanding the representational format of 
social norms; we are interested in identifying under what circumstances 
representations in a given format support social norm compliance. One way to do 
this is shown by Kemp and Tenenbaum (2008): A probabilistic model may be 
defined and social representations in a particular format specified within the model. 
When the probabilistic model does not fit behavioural data concerning, for example, 
social categorization and category learning, we may use a qualitatively different 
representation while retaining the explanatory framework of Bayesian computation. 
This will enable us to identify which representational format best explains 
behavioural performance in the social domain. We can thus evaluate different 
proposals within the same type of probabilistic explanatory framework. 
 The structured representations that might be used in probabilistic 
computations in the social domain need not be explicitly encoded in the brain. There 
is a growing wealth of research on how the brain might maintain a generative model 
of the environment, and how neurons might encode probability distributions and 
combine those distributions according to close approximations to Bayes’ rule (e.g. 
Berkes et al. 2011; Ma et al. 2006). Yet we are far from understanding how exactly 
representations in multiple formats supporting Bayesian inference are encoded in 
neural circuits. This “is arguably the greatest computational challenge in cognitive 
neuroscience more generally—our modern mind-body problem” (Tenenbaum et al. 





This chapter has distinguished three specific options about the format in which social 
representations relevant to norm compliance may be stored. I have discussed 
exemplars, prototypes and scripts, and related each option to the social and moral 
domain. For each option, empirical consequences have been drawn. After having 
noted that there seems to be telling evidence that we use representations in multiple 
formats, I have presented in broad strokes a probabilistic approach to cognition that 
allows for representations in multiple formats. I have argued that this approach, in 
comparison to a purely bottom-up, connectionist one, is probably more fruitful to 
understand what is the representational format of the background knowledge that 




Moral Judgement for Bayesian Brains 
This chapter argues for two claims. First, some central aspects of the psychological 
mechanism of moral judgement can be described within the RL-Bayesian 
neurocomputational framework laid out in Chapter 1. Second, such a 
neurocomputational description of moral judgement can shed new light on puzzling 
findings about specific patterns of moral judgement. 
 The chapter builds on the account of the Bayesian brain put forward in 
Chapters 1 and 3 and on the notion of social (neural) representation characterized in 
Chapters 1 and 2. In spite of my reference to brains and neural representations, the 
discussion here will be at a more abstract level most of the time. 
 There are three sections in the chapter. The first section distinguishes between 
two broad senses of ‘judgement.’ The second section identifies three 
neurocomputational ingredients, which can be used to describe aspects of the 
psychological mechanism of moral judgement. Such ingredients are: the norm prior, 
the likelihood of moral judgement and the continuous updating of norms courtesy of 
Bayesian inference. The last section argues for new ways of understanding 
traditionally controversial findings concerning psychopaths’ moral judgement and 
the ontogenesis of moral judgement. 
 A neurocomputational perspective on moral judgement promises to bear 
explanatory fruit because it forces us to move beyond either-or dichotomies, which 
have shaped and in some cases limited debates in the psychology of moral 
judgement. I have in mind such dichotomies as: emotion versus cognition, learned 




1. Judgement as a State and Judgement as a Process 
‘Judgement’ is an ambiguous term. Different senses are hardly made explicit in 
discussions of moral judgement. I now distinguish between two general ways of 
understanding the term, which will be helpful to avoid confusion in the account 
articulated in the remainder of the chapter. 
 One way to understand ‘moral judgement’ is in terms of a mental state. In this 
sense, moral judgement can refer to either representational or non-representational 
mental states. Accordingly, ‘judgement’ can refer to mental states that are not 
necessarily representational and that can be expressed by sentences or utterances. In 
a narrow sense, ‘judgement’ refers to representational mental states. Beliefs are the 
paradigmatic example of such mental states. Beliefs are generally considered to be 
mental states that represent something to be the case. Whenever we take something 
to be the case or take it as true, we believe that something. So, moral judgement may 
refer to some moral belief we have. That a mental state is representational does not 
entail that we must be aware of that mental state. Whatever the representational 
status of moral judgement, a separate issue is whether we are aware of the moral 
judgement we entertain or not. ‘Moral judgement’ need not refer to states of the 
mind, representational or not, that involve active reflection or awareness of anything 
specific. 
 The second way to understand ‘moral judgement’ is in terms of a mental 
process. As a process, ‘moral judgement’ can refer to deliberation (or practical 
reasoning), which is not necessarily a conscious process. Deliberation (or practical 
reasoning), as understood here, is the process that enables agents to answer the 
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question of what one ought to do. Courtesy of moral judgement (viz. deliberation), 
agents come to entertain such mental states as beliefs and attitudes expressing that 
one ought to behave in some way rather than another under certain types of 
circumstances. 
 Here I am concerned both with the process enabling agents to resolve what 
one ought to do under a certain type of circumstance, and with ‘moral judgement’ as 
a mental state expressible with a sentence or utterance. In neither of these senses, 
‘judgement’ refers necessarily to an introspectively accessible or conscious mental 
state or process. As I go along articulating my proposal, I shall make clear which 
sense is relevant to my argument. 
 Representations are an essential part of the account of norm compliance I put 
forward in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 argues that we should explain norm compliance by 
appealing to neural representations. It is worth noting, however, that the centrality of 
the notion of representation in my account does not mean that I maintain that in our 
cognitive system all signals, which can affect our social/moral behaviour, must be 
representational. As I build on those two chapters here, I shall sometimes 
characterize moral judgement in terms of representations. This does not entail that 
the states of the mind expressed by moral utterances are necessarily beliefs or that 
the processes underlying moral deliberation are necessarily “cognitive” as opposed to 
“emotional.” In fact, by embracing a neurocomputational perspective—let me 
emphasize it—one of the burdens of this chapter is to show some ways in which we 
may move beyond either-or dichotomies such as emotion versus cognition, or 
cognitivism versus non-cognitivism, which might hinder progress in our 




2. Moral Judgement as Bayesian Inference 
The psychological mechanism of moral judgement can be described by appealing to 
three neurocomputational ingredients: 
• The prior representation of social norms concerning socially/morally 
(in)appropriate or right/wrong behaviour in a given context. 
• The relationship describing how likely it is that any moral judgement gives 
rise to certain sensory data. 
• The continuous updating of norms courtesy of Bayesian inference. 
The first two ingredients are relevant to explaining especially moral judgement as a 
state of the mind. The other helps us pick out important features of moral judgement 
as a process. 
 With these ingredients in place, making a moral judgement would amount to 
activate what can be called ‘norm priors’ and combine the information carried by 
norm priors with incoming sensory data. I shall now explain the three ingredients. 
 
2.1 Moral Judgement as Prior 
Agents’ knowledge about how one ought to behave under certain types of 
circumstances is a subset of their social and moral knowledge. For example, an 
agent’s knowledge that she ought to buy the next round of drinks at the pub is a 
subset of her social and moral knowledge. As the previous Chapter suggested, social 
knowledge can have multiple formats. It can be encoded as clusters of prototypes, 
exemplars, scripts or rules in a system. In Chapter 2 it was argued, furthermore, that 
one fruitful way to conceive of what it is to have beliefs and preferences is in terms 
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of probability distributions encoded by the nervous system. If agents’ social and 
moral knowledge is constituted by their social/moral beliefs, then one fruitful way to 
conceive of social and moral knowledge is in terms of probability distributions. Now 
I articulate a few points made in Chapters 1 and 2 and relate them to moral 
judgement. 
 A probability distribution, recall, describes the range of possible values that a 
random variable can attain and the probability that that variable is within some range. 
I call social distributions those distributions that encompass social random variables. 
Social random variables describe features relevant to interact appropriately with 
others. Such features can be facial expressions, motion dynamics, eye gaze direction, 
and ostensive social signals such as certain types of gestures or tones of speech used 
(typically deliberatively) to communicate determinate intentions. Each social random 
variable—for instance, a facial expression—can take different values—for instance, 
a facial expression can be sad, angry or happy. 
 There can be correlations among social variables, or among specific values of 
social random variables. For instance, a certain facial expression may be correlated 
with particular motion dynamics; or a particular tone of voice may be correlated with 
a certain posture and certain ostensive social signals. By long association, we can 
expect many social features and events to be almost always together in certain types 
of circumstances. The social distributions describing such features and events, which 
our cognitive system might encode, can be joint over multiple variables. Depending 
on the details of one’s learning trajectory, correlations among different social random 




 It is worth recalling that if our cognitive system encodes multivariate social 
probability distributions, then we need not have infinite representational resources or 
infinite information processing capacity, since probability distributions can be 
represented with small sets of values—for example, it suffices to represent a 
multivariate normal distribution with its mean and covariance matrix—and 
transformations of such distributions can be carried out by algorithms that 
approximate exact Bayesian computations. For example, Monte Carlo or stochastic 
sampling-based approximations of Bayesian computation are algorithmic schemes, 
which neural activity might implement in feasible ways (see e.g. Fiser et al. 2010). 
 Agents’ social/moral knowledge—I suggest—is built on the multivariate 
social distributions encoded in a hierarchical way in their cognitive systems. From 
multivariate social distribution, agents would have knowledge about, for example, 
how one is expected to behave in a given situation, how other people are likely to 
react to one’s behaviour in some type of circumstance, how one will react to certain 
behaviour displayed by others or by her. 
 Social/moral knowledge, on which our moral judgements depend, might 
consist of distributions over a range of candidate hypotheses, which specify how one 
ought to behave across different types of situations in the social environment. Social 
distributions encoded in an agent’s cognitive systems specify the strength with which 
the agent entertains any hypothesis before any observation about the hypothesis is 
available. The subset of social distributions corresponding to such a priori mental 
states about (in)appropriate or right/wrong behaviour in the moral/social environment 
can be called norm priors. 
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 The moral qualities attached to any norm prior depend on representations at 
still higher levels in the hierarchy of distributions in our cognitive system. Such 
representations constitute a bedrock of general knowledge concerning how our 
attitudes and our actions should take into account the needs, the desires and 
expectations of others. The importance (or value) attached to a behaviour or an 
action is updated courtesy of reward-prediction errors, which are mainly, but not 
exclusively, triggered by the observation of the sensory- and reward-data given rise 
by that behaviour. More on this in section 2.3 below. 
 The normativity of moral judgement depends on this bedrock of value-
knowledge which infuses the world with value, with importance. Value-knowledge 
provides us with general moral convictions and moral concerns. It guides our 
behaviour by specifying goals we deem important, tracks changes in our 
motivational states and causally affects our normative judgements. This bedrock is 
shaped by the workings of value-based systems like the RL-systems described in 
Chapter 1. These systems not only enable smooth, adaptive interactions with others, 
but, as Chapters 5 and 6 will suggest, underlie our capacity to care about things and 
to create importance in our world as well. Let me now characterize norm priors more 
precisely. 
 Norm priors can be formalized thus: 
 [1] Prob (A ought to φ in S), 
where A is some agent, φ specifies an action and S is a type of situation. In our 
cognitive hierarchy, distributions of form [1] would be encoded at higher levels than 
distributions constituting our bedrock of value-knowledge. These distributions have 
the following form: 
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 [2] Prob (φ has value V | social representations Rs), 
where Rs is the representation of situation S. At still lower levels we would find 
social distributions of the form: 
 [3] Prob (Rs | situation S). 
Further down the hierarchy would lie encodings of objects, shapes, colors, textures, 
sounds, and so on, until we reach encodings of simple physical quantities such as 
velocity or orientation. 
 With this characterization in hand, I put forward the hypothesis that moral 
judgements as states of the mind can be fruitfully understood as norm priors encoded 
in our cognitive system. I now give some flesh to this hypothesis by highlighting four 
properties of moral judgements, which can be naturally accommodated if we 
understand moral judgements as norm priors. 
 
2.1.1 Moral Judgement. Prior to What? 
Norm priors are not prior to any experience or skill relevant to (in)appropriate or 
right/wrong behaviour. In general, priors refer to a learner’s degree of belief in a 
hypothesis before observing data relevant to that hypothesis in the situation at hand. 
This does not mean that the learner’s prior refers to her degree of belief in a 
hypothesis before she has acquired any body of knowledge or skill relevant to make 
a judgement or to act in the situation at hand. An agent’s norm prior, for example, 
might refer to her degree of belief in the hypothesis that she ought to buy the next 
round of drinks in that situation before she observes the sensory data given rise by 
that behaviour in that situation. 
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 The agent’s norm prior reflects her state of knowledge and practical 
competence as she faces a certain situation. The agent judging that she ought to buy 
the next round of drinks may in fact have much relevant prior experience with social 
behaviour in pubs. She may have gained this body of knowledge from direct 
apprenticeship or from testimony, by reading books or listening to some friends’ 
stories. This kind of prior experience is necessary in every aspect of ordinary moral 
affairs requiring some learned moral skills. 
 An agent’s norm prior, therefore, does not consist in a hypothesis about what 
one ought to do which the agent entertains “at the beginning of the beginning,” 
before the agent has undergone any experience or developed any skill (Suppes 2007). 
Rather, it is almost always the case that there has been some experience and that 
some skills have been developed prior to the elicitation of a norm prior in a particular 
situation. 
 Norm priors can accommodate that it is almost always the case that our moral 
judgements obtain against a background of moral experience and skills gained during 
continuous social apprenticeship. I shall have something to say about “the beginning 
of the beginning,” about which types of norm priors might be hardwired in our 
cognitive systems in section 3.2.1 below. 
 
2.1.2 Three Gradable Properties of Moral Judgement 
In general, the more spread out a random variable of a probability distribution, the 
greater the entropy of that distribution, and the greater the uncertainty the agent has 
towards the corresponding hypothesis (Kruschke 2008b). Both the value-knowledge 
and the social distributions encoded in an agent’s cognitive system have varying 
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degrees of uncertainty (or entropy). So, norm priors have varying degrees of 
uncertainty (or entropy). This can naturally accommodate the fact that moral 
judgement seems to have a number of “gradable” properties (on these properties see 
Smith 2002). 
 The first property, which moral judgement seems to share with all judgement, 
is the level of confidence or uncertainty that an agent has that a behaviour in some 
situation is good (or bad), right (or wrong), appropriate (or inappropriate) as she 
judges it to be. Agents may be more confident that stealing is wrong than they are 
that not buying the next round of drinks at the pub is wrong. 
 The second property of moral judgements is that they are more or less stable 
in the face of new information. This feature seems to apply generally to all 
judgement as well. Agents, for example, may be equally confident that stealing is 
wrong and not buying the next round of drinks at the pub is wrong. But, in the face 
of incoming new information, agents’ confidence in the former judgement is more 
stable than their confidence in the latter judgement. 
 The third property, which seems specific to normative judgement, is the 
degree of importance, or value that an agent assigns to some behaviour in some 
situation. Agents, for example, can assign high value (or high importance) to not to 
steal, but they can assign higher value to not to murder. 
 As pointed out by Smith (2002, Sec. 2), these three properties are relevant to 
explaining action. The more confidence agents have that they ought to do something 
under some type of circumstance, the more they will be motivated to do it, all else 
being equal. The more value they assign to certain behaviour under some type of 
circumstance, the more they will be motivated to do it. Over time, the motivation that 
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agents have to engage in some type of behaviour in some social situation co-varies 
with the level of stability of their judgement concerning that type of behaviour. 
 If we understand moral judgement as norm prior, then confidence in one’s 
moral judgement corresponds to the entropy of the underlying norm prior. So, the 
higher the entropy of an agent’s norm prior, the less certain the agent that she ought 
to do something, as specified by the norm prior. 
 Moreover, by considering that norm priors are constituted by a hierarchy of 
representational levels, with representations of value at higher levels, we can explain 
situations where agents are confident that some type of behaviour has certain social 
features, but they are less confident about the moral qualities of that type of 
behaviour. 
 Different distributions in the hierarchy can in fact have different levels of 
entropy. In particular, the entropy associated to some distributions underlying our 
body of value-knowledge can have high entropy, while social distributions at lower 
levels in the hierarchy might have lower entropy. As we learn how to successfully 
navigate our social space, and how to appropriately judge situations in our 
social/moral environment, the uncertainty (or entropy) of our norm priors decreases. 
As the uncertainty of an agent’s norm prior becomes lower and lower, the agent will 
be more motivated to engage in the type of behaviour specified by the norm prior, all 
else being equal. 
 
2.1.3 Bias and Moral Judgement 
One of the most robust findings in moral psychology is that moral judgement and 
social behaviour, more generally, can be affected by morally irrelevant situational 
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factors (for reviews see Bargh and Williams 2006; Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). Here 
are a couple of examples. People’s tendency to cheat or to act selfishly increases if 
they wear sunglasses or they are placed in a dimly lit room (Zhong et al. 2010); 
people’s moral judgement is less severe after they wash their hands with soap and 
water (Schnall et al. 2008). 
 Situational factors bias moral judgement in that they incline an agent to make 
one judgement, or a decision, over another. As such, ‘bias’ does not entail a 
deviation from a normative standard of judgement. Situational factors trigger specific 
informational processes, which lead agents to put more weight on certain sources of 
information, to prioritize some representations at the expense of others, and—
relevant to our topic—to activate some social distribution over others. 
 Because of such biases, people’s moral judgements vary across contexts even 
if their body of relevant moral knowledge and skills remain constant. Some biases 
influence the ease of retrieval of relevant information, or make available 
counterfactual alternatives to a given hypothesis, or make us focus only on particular 
features of some situation. Biases affect informational processes underlying distinct 
aspects of practical reasoning dependant on memory or attention (see Sunstein 2005). 
 If an agent’s moral judgement is understood as norm prior, then which norm 
prior is active in a given situation will depend on the factors present in the situation. 
These factors will bias the transformations carried out by our system along the 
hierarchy of social distributions leading to the construction and activation of norm 
priors. When two priors fit the sensory data equally well, biases are the only basis for 





Finally, it should be clear that some of the information carried by norm priors is 
available to consciousness and can be verbalized, expressed in utterances and 
sentences. The overwhelming bulk of our moral knowledge, however, might not be 
accurately or approximately verbalized, as people often have beliefs and attitudes 
they are not aware of having. Yet this knowledge can affect our moral behaviour. 
Here is an example: In spite of their self-reported beliefs and attitudes towards black 
people, European American and African American are more likely to misidentify a 
harmless object as a gun if they are first shown a picture of a black man rather than a 
picture of a white man (Payne 2006). 
 If moral judgement is understood as norm prior, and norm priors are the kinds 
of probabilistic internal representations that the previous chapters have described, 
then we can accommodate the fact that many of our moral judgements are not 
introspectable or conscious mental states. Within the neurocomputational framework 
I embrace, beliefs and desires are understood as probabilistic representations. They 
need not refer to mental states of which we are aware or which we can verbalize. 
Yet, probabilistic representations such as norm priors have effects on agents’ 
behaviour and can be controlled and manipulated. From this perspective, people can 
have some moral judgements, which they consciously “disbelief.” To put it another 
way, what people can have access to and verbalize is just a little, often inaccurate, 
and approximate portion of the rich body of moral and social knowledge encoded in 
their cognitive system. 
 By understanding moral judgement as norm prior, we can naturally separate 
questions about how moral judgements develop and affect our behaviour from 
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questions about how much we can verbalize of our moral judgements. With this 
separation, we can consider whether and how the moral judgements that are 
verbalized—or moral discourse more generally—can be used in important ways or 
can have some impact on moral thought. The relationship between language and 
moral thought will be the topic of the next Chapter. 
 
2.2 Likelihood of Moral Judgement 
The relationship describing how sensory data vary with any moral judgement can be 
called ‘likelihood function of moral judgement.’ Call ‘Sensory Input I’ the sensory 
consequences given rise to by the moral judgement ‘A ought to φ in S,’ the likelihood 
functions of moral judgement can be formalized thus: 
 [4] Prob (Sensory Input I | A ought to φ in S). 
This quantity is a function of both observed sensory data and moral judgement. The 
likelihood of a moral judgement is the probability of sensory input given the 
hypothesized moral judgement. It measures how expected some set of sensory inputs 
is for different moral judgements: it expresses to what extent a moral judgement fits 
some set of sensory inputs. Likelihood functions of moral judgements can be 
regarded as generative models of observing sensory input I under the hypothesis that 
one ought to φ in S. The likelihood of moral judgement reflects how probable it is 
that we receive, for example, the current sensory input given the judgement we 
entertain that one ought to take vengeance, or given the judgement we entertain that 
one ought to forgive. 
 It is noteworthy that the notion of likelihood is distinct from the notion of 
probability. Mathematically they are directly related to each other: The likelihood of 
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some particular moral judgement given some observed dataset of sensory inputs (I1, 
I2, …, In) is equal to the probability of the observed dataset given the moral 
judgement. For example, the likelihood of the judgement that one ought to buy the 
next round of drinks at the pub given such sensory inputs as a smile, a pat on the 
back, a ‘cheers’ is equal to the probability of those sensory inputs, given the moral 
judgement that one ought to buy the next round of drinks at the pub. But likelihoods 
and probabilities differ in what they represent. For probabilities, the hypotheses (or 
parameters) are known and the data are unobserved. For likelihoods, the data are 
observed and the values of the hypotheses (or parameter values) are unknown. So, 
for likelihoods of moral judgement we don’t know which particular moral judgement 
obtains in a particular situation. Likelihoods specify the probability of sensory data 
we receive given different possible moral judgements we could entertain. 
 Likelihoods of moral judgement can be relevant to describe the psychological 
mechanism of both moral judgement as a mental state and moral judgement as a 
process. On the one hand, the likelihood of norm compliance specifies how observed 
data are related to different moral judgements, understood as states. On the other 
hand, according to the view I favour, moral judgement as a process consists in 
combining norm priors with likelihoods. The next subsection will articulate this latter 
point. Let me expand on the former now. 
 Likelihoods of moral judgement are sensory estimates, which are relevant to 
understand the psychological mechanism of such aspects of our social and moral life 
as trusting, hoping and promising. Many of our moral judgements depend on trust 
and hope since they depend on trusting in the testimony of others or on hoping that 
something will be the case. For example, my judgement that one ought not to leave a 
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tip in restaurants in Japan depends solely on trust in the testimony of others. Many of 
our moral judgements, furthermore, concern trust, hope and promises. For example, 
we may judge that we ought to keep promises or ought not to betray those who trust 
us. It should be clear that thus trusting, promising and hoping allow us to form 
relationships with others. We may depend on these social relationships to satisfying 
our needs, our desires and to accomplishing the projects we consider important. 
 But trusting, hoping and promising involve uncertainty. We are uncertain, for 
example, that people we trust will not betray us. We are uncertain that this person is 
trustworthy, and therefore that we should trust her. If it were certain that some people 
would pull through without betraying us, then it would be unnecessary to trust them. 
If it were certain that something will be the case, then it would make no sense to 
hope for it. If there were guarantee that people keep their word, then we would have 
no need to make promises. 
 Likelihoods of moral judgement provide us with information about this 
uncertainty, as they specify the relationship between moral judgements and the 
sensory inputs they give rise to. Likelihoods of moral judgement describe how our 
moral/social environment changes so as to produce sensory inputs from different 
possible moral judgements—or from behaviour conforming to a certain judgement. 
Ray et al.’s (2009) study on the Trust Game, which was described in Chapter 2, 
clearly illustrates this point. In their study, agents’ likelihood functions specify the 
probability of observing a sequence of sensory data (e.g. the opponent’s observed 
actions), given the hypothesis that the opponent is of a certain type. That reflects—to 
repeat—how probable it is that we would observe the opponent’s current action, 
given that the opponent is trustworthy, or given that the opponent is shady. If 
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opponents are in fact of a certain type, then a player may hold the judgement that she 
ought (or ought not) to trust them since that player’s trust would successfully target 
trustworthy agents. 
 Likelihood functions of moral judgement, then, might enable agents to judge 
who is trustworthy, and therefore should be trusted, and to act on this judgement. 
Identifying how our cognitive system might encode and transform likelihood 
functions of moral judgement might shed new light on the psychological mechanism 
of at least trusting, hoping and promising. 
 
2.3 Norm Update 
We make a moral judgement—I hypothesize—by combining norm priors with 
likelihoods of moral judgements. More precisely, a moral judgement would be 
obtained by multiplying each norm prior by the value of the likelihood of moral 
judgement. At any given time, the moral judgement that we entertain is the least 
uncertain moral judgement, which is the peak of the posterior distribution Prob (A 
ought to φ in S | Sensory Input I). More formally: 
 
 [5] Prob (A ought to φ in S | Sensory Input I)  
    ∝ Prob (Sensory Input I | A ought to φ in S) Prob (A 
     ought to φ in S) 
 
From [5], two points should be clear. First, when we make a moral judgement, that 
is, when we entertain the judgement that one ought to do something in a certain 
situation, we incorporate prior moral knowledge to estimates of the sensory 
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consequences of possible moral judgements. Moral judgements are computed based 
on available moral knowledge and on incoming sensory input. Such computations 
might consist of Bayesian inferences carried out in the neural hierarchy underlying 
moral cognition. For any layer in the hierarchy, each posterior becomes a new norm 
prior and can be further updated based on incoming sensory input. 
 Second, even if we may not be aware of it, our moral knowledge is 
continuously updated based on new sensory information. The updating might be 
carried out courtesy of prediction-errors propagated along the hierarchy. Under the 
impact of new information, how stable the knowledge at each layer is depends on the 
shape of the distributions encoded at the immediate neighbour layers. The higher the 
entropy of some social distribution at some level, the more likely it is that the 
knowledge at that level will undergo revision. Let me illustrate the first point.5 
 Let i stand for the current sensory input; x1 stands for a random variable 
describing the possible values of the feature computed by neural populations at layer 
1 in the cortical hierarchy; xh stands for all knowledge encoded at higher layers, e.g. 
contextual information about the social situation and more abstract value-knowledge. 
Neural populations at layer 1 come to represent the most probable values of x1 by 
computing the a posteriori distribution that maximizes Prob (x1 | i, xh). Assuming for 
simplicity that Prob (i | x1, xh) does not depend on the higher-level information 
carried by xh, we can say that the transformations brought about at layer 1 consist in 
multiplying the likelihood of x1, Prob (i | x1), by the prior Prob (x1 | xh). The prior 
carries information about the degree of compatibility of every possible value of x1 
                                                 
5 This illustration relies on Lee and Mumford (2003, Sec. 2). 
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with the high level knowledge xh. The likelihood carries information about the 
impact of incoming input given any value of x1. 
 According to this view, each cortical layer is an expert for inferring certain 
features of our social/moral environment. Populations of neurons at each layer in the 
hierarchy are mainly interested in the computations carried out by their immediate 
neighbours. Inference carried out by neural activity at one layer is constrained by 
both bottom-up data coming from the feed-forward pathway and the top-down 
information feeding-back. 
 Let’s assume that our moral cognition is underlain by neural populations 
ordered hierarchically in four layers. Each layer computes a set of features with the 
top layer computing a moral judgement, or a “belief-state.” Call these features x1, x2, 
x3, the judgement j, and the incoming sensory input i. Each feature computed in the 
hierarchy is provided with a value-tag from the high-level body of value-knowledge. 
If we judge that an action is wrong or some behaviour is inappropriate, then it is 
wrong or inappropriate because of certain of its features and of their value-tags. 
Whether the behaviour is right/wrong or (in)appropriate is determined by the 
distributed probabilistic computations taking place along the hierarchy. Features 
represented by social distributions can be morally significant in some case, but can 
make a different moral difference in another type of circumstance. Features have 
variable moral relevance depending on the computations of other features of the case 
we face and on their value-tags. 
 Here is an example. We make the simplifying assumption that if in the 
sequence (i, x1, x2, x3, j) any variable is fixed, then the variables computed at the 
immediate neighbour layers are conditionally independent. The moral judgement 
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entertained by the system at a time, with incoming input i, can then be described with 
the multivariate distribution: 
 [6] Prob (i, x1, x2, x3, j) =  
   Prob (i | x1) Prob (x1 | x2) P (x2 | x3) Prob (x3 | j) Prob (j) 
From [6], it follows that the moral judgement entertained is computed thus: 
 [7] Prob (x1 | i,  x2, x3, j) ∝ Prob (i | x1) Prob (x1 | x2) 
  Prob (x2 | i,  x1, x3, j) ∝ Prob (x1 | x2) Prob (x2 | x3) 
And so forth until: 
 Prob (j | i, x1, x2, x3) ∝ Prob (x3 | j) Prob (j) 
Social feature x1 is computed through activity in neural populations in layer 1. The 
computation of x1 is affected by the bottom-up feed-forward data i and the 
probabilistic prior Prob (x1 | x2) fed back from layer 2. The feed-forward input drives 
the generation of a moral judgement; the feedback from higher layers provides the 
priors to constrain inference at lower layers. So the moral judgements, understood as 
mental states, we entertain at a time would just be the result of the interaction 
between these feed-forward and feedback signals. The least uncertain of our moral 
judgements is the moral judgement having more impact on our cognitive system and 
on our behaviour at a given time. 
 The second point highlighted by [5] is that moral knowledge is constantly 
revised and updated. There are at least three ways agents’ moral knowledge 
undergoes changes. First, moral knowledge undergoes changes through conscious 
reflection. Agents reflect on what one ought to do in a given situation by assessing 
and weighing their reasons for behaving in a certain way rather than another. 
Conscious reflection on what one ought to do can take place within a dialogue with 
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other agents, where different moral judgements are put forth for consideration and 
defended either by argument or by other persuasive means. This may lead to a 
revision of the shape of the distributions encoding the moral knowledge available for 
conscious reflection and verbalization. I shall get back to this point in the next 
Chapter. 
 The second way agents’ moral knowledge undergoes changes is through 
random fluctuations in its underlying distributions or in the value-tags attached to 
features represented by such distributions. Ongoing brain activity is found over a 
wide range of spatial and temporal scales. The functional significance of variations in 
spontaneous activity is not clear, but it is not unreasonable to believe that it might be 
also associated with variations in our body of social and moral knowledge (for a 
review on the functional significance of ongoing activity fluctuations see Sadaghiani 
et al. 2010). 
 Agents’ moral knowledge is constantly affected by the sensory input they 
receive. This is the third way it can undergo changes. An agent’s moral knowledge 
will not undergo changes under the impact of sensory input at a given time only if 
the agent’s moral knowledge at that time predicts exactly her incoming sensory 
input. If the agent’s moral knowledge fails to predict the incoming sensory input at a 
time, then a prediction-error is triggered, which will lead to a revision of the body of 
moral knowledge. Prediction-errors would be the part of the feed-forward signal that 
is not predicted by the prior knowledge encoded in higher layers. In this case, the 
more prediction-error, the more our social/moral knowledge will be revised. 
Prediction-errors can bring about a revision of the value-tag attached to some social 
distribution or of the social distribution itself. 
206 
 
 Here is an illustration of how new information can affect our moral 
judgement courtesy of prediction-errors. Other people’s utterances provide us with 
new information, which can impact our evaluative judgement. In an fMRI 
experiment, Klucharev et al. (2009) asked participants to rate the attractiveness of 
some faces while their brains were scanned. After each judgement, participants were 
informed about peers’ average rating. A conflict with the peers’ opinion elicited a 
response in the nucleus accumbens and the rostral cingulated zone similar to a 
prediction-error signal. The magnitude of this signal seems to have impacted on 
people’s evaluative judgement since it predicted conformity with peer rating. 
Participants, in fact, judged again the same faces outside fMRI scan after thirty 
minutes. Those initially in disagreement with the group rating tended to change their 
judgement toward conformity. Prediction-errors may trigger long-term conforming 
adjustment of an individual’s judgment. 
 
3. Neurocomputationalism at Work on Moral Judgement 
Thus far I have provided a description within a RL-Bayesian neurocomputational 
framework of some central aspects of the psychological mechanism of moral 
judgement. 
 It is now time to put this neurocomputational proposal at work and see what it 
can bring to the table. The remainder of the chapter argues that the 
neurocomputational description of moral judgement put forward above can shed new 
light on puzzling findings about specific patterns of moral judgement. I focus on the 




3.1 The Moral Judgement of Psychopaths 
Psychopathy is a developmental disorder that involves pathological social behaviour. 
Psychopaths habitually violate important norms in their society. They are glib, 
impulsive, irresponsible, manipulative, egocentric, callous, lack empathy and have 
shallow emotions (Hare 2003). Psychopaths also make abnormal moral judgements. 
In particular, they have serious difficulty in drawing the so-called 
“moral/conventional distinction,” which I now introduce. 
 Most people treat judgements such as “You ought not to steal” differently 
from judgements such as “You ought not to leave a tip in restaurants in Japan.” The 
former, people would say, concerns a moral norm, whereas the latter a social norm 
(or convention). Most people would judge that violations of moral norms like hitting 
another person are more serious than violations of social norms like speaking without 
raising your hand. They would also deem the normative force of moral norms as less 
dependent upon authority figures and upon other people’s expectations than the force 
of conventions. So, it seems that moral violations can be characterised by their 
consequences for the liberty, wellbeing and welfare of others; violations of social 
norms (or conventions) can be characterised as violations of behavioural uniformities 
structuring social interaction within a given social environment. 
 There is good empirical evidence that the capacity to distinguishing between 
moral norms and conventions/social norms is central to the normal development of 
our normative competence (Turiel 1983). A number of psychological experiments, 
using what is known as the moral/conventional task, have been run across 
nationalities, cultures and ages to test putatively defining characteristics of moral 
norms and conventions. The task consists in presenting subjects with violations of 
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prototypical moral norms as well as with violations of other norms, and asking them 
a series of probe questions (e.g. “How wrong is the behaviour in the example?”; 
“Would the behaviour be wrong if some authority figure permitted it?”; “Would it be 
wrong also in a different place or at a different time in history?”; “Why is the 
behaviour wrong?”). Healthy subjects distinguish moral and conventional violations 
from the age of 39 months (Smetana 1993). Psychopaths have difficulty in drawing 
this distinction (Blair 1995). 
 There are two main puzzling findings about psychopaths’ judgement in the 
moral/conventional task. First, psychopaths tend to judge all transgressions as cases 
of moral transgressions (Blair et al. 1995a, 1995b). Psychopaths judge that, for 
example, it is not okay that a schoolboy walks out of the classroom without 
permission even if the teacher says it is permissible to do so. Second, unlike healthy 
controls, psychopaths ignore considerations about victims’ welfare or social disorder 
when they justify why some action is wrong. Psychopaths and healthy controls—it is 
noteworthy—do not differ in the way they draw, and justify, the moral/conventional 
distinction when they are confronted with positive acts like comforting a friend or 
wearing the uniform at school (Blair et al. 1995b). 
 
3.1.1 Not by Emotion Alone 
Authors like Jesse Prinz (2007) and Shaun Nichols (2004) link psychopaths’ 
incapacity to make judgements concerning moral and conventional/social norms to 
their emotional abnormality. Many discussions of psychopathy, in fact, identify lack 
of sympathy and incapacity to feel guilty as the deficits at the root of this disorder. 
Psychopaths appear to be indifferent to the concerns and some feelings of the others. 
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For example, in response to cues of distress such as the facial expression of a crying 
child they show no affective response (Blair et al. 1997). Psychopaths feel little 
remorse when they break moral or social norms. They show an incapacity to attribute 
guilt to violators of moral norms (Blair et al. 1995a). “The moral blindness of 
psychopaths—Prinz (2007, p. 46) writes—issues from an emotional blindness.” But 
the evidence does not warrant such a conclusion. 
 Psychopaths’ emotional profile is not flat: children with psychopathic 
tendencies, and adult psychopaths alike, are normal in their attributions of happiness, 
embarrassment and sadness to people described in short vignettes (Blair et al.1995a). 
So they don’t seem to have a general inability to experience emotion (Blair 1997). 
Psychopaths “show reduced skin conductance to sad, but not angry expressions. 
Moreover, children with psychopathic tendencies have been found to show selective 
recognition difficulties for sad and fearful expressions but not for angry, disgusted, 
surprised, or happy expressions” (Blair et al. 2001, p. 493). Psychopaths, thus, seem 
to be impaired in specific forms of emotional processing: they are probably impaired 
in emotional learning based on fear conditioning, and, as noted, in attribution of 
guilt. Although they show reduced emotional response in anticipation of punishment, 
they have normal response to reward (Blair et al. 2005). So, an appeal to an 
impairment in emotional processing might not suffice to explain psychopaths’ 
idiosyncratic pattern of normative judgement. 
 Neuropsychological research indicates that dysfunction in the amygdala is 
reliably associated to psychopathological behaviour (Blair 2003). The amygdala is 
one brain region most implicated in antisocial, aggressive and psychopathic 
behaviour (Raine and Yang 2006). Psychopathic individuals show a pattern of 
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functional impairments generally displayed by patients with a lesion or dysfunction 
in the amygdala: They have “deficits in aversive conditioning, the augmentation of 
startle response by visual threat primes and fearful expression recognition” (Blair 
2007, p. 388). More relevant here, psychopaths also show reduced activity in the 
amygdala during moral judgement (Glenn et al. 2009). 
 So, although “psychopathy is not associated with a lesion to a particular 
region, nor have all functions mediated by any particular region been shown to be 
compromised” (Blair 2007, p. 388), if psychopathy is reliably associated to a 
dysfunction in the amygdala, then one way to make progress in understanding 
psychopaths’ abnormal pattern of moral judgement is by identifying possible 
computational roles of this brain region. 
 
3.1.2 The Amygdala as Uncertainty-Detector and Psychopathy 
Here is my proposal. The general computational roles of amygdala activation might 
be twofold. On the one hand, the amygdala would contribute to detecting the 
uncertainty associated to the structure of a situation with respect to a probabilistic 
model of that situation. That is, amygdala would detect unpredictable or uncertain 
situations. On the other hand, given its detection of the uncertainty of the situation, it 
would signal a need to learn: Having computed that a situation is uncertain to a 
certain degree (or unpredictable), the amygdala would bias an organism towards 
greater sensitivity to the causal and reward structure of the environment. 
 In the case of moral judgement, amygdala activation would contribute in the 
detection of the level of uncertainty underlying a given moral situation in terms of 
the variance of the posterior of moral judgement activated by that situation. The 
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more uncertain the situation, the more active the amygdala will be. One way to 
capture the hypothesis that the amygdala might be sensitive to morally uncertain 
situations is in terms of a norm prior with maximum entropy, so that for any agent 
different actions seem equally (in)appropriate (or right/wrong) in that situation. 
Another possible way is in terms of a (nearly) “flat” (or constant) likelihood of moral 
judgement, such that different moral judgements fit equally well the sensory data, 
and so the cognitive system lacks information for selecting between competitive 
moral judgements. 
 The uncertainty underlying a moral situation might in turn be due to 
uncertainty with respect to the reward or the causal structure of a given environment. 
Having detected that a situation is morally uncertain, the amygdala would signal a 
need to learn about its structure, so that the entropy of the active prior could decrease 
and moral uncertainty resolved. I now make clearer and give some support to this 
hypothesis by describing Herry et al.’s (2007) experiment, which expands on 
findings about the amygdala in associative learning (for a review of amygdala 
functions see LeDoux 2008). 
 Herry and colleagues (2007) used a translational approach in humans and 
mice to ask whether the amygdala is essential “for processing sensory information 
that does not allow an exact prediction in time” (p. 5958). In their study, humans and 
mice were exposed to sound pulses. There was nothing specifically social or 
emotional about the pulses which were not associated with any other stimuli either. 
Herry and colleagues used two sound pulse sequences. One sequence was 
randomized so that the pulses occurred unpredictably at a variable interval. In the 
other sequence the sound pulses occurred predictably (every 200ms). It was found 
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that a sequence of unpredictably-timed sound pulses was associated to sustained 
amygdala activity both in mice and humans, measured as c-fos changes in the 
mice—where c-fos is a protein used as an indirect marker of neural activity—and 
fMRI responses in the humans. 
 This finding supports the hypothesis that uncertainty per se, rather than 
emotional or social dimensions of stimuli, is sufficient to engage amygdala 
processing. Thus, amygdala activity might be tuned to the level of uncertainty of the 
statistical structure of the environment. Recall that this level of uncertainty depends 
on the probabilistic model of the environment encoded in agents’ cognitive system. 
Amygdala activity, then, might contribute to the detection of whether there is a 
significant mismatch between the model and the structure of the environment an 
agent finds herself. More specifically, it might “track a quantity, known as 
associability, which reflects the extent to which each cue has previously been 
accompanied by surprise (positive or negative prediction errors” (Li et al. 2011, p. 
1250). 
 One possible function of such uncertainty-detection could then be connected 
to learning about the environment. Amygdala-based computation of uncertainty 
might bias the agent towards greater vigilance to the contingencies in that 
environment (Blackford et al. 2010). More specifically, amygdala activity might 
control “learning rates dynamically, accelerating learning to cues whose predictions 
are poor and decelerating it when predictions become reliable” (Li et al. 2011, p. 
1250). 
 The second part of Herry and colleagues’ study addressed the hypothesis that 
amygdala-based computations supports important aspects of learning about 
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environmental contingencies. They asked what behavioural effects amygdala 
response to uncertainty could have. In this second part, both humans and mice were 
engaged in tasks indexing stress and anxiety while one of the two sound pulse 
sequences played in the background. In particular, the human subjects were engaged 
in a dot-probe task where they viewed angry and neutral faces on a screen and had to 
press a button when a dot appeared in the location previously occupied by the face. 
 Compared with the predictable tone condition, in the unpredictable tone 
condition both mice and humans behaved more like anxious, hyper-vigilant subjects. 
Specifically, compared with the predictable tone condition, human subjects showed 
shorter reaction time when the dot occupied the position of the angry face instead of 
the neutral face when exposed to a sequence of unpredictable tones. Thus amygdala 
activity in response to an uncertain sensory environment seemed to bias responses 
towards greater sensitivity to threats, or more generally to biologically-relevant 
stimuli. By enhancing vigilance, amygdala activity might then signal the need to 
learn the structure of the environment (Whalen 1998). The role of the amygdala as 
uncertainty-detector might be more fundamental than—or even account for—its 
involvement in emotion and social cognition (Pessoa and Adolphs 2010). 
 
3.1.3 What’s Wrong with Psychopaths’ Moral Cognition? 
If psychopathy is a developmental condition, then psychopaths’ abnormality is 
probably linked with moral judgement as a process. Psychopaths would have moral 
knowledge but they would be incapable of updating it. The moral cognition of 
psychopaths might be deviant, first and foremost, as a result of an insensitivity to the 
uncertainty of a given situation measured with respect to an internal probabilistic 
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model of the situation. Because psychopaths would be unable to detect morally 
uncertain situations, they would lack signals enhancing their vigilance and 
disposition to learn about the structure of a given social situation. 
 Given the wealth of evidence indicating that amygdala activity can facilitate 
memory consolidation in other neural structures, sustained amygdala activity 
associated with detection of morally uncertain situations “may represent one possible 
mechanism by which prediction errors generated in one brain area may influence 
more widespread memory systems” (Herry et al. 2007, p. 5965). So, psychopaths’ 
capacity to update and revise their moral knowledge might be compromised due to a 
lack in some types of prediction-errors or because the prediction-errors they generate 
fail to influence storage of new moral information. 
 
Why Do Psychopaths Treat Conventional Wrongs As If They Were Moral 
Wrongs? 
Psychopaths treat conventional wrongs as if they were moral wrongs because they 
have difficulties in updating their moral knowledge, in particular their value-
knowledge. Such difficulty would ultimately depend on their blindness to uncertainty 
underlying social situations, which makes it difficult for their internal models of the 
social environment to be updated. 
 Abstract norms prohibiting harmful and unjust behaviour might be the norm 
priors hardwired in our cognitive system which constitute our moral knowledge at 
“the beginning of the beginning”—more on this in a moment. We would revise this 
body of “prior” moral knowledge and pick up other types of norms such as the local 
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social norms and conventions structuring our social environment by learning from 
repetitive social interaction or by being explicitly instructed. 
 Because psychopaths are blind to uncertainty, they will have difficulties in 
learning from direct interaction with their social environment. Given that detection of 
uncertainty typically triggers heightened vigilance towards biologically-relevant 
stimuli, towards threats in particular, psychopaths may be less vigilant to social 
punishments. Thus, psychopaths would not be able to update their moral knowledge 
via value-based learning, in particular via social-punishments. They would not be 
able to revise their normative knowledge on the basis of the reward-consequences of 
their behaviour either. 
 Explicit instruction can enable them to pick up at least some of the social 
norms and conventions that regulate interaction in their social environment. This 
type of learning may be insufficient, however, to convey the gradable properties of 
moral judgement since, in general, explicit instruction conveys information about 
rules as if they were exceptionless, non-gradable generalizations (Cf. Rogers and 
McClelland 2004). But conventions, unlike moral norms, are usually not treated as 
exceptionless generalizations. So, although along their learning trajectory 
psychopaths can acquire moral norms and conventions, the way they learn about 
them does not allow for distinguishing between the two types of norms. Hence they 
make judgements about conventional violations as if they were moral. 
 
Why Are Psychopaths Blind to the Welfare of Victims of Norm Violations? 
If psychopaths have a difficulty in learning about the structure of their social 
environment, then they will tend to have difficulties in representing reliably how 
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sensory input varies with any moral judgement. This is partly because of 
psychopaths’ lack of vigilance towards the sensory consequences of any norm-
compliant behaviour. If they are not vigilant in this sense, then the sensory 
consequences of any norm-compliant behaviour will provide unreliable data about 
any of their particular moral judgement. In other words, psychopaths’ likelihood 
function of moral judgement is “wide,” and consequently their moral judgement will 
be more strongly influenced by their norm prior. Being more strongly influenced by 
their norm priors, psychopaths will tend to put less weight on the consequences of a 
given moral or conventional transgression when they are asked to justify their 
judgement. Hence, when they justify their moral judgements, psychopaths will make 
predominant reference to information encoded in the norm prior, that is, to 
information about the norm itself (e.g. “It is not acceptable to do that”); compared to 
healthy controls, they will be less likely to make reference to other’s welfare (“Doing 
that will hurt that person”) or to the disruption caused by the transgression (“The 
class will be distracted if I do it”). 
 
Four Predictions 
Specific predictions can be drawn from this diagnosis. First, if psychopaths are 
insensitive to the uncertainty of a moral situation, then, in comparison to non-
psychopathic subjects, they will show less cognitive dissonance and less anxiety in 
judging a potentially problematic moral scenario, as they will be less prone to moral 
uncertainties. If amygdala activation detects uncertainty, and psychopaths are 
insensitive to the uncertainty of a moral situation, then given a moral scenario, 
psychopaths’ norm priors will generally display a smaller degree of entropy than 
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non-psychopaths’ norm priors, or their likelihoods of moral judgements will 
generally be more “peaked” than non-psychopaths’ likelihoods of moral judgements. 
 Second, psychopaths will be less vigilant—that is, they will show higher 
sensory thresholds throughout sensory cortex—when they have to judge a moral 
scenario; in particular, they will be less vigilant towards potentially-threatening 
stimuli in uncertain moral situations. 
 Third, psychopaths will be less disposed to revise their body of moral 
knowledge in comparison to non-psychopaths in the face of new relevant moral 
information. This learning impairment might be due to lack of prediction-errors or to 
a failure to consolidate memories courtesy of prediction-errors. 
 Fourth, if explicitly instructed about the authority-dependent nature of 
specific conventions, psychopaths will tend to show a normal capacity to draw the 
moral conventional distinction. 
 Rather than depending on an emotional deficit, therefore, the deficiencies in 
moral judgement of the psychopath might perhaps be consequence of a learning 
deficit, which ultimately would be consequence of an incapacity to detect and deal 
with uncertainty in morally significant situations. 
 
3.2 Children’s Moral Judgement 
Children as small as three years of age can distinguish between moral norms (e.g. 
norms involving justice and harm) and conventions. So, small children seem to be 
equipped with abstract information about the moral world. At the same time, children 
learn about their social and moral environment from direct experience. 
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 The type of information they acquire during development might not be 
sufficient to ground the moral/conventional distinction. The explicit moral education 
that children receive seems to be mainly directed towards social norms rather than 
moral ones. Casual observation suggests that most advice and corrections that 
children receive from caregivers and parents are directed towards social norms or 
conventions (“Don’t burp!”, “Wait for your turn!”) rather than moral norms (“Be 
just!” or “Don’t kill your mates”). Where does small children’s moral knowledge 
come from? 
 
3.2.1 Children as Probabilistic Learners and Their Built-In Priors 
I wish to suggest with Gopnik et al. (2010, p. 342) that “the child is a probabilistic 
learner, weighing the evidence to strengthen or reduce support for one hypothesis 
over another.” From this perspective, we might explain findings on small children’s 
judgement in the moral/conventional task by appealing to “evolutionarily built-in” 
norm priors. 
 One argument in support of this hypothesis goes like this: 
 
 P1. At least partly, natural selection has shaped our psychological tendencies. 
 P2. Humans are generally averse to risky states—where objective  
 probabilities are known—and to uncertain states—where objective 
 probabilities are missing. 
 P3. Risk aversion is evolutionary advantageous under many circumstances. 
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 P4. If risk aversion is evolutionary advantageous under many circumstances, 
 then, a fortiori, uncertainty aversion is evolutionary advantageous under 
 many circumstances. 
 P5. Actions that involve harm and injustice bring about highly uncertain 
 social states. 
 C. Therefore, humans may have inbuilt priors such that they averse to actions 
 that involve harm and injustice. 
 
I take it that P1 is non-contentious. P2 is underwritten by a substantial wealth of 
evidence (see e.g. Weber and Johnson 2009). P3 and P4 can be justified by appealing 
to Friston’s free-energy principle, which we encountered in Chapter 1, thus. In an 
evolutionary setting, “model”-selection (or agent-selection) is constrained by free-
energy minimization: models with the lowest average uncertainty are the ones who 
are likely to survive and passed on to the next generation. 
 P3 can receive independent justification as well. Here I draw on Samir 
Okasha (2007). Okasha’s argument is that, under realistic assumptions, types of 
organisms with a lower variance in their reproductive output—individuals who are 
risk-averse with respect to their offspring—have fitness advantage under a variety of 
circumstances. Suppose—Okasha argues—that there are only two types of organisms 
in a population. They reproduce asexually, and their types are transmitted faithfully 
from parent to offspring. Type A organisms have fixed reproductive output (e.g. 5 
offspring); type B organisms have a reproductive output that varies stochastically 
(e.g. 10 or 0 offspring with 0.5 probability). Although both A and B organisms have 
the same expected number of offspring E (E(B) = 0.5 * 10 + 0.5 + 0 = E(A) = 5), 
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they do not have the same expected frequency of offspring. The frequency of a type 
X after a generation is given by: 
 NUMBER of Offspring of Type X / TOTAL number of Offspring in the 
Population 
 In a population with 2 organisms, one of type A the other of type B, after one 
generation, the population will contain 5 A and 10 B with 0.5 probability and 5 A 
and 0 B with 0.5 probability. By applying the formula above, in the former case the 
frequency of the A type will be 1/3, in the latter 1. If we compute the expected 
frequencies F, we have: 
 F(A) = 0.5 *1/3 + 0.5 * 1 = 2/3; and 
 F(B) = 0.5 * 2/3 + 0.5 * 0 = 1/3. 
 Type A has higher expected frequency in the second generation. Since 
frequency is what matters for evolution, type A is fitter than B because its lower 
variance in reproductive output, or, put it in other words, because it is averse to risk. 
Therefore, under many circumstances evolution seems to favor risk-averse 
organisms. 
 If P3 is plausible, then P4 is plausible a fortiori. The consideration in support 
of P4 is simple. What is generally referred to as a ‘risk’ involves knowledge of 
objective probabilities. In the case of ‘uncertainty,’ instead, objective probabilities 
are unknown: they have to be guessed on the basis of prior experience. If risk-averse 
organisms have an evolutionary advantage over risk-seeking ones in many 
circumstances, then uncertainty-averse organisms will have an evolutionary 
advantage over risk-averse ones, as dealing with risk is less computationally-
consuming than having to deal with uncertainty. Uncertainty-averse behaviour may 
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be evolutionary advantageous. And our tendency to be averse to uncertainty might 
have an evolutionary explanation. 
 P5 seems plausible as well. Types of behaviours that are harmless or that 
promote justice seem to be particularly efficacious to minimize agents’ uncertainty. 
Social and moral institutions “create order out of chaos, […] make our lives more 
predictable, and thereby allow us to devote less of our resources to solving recurrent 
social problems repeatedly” (Schotter 1981, p. 143). Under most circumstances, 
behaviour that involves harm or injustice tends to bring about uncertain states. 
Breaking a promise or punching others are such types of behaviours: situations 
where injustice and violence are systematically pursued are highly chaotic. 
Compared to behaviour like keeping a promise, the sensory consequences of harmful 
or unjust behaviours seem to be relatively harder to estimate. 
 If my argument in this section is sound, then there are grounds to conclude 
that at “the beginning of the beginning” humans might have norm priors such that 
they judge behaviour involving harm and injustice as wrong. Such behaviours would 
be “wrong” partly because they are catalysts of uncertainty. We may have an evolved 
bias to avoid types of actions like breaking a promise or hurting others. This built-in 




This chapter has expanded on the Bayesian Brain Hypothesis and brought the 
Bayesian framework to bear on moral judgement. Specifically, it has put forward the 
suggestion that some central aspect of the psychological mechanism of moral 
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judgement can be described within a RL-Bayesian neurocomputational framework. It 
has argued that this framework promises to shed new light on puzzling findings 





Leges Sine Moribus Vanae.6 
Does Language Make Moral Thinking Possible? 
Does language make moral thought possible? After having put forth an account of 
moral judgement in the previous chapter, I now tackle this specific question. More 
generally, in this chapter I explore the relationship between language and moral 
cognition by engaging with some relevant aspects of Andy Clark’s work. I also point 
to one important capacity, the capacity for florid control, which might be enabled by 
the workings of RL algorithms implemented by dopaminergic circuits. 
 Clark’s unabashedly transdisciplinary work and argumentative style represent 
an ideal platform for advancing a debate such that concerning the relationship 
between language and moral cognition. By bringing insights and results from various 
disciplines to bear on the understanding of such a relationship, Clark claims that 
human language explains the possibility of moral thought. He argues for a supra-
communicative view of language according to which we use language not only, or 
mainly, to communicate (Clark 1998; 2006a; 2006b). Language, for Clark, augments 
our cognitive abilities, makes learning easier, facilitates us to offload our memory, 
helps us to structure the environment where we live, to manipulate and re-organize 
complex data-sets. We also use language to coordinate our interactions, make plans, 
persuade others and simplify complex tasks. Courtesy of language we can access our 
own cognitive practices from a second-order stance. Language, importantly, appears 
to make possible new domains of thinking (Bermúdez 2003; Carruthers 2002; Clark 
1997, Ch.10; Dennett 1991, Ch. 8). 
                                                 
6 From Horace, Odes, III, 24. Transl.: “Laws without morals [are] useless”. 
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 For Clark, the presence of language and the way people use it mark a 
fundamental divide between humans and all the other animals with respect to moral 
cognition. In an exchange with Paul Churchland, Clark writes: 
 
Recent work in cognitive science highlights the importance of exemplar-based know-how 
in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, certain accounts of moral 
knowledge now stress exemplar-based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of rule-
and-principle based accounts. I shall argue, however, moral thought and reason cannot be 
understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition—like other forms 
of ‘advanced’ cognition—depends crucially on the subtle interplay and interaction of 
multiple factors and forces and especially (or so I argue) on the use of linguistic tools and 
formulations and more biologically basic forms of thought and reason (Clark 2000a, p. 
267). 
 
 More recently, in a debate with John Haugeland, Clark (2002a) presses the 
same point by arguing that linguistic objects like labels, words and sentences 
radically transform and expand the cognitive space our minds can explore. In 
particular, language would make available to our minds a “social-normative space.”7 
According to Clark, the unique profile of our moral cognition, which John 
Haugeland calls ‘norm-hungriness’, is a “secondary effect of getting language going” 
(Clark 2002a, p. 54, discussion). 
 I take issue with Clark and argue for two claims. First, language is probably 
not necessary for moral cognition: at bottom, moral cognition is probably a kind of 
                                                 
7 Here I use ‘moral cognition’ and ‘moral thinking’ interchangeably, I also use ‘social-normative 
space’ as akin to ‘moral space’. Although I acknowledge that there is a spectrum of social behaviours 
some of which tend to be called ‘moral’, for my purposes it is not necessary to precisely define 
‘morality’. My use of the terms furthermore is consistent with Clark’s, Churchland’s and Haugeland’s 
whose works are my main focus. 
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skill dependent on basic capacities of pattern-recognition and social learning. 
Second, our unique norm-hungriness could depend on our capacity for florid control 
rather than on language. This capacity will be further explained in the next chapter, 
in relation to the capacity to care. 
 The chapter is in four sections. The first section gains a broader perspective 
on the topic by rehearsing some of the central ideas in Clark’s exchanges with 
Churchland and Haugeland. Then, it reconstructs Clark’s main argument for why the 
moral domain of thinking is made possible by the presence and use of language. The 
second section is in three parts. It firstly challenges Clark’s view on the relationship 
between language and moral cognition. Secondly, it puts forward the hypothesis that 
norm-hungriness could depend on humans’ capacity for florid control. Finally, it 
considers to what extent my disagreement with Clark is merely terminological. The 
third section provides a succinct map of different effects that language can have on 
moral cognition. The last section summarizes the claims made and defended and 
points to questions for further research. 
 
1. Churchland, Haugeland and Clark’s “Discursive Construction of the 
Moral Space” 
I begin by introducing Paul Churchland’s argument for why language is probably 
unnecessary for moral cognition (Churchland 1995, Ch. 6 and Ch. 10; 1996; 2000). 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, Churchland claims that moral cognition is a kind of 
perceptual skill based on pattern recognition and prototype-based learning and 
categorization. As such, its possibility would not depend on certain uses of language 
or on linguistically codified rules. 
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 Churchland’s argument—as already noticed—is deeply influenced by results 
from cognitive neuroscience and by the requirements of neural networks modelling. 
One of its premises is that artificial neural networks are especially relevant for 
understanding human and animal cognition. 
 If neural networks don’t process information by relying on any system of 
linguistic symbols or linguaform rules, then cognition does not probably require any 
system of linguistic symbols or linguaform rules. Linguistic symbols or linguaform 
rules are not causally involved in neural networks’ processes. Therefore, cognition 
does not probably require any system of linguistic symbols or linguaform rules, to 
the extent that neural networks are relevant to understanding it. Churchland 
concludes that “a normal human capacity for moral perception, cognition, 
deliberation, and action, has rather less to do with rules, whether internal or external, 
than is commonly supposed” (Churchland 1996, p. 101). The possibility of moral 
cognition would not depend on language. 
 Moral thought would rather depend on perceptual skills acquired over a life-
time of social experience. For Churchland, we learn how to recognize a wide variety 
of situations and how to respond to them by relying on a library of moral prototypes 
that we acquire from interaction with others. Moral prototypes, recall, are statistical 
central tendencies extrapolated from concrete moral examples encountered in a 
variety of social interactions. They facilitate us to classify and comprehend new 
social situations, and to respond to them appropriately. The successful navigation of 
our social and moral environment would ultimately depend on our prototype-based 
perceptual or recognitional skills which are embodied in configurations of synaptic 
weights of appropriately trained neural networks. 
227 
 
 Clark agrees with Churchland on the relevance of artificial neural networks 
and cognitive neuroscience for understanding cognition. He argues, however, that 
language plays a fundamental role in constituting some of our social behaviours as 
genuinely moral. For Clark, the presence of language and certain uses of language set 
us apart from other animals by making us genuine moral agents. 
 In reaction to Churchland, Clark emphasises two points. First, moral 
judgement, moral deliberation and social decision-making are capacities that have a 
fundamental communal and collaborative dimension. Clark notices that “missing so 
far from the discussion [on the foundations of moral thought] is any proper 
appreciation of the special role of language and summary moral maxims within a 
cooperative moral community” (1996, pp. 120-121). 
 Moral judgement has a fundamental cooperative dimension since it involves 
being sensitive to the needs, reasons and desires of others. Such sensitivity demands 
a “commitment to finding routes through the moral space that accommodate multiple 
perspective and points of view” (Clark 2000b, pp. 309-10). In order to find such 
“routes through the moral space” language is essential because it makes possible to 
us to give and share reasons for our behaviour (Clark 1996; 2000b). 
 Second, for Clark, the domain of moral thinking is made available to us by 
linguistic objects such as moral labels, codified rules and social classifications. 
Churchland maintains that the role of this linguistic, external scaffolding is to 
offload, preserve and share our moral knowledge; but language, according to 
Churchland, is not causally necessary to make the moral space available to us. For 
Clark, instead, without a linguistic apparatus we would be blind to those behavioural 
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patterns and concepts in our life that constitute the moral domain of thinking. Thus, 
language, for Clark, is causally necessary (or constitutive) to moral thinking. 
 The conjunction of these two claims can be called the thesis of the discursive 
construction of the moral space. Clark’s thesis can be summarized thus: 
 
the moral realm comes into view, and moral cognition is partially constituted, only by the 
joint action of neural resources we share with other animals and the distinctively human 
infrastructure of linguaform moral debate and reason (Clark 2000b, p. 311). 
 
 More recently, Clark has articulated this thesis during an exchange with John 
Haugeland (Clapin 2002, Part I). Haugeland holds that humans have a peculiar norm-
sensitivity or insatiable norm-hungriness which is unique to our species and is prior 
to the development of our impressive linguistic abilities. Language, for Haugeland, 
could not get off the ground without this norm-sensitivity or norm-hungriness. 
 Although it’s not clear what Haugeland intends exactly by ‘norm-hungriness,’ 
one plausible way to understand this notion is in terms of a need or desire to create 
and abide by a multitude of norms. Such a need would lead to societies where the 
“structures of a community can rely on the fact that almost all its members will abide 
by almost all the norms almost all of the time” (Haugeland 2002, p. 32). 
 According to Haugeland, our norm-hungriness would depend on some neural 
innovation: “The native wetware endowment of homo sapiens—Haugeland writes 
(2002, p. 31)—has to have evolved so as to support our norm-susceptibility and 
norm-hungriness.” Such a neural innovation is distinct from any neural circuits 
implementing our linguistic capacities. It is the very possibility of language and 
language-use that depends on the neural circuits implementing norm-hungriness. 
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 Haugeland suggests that norm-hungriness and social norms exert “a kind of 
‘normative gravity’ [such that] … when an individual’s dispositions stray from 
producing [normal, conformist] behavior … they are ‘pulled back in’” (Haugeland 
2002, p. 32). Such normative gravity would promote “tight clumps [of sociality] 
separated by large empty gaps” (Ibid.). It would promote, that is, the emergence of 
discrete, identifiable types of social behaviour. This, in turn, would pave the road to 
digitalness which seems to be a prerequisite for the emergence of language. For 
Haugeland, therefore, “social norms may have laid the groundwork for language in a 
more basic way … by enabling the digitalization of behavioral types” (Ibid., p. 33). 
 According to Haugeland’s account, Clark would then be “norm-blind.” Clark 
is focused on language; and language is the wrong target for understanding the rise 
of moral cognition since moral cognition and norm-hungriness would be prerequisite 
rather than consequences of human language. In fact, Clark’s thesis of the discursive 
construction of moral cognition “depicts norm-sensitivity and norm-hunger as 
secondary effects of our linguistically enhanced capacity to target biologically basic 
processing resources on increasingly abstract and higher order domains” (Clark 
2002a, p. 40). 
 Clark, in reaction to Haugeland, argues that it was the emergence of language 
that allowed us to objectify “complex features and relations” which “ma[de] 
available new, quasi-perceptual, spaces for reasoning” (Ibid., p. 42); and it was this 
phenomenon that cranked up the unfolding of the social-normative space that our 
minds can explore. 
 Let me now explain more carefully Clark’s argument in support of his thesis 




1.1 Chimps, Representational Re-Coding and Morals 
In his exchanges with Churchland and Haugeland (Clark 1996; 2000a; 2000b; 2002a) 
Clark’s main argument in support of his thesis of the discursive construction of the 
moral space is a study of analogical reasoning in chimps (pan troglodytes) by 
Thompson, Oden and Boysen (1997). Thompson and colleagues seemingly show that 
chimps trained to use arbitrary plastic tokens of different shapes and colors, which 
are consistently associated with pairs of identical objects (e.g. two shoes or two cups) 
or with pairs of different objects (e.g. one shoe and one cup), learn to grasp abstract 
relationships. 
 The task in Thompson and colleagues’ study was to identify higher-order 
relationships of sameness or difference by exploiting the plastic tokens as stand-ins 
for same-relationship and difference-relationship. The chimps had to recognize a 
display of Cup/Cup as an instance of the same-relationship and a display of 
Cup/Shoe as an instance of the difference-relationship. Experience with the external 
plastic tokens seemed to be necessary for the chimps to solve more abstract 
problems. Presented with a display of Cup/Cup and Shoe/Shoe, or a display of 
Cup/Shoe and Cup/Shoe, the chimps could identify the higher-order relationship of 
sameness also in this case. Chimps were also able to recognize that a display of 
Cup/Shoe and Cup/Cup instantiated the higher-order relationship of difference. 
Chimps that did not undergo that kind of symbolic training could not succeed in the 
task. Hence it seems that prior experience with the external tokens was necessary 
before the chimps could perform successfully. 
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 The conclusion drawn by Clark from this example concerns the capacity 
acquired by the chimps courtesy of objectification of abstract relationships—a 
process “akin to acquiring a new perceptual modality” (Clark 1998, p. 175). 
According to Clark, the chimps in Thompson and colleagues’ study learn to solve a 
complex problem because of representational re-coding—which was mentioned in 
Chapter 2. Chimps would be able to symbolically re-code complex abstract 
relationships into iconically equivalent, simple, usable objects. Clark suggests that 
this capacity leveraged on the experience with the plastic tokens which enabled the 
chimps to acquire new mental representations. Such mental representations could 
stand in for the abstract regularities instantiated by the plastic tokens. Thus, for 
example, when the chimps faced a pair of identical objects, they could retrieve a 
mental representation associated to the same-relationship. When the chimps were 
confronted with two pairs of objects like Shoe/Shoe and Cup/Cup, they could 
retrieve and use two representations of plastic tokens of the same type. The task was 
thereby reduced to the first-order problem of recognizing that two tokens were of the 
same type. Let’s now reconstruct Clark’s argument with his case-study in hand. 
 Clark’s first step consists in showing that words, labels and tags are tools that 
enable representational re-coding. Language, that is, enables us to objectify our 
thoughts and ideas in the same way experience with plastic tokens enabled the 
chimps to objectify abstract relationships. Language, according to Clark, would 
compress abstract regularities into basic cognitive objects. Such cognitive objects can 
make possible new domains of thinking. And in these new cognitive domains, the 
computational space we have to search in order to solve a certain problem would be 
dramatically reduced (Clark and Thornton 1997). These cognitive objects can enter a 
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process of objectification themselves, thereby allowing us to create and explore 
further cognitive domains. 
 The second step in Clark’s argument is important. Clark argues that moral 
cognition is a new domain of thinking made possible by the kind of representational 
re-coding enabled by language. Our use of public language enables us to compress 
abstract relations and features in cognitive objects anchored to moral labels and 
maxims. Normative talk would render certain features and abstract relationships 
visible and usable for us, just as experience with plastic tokens rendered abstract 
relations-between-relations visible and usable for chimps. The normative space of 
morality, according to Clark, is a virtual, higher-order cognitive realm; and norms, 
duties, rights, promises, commandments and obligations are examples of objects that 
populate such a realm. According to Clark, therefore, it is a process of objectification 
empowered by our use of language that makes moral thinking possible and builds up 
our unique norm-hungriness: our capacity to create, learn and act upon social norms. 
 I am not persuaded by Clark’s argument. I agree with Clark that language 
plays an important role in the unfolding of the social normative spaces we inhabit, 
but I am not convinced by the second step in his argument. Specifically, I am not 
convinced that the kind of representational re-coding described by Clark as 
empowered by language is necessary for the rise of moral thinking and in particular 
for making possible a social-normative space. Human norm-hungriness does not 
probably follow from “getting language going.” Our peculiar norm-hungriness would 
rather depend on florid control. 
 I am sympathetic, instead, with aspects of both Churchland’s and 
Haugeland’s accounts. On the one hand, I agree with Churchland that the very 
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possibility of moral cognition does not depend on a linguistic apparatus. The account 
of norm compliance laid out in Chapter 1, in fact, does not make reference to 
language or linguistic resources. On the other, I am attracted by Haugeland’s idea 
that humans’ peculiar norm-hungriness might depend on some neural innovation. 
 
2. Why Language Could Not Be Necessary for Moral Thinking 
Is the capacity enabled by re-coding, and displayed by the chimps in Thompson and 
colleagues’ study, causally necessary for creating and successfully navigating a 
social-normative space? To answer this question let’s consider the case of macaque 
monkeys. 
 Macaque monkeys can judge whether two objects are identical on the basis of 
their physical features or of category similarity. They fail, however, in the type of 
high-order reasoning task where chimps can succeed (Thompson and Oden 1998). 
So, they seem to lack a capacity for representational re-coding as rich as that of 
chimps. How does this affect their capacity to navigate their social space? Is 
representational re-coding causally necessary for the rise of social norms and for 
making possible complex social interactions? 
 One famous study by Dasser (1988) with long-tailed macaques shows that the 
ability to recognize others’ social relations—arguably an essential ability for 
successfully interacting with other agents—may depend on mechanisms other than 
representational re-coding. Macaques were trained to view photographs of other 
familiar members of their group. The photographs were either of a mother and her 
offspring, or of two unrelated group members. After training with the same mother-
offspring pairing, the monkeys could successfully judge whether novel combinations 
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were a mother-offspring pair or a pair of unrelated individuals. Macaques displayed a 
capacity to recognize a social concept such as mother-offspring independent of the 
physical characteristics of the particular individuals involved. In fact, the pictures of 
mother-offspring pairs included mothers with infant daughters, mothers with adult 
daughters, and mothers with sons. 
 Another study, by Bovet and Washburn (2003), shows that rhesus macaques 
(Macaca mulatta) are able to categorize unfamiliar conspecifics on the basis of their 
dominance relations. Here, the monkeys were confronting video-clips of agonistic 
interactions of unknown individuals of their same species. After some observations, 
the monkeys were able to successfully recognize the dominant monkey in each 
interaction. 
 These two examples show that animals such as macaque monkeys, who 
cannot reason analogically, can nevertheless build up complex social knowledge just 
from observation and experience with conspecifics. Although it is widely believed 
that chimpanzees, and great apes in general, have more complex social cognitive 
capacities than monkeys, the difference is not significant—and it is possible that this 
belief stems from a bias of researchers of animal cognition and behaviour in favor of 
chimps rather than from careful empirical investigation (Tomasello and Call 1997, p. 
350). The social space navigated by macaque monkeys is of comparable complexity 
as the social space of chimps notwithstanding their inability for the kind of 
representational re-coding required by analogical reasoning. Hence, representational 
re-coding is probably not causally necessary for making possible complex social 
knowledge and for proficient social navigation. If moral cognition enables the 
proficient navigation of one’s social space that is not because of the further capacity 
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to use tags and labels to represent abstract, complex relationships. This conclusion 
needs some qualification. 
 There is no claim in Clark’s argument that chimps have more complex social 
knowledge or social structures courtesy of their capacity for analogical reasoning. 
His point with the chimps’ case-study is to provide us with a (non-linguistic, non-
moral) example in support of the claim that language as an artifact makes possible 
new cognitive domains. 
 I agree on the general point that re-coding is a formidable way to make 
available new cognitive objects which can be used for further thought. Nonetheless, 
if animals like macaque monkeys who have a limited capacity for representational 
re-coding present a level of social expertise similar to that of animals like chimps 
that are more skillful in re-coding, then re-coding is probably not causally necessary 
for the emergence of a complex social-normative space. 
 At bottom, moral wisdom might be a type of know-how, enabled by 
Bayesian-RL neurocomputing, that we share with “baboon troops, wolf packs, 
dolphin schools, chimpanzee groups, lion prides, and so on” (Churchland 2000, p. 
297). In many of these animals we don’t witness a capacity for representational re-
coding, yet they do display “the same complex ebb and flow of thoughtful sharing, 
mutual defense, fair competition, familial sacrifice, staunch alliance, minor 
deception, major treachery, and the occasional outright ostracism that we see 
displayed in human societies” (Ibid.). 
 Pattern-recognition and certain types of social learning might suffice for 
animals like macaques to perform successfully in the tasks described above, and 
more generally to proficiently navigate their social-normative space (Churchland 
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2011). Those monkeys had extensive interaction with other conspecifics before 
confronting the experimental tasks. In the course of such interactions, macaques 
could learn that certain patterns of cues correspond to certain abstract relationships 
(e.g. grooming, parenting, sexual interaction, fights or alliances). The identification 
of different types of relationships need not depend on recollection of all the specific 
elements instantiated in particular cases. Rather, as suggested by Churchland, it can 
depend on prototype-based cognitive constructs which deliver the statistical central 
tendency of a large number of concrete exemplars many of which can differ in 
important ways from the others. If macaques can extract and keep track of different 
social prototypes across contexts and act upon them, then they may successfully deal 
with new social situations by recalling what prototype best corresponds to the 
particular pattern of cues in that context. 
 Such library of prototypes, as Chapters 1 and 4 argued, might get imbued 
with value after patterns of rewards and punishments are received in a given situation 
(Ibid., Ch.2). For example, assume that a sufficient number of macaques are willing 
to punish other macaques for behaving in a way b which is harmful to the group 
members. When macaques assist to behaviour b, they may have certain prototypes 
associated to b or to aspects of b. If some macaques engaging in b are punished, then 
b will probably get discounted: macaques will tend to avoid engaging in b in certain 
circumstances. While rewarding objects and events make agents come back for more, 
negative-valenced objects and events tend to be avoided. Thus some of the 
prototypes associated to b might acquire a negative valence. For example, when 
macaques that are at a lower level in the social hierarchy eat berries in certain 
circumstances, other macaques may punish them. Under certain circumstances, that 
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is, eating berries when you are at a lower level in the hierarchy is a behaviour that 
will tend to be discounted. Thus, the macaques might learn that some types of 
behaviours, which are represented in certain ways, cause the delivery of punishment, 
and if they want to avoid punishment, they should behave in certain ways rather than 
others in certain circumstances. 
 In this sense some prototypes can acquire value. There is in fact evidence that 
animals like macaques can “divide the world into distinct in-groups and out groups, 
associate and categorize novel stimuli associated with these groups, and valence 
these groups as ‘good’ or ‘bad’—all in the absence of language” (Mahajan et al. 
2011, p. 401). 
 Now, even if my argument thus far is sound, my proposal would still face two 
problems. First, the trial-and-error learning and pattern-recognition capacities on 
which moral cognition and social navigation might depend are common to most 
animal species. But humans—unlike other animals—do seem to display a peculiar 
norm-hungriness, as Haugeland suggests. If we take this apparent difference 
seriously, what could account for it? 
 Second, it seems that my disagreement with Clark is merely terminological. 
We agree that facts like chimps’ capacity for representational re-coding and 
macaques’ social categorization are relevant to explain the emergence and unfolding 
of moral thinking. Our dispute seems to concern merely the language used to 
describe this space. Are there substantive points of disagreement between Clark’s 
and my argument? 




2.1 Human Norm-Hungriness and Florid Control 
To begin addressing the first issue, one approach is to ask whether some capacity 
enabled by some neural innovation could account for our peculiar norm-hungriness 
as surmised by Haugeland. As the prefrontal cortex is reliably involved in most of 
what it’s taken to be distinctively human forms of thinking and capacities, one 
promising way to understand our idiosyncratic norm-hungriness is to point to some 
cognitive capacity enabled by the human prefrontal cortex (on this point see Preuss 
2009; Stone 2007). Pursuing this approach, my hypothesis is that humans’ peculiar 
norm-hungriness depends on human capacity for florid control which is enabled by 
the concerted interaction between our prefrontal cortex and the dopaminergic RL-
system. I now elaborate my hypothesis. 
 The prefrontal cortex (PFC), which we already encountered in previous 
chapters, is the neo-cortical region most complicated in primates. It comprises an 
ensemble of interconnected areas organized such that they can send and receive 
neural projections from the sensory and motor systems, and many sub-cortical areas. 
Compared to other mammals, humans evolved large brains, with a disproportional 
enlargement of the PFC relative to body size (Kaas and Preuss, 2008). Human PFC 
differs not just in size but also presents much more morphological complexity (Stone 
2007; Preuss 2011). Among the advantages derived from a larger and more 
complicated PFC, there seem to be sophisticated capacities such as high-level, 
flexible goal pursuit, planning, selective attention, and working memory (Fuster 
2008). 
 The dopaminergic system in the basal ganglia and brainstem is just behind the 
PFC. It should be clear at this point that the dopaminergic system is known to play 
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major roles in motor control, learning, motivation and reward-based decision-making 
(for reviews see Seamans and Durstewitz 2008; Redgrave 2007). Between the PFC 
and dopamine neurons in the basal ganglia there are strong bidirectional connections 
which probably indicates that the interaction between PFC and dopaminergic system 
in the basal ganglia could serve specialized cognitive functions: there is evidence that 
the PFC could exert top-down regulatory control over the ascending modulatory 
signals from the brainstem (Robbins and Arnsten 2009), while phasic dopamine 
signals could attend to the gating of new information to the PFC (Cohen, Braver and 
Brown 2002). Although the human neo-cortex does not seem to present an increase 
of dopaminergic innervation in comparison to the neo-cortex of other species, 
humans present some significant innovations in the morphology of dopamine cortical 
innervations, which also tells for a specialized role of dopamine in cortical 
organization occurred in the evolution of the human brain (Raghanti et al. 2008). 
Neuropharmacological research also shows that PFC functions such as self-control 
and attention are highly sensitive to changes in dopamine levels (Robbins and 
Arnsten 2009). 
 Given the possible computational roles of the PFC-Basal ganglia circuit in the 
RL-Bayesian mechanism laid out in Chapter 1, and given all the cognitive functions 
for which the concerted activity of the PFC and the dopaminergic system are 
necessary, it shouldn’t be surprising that they are also crucially implicated in social 
cognition and moral judgement (Forbes and Grafman 2010). But what could the 




 The hypothesis on offer is that among the cognitive functions enabled by such 
an interaction there is what can be called florid control. The apparent peculiarity of 
our norm-hungriness could be accounted for by the human cognitive capacity for 
florid control. This is the capacity to value and pursue biologically-arbitrary thoughts 
and behaviours in the face of distracting stimuli, disruptive emotions, competing 
drives and intentions. Florid control comprises two distinct cognitive capacities: the 
capacity to value biologically-arbitrary thoughts and behaviours, and the capacity to 
maintain and follow through thoughts and behaviours while ignoring potential 
distractive stimuli and suppressing competing and disruptive information. The 
human dopaminergic system would support mainly the former capacity; the PFC 
would be essential for the latter. 
 Biologically-arbitrary beliefs and behaviours are those that do not obviously 
contribute to life maintenance and reproduction. Chastity and hunger-strike are 
examples of biologically-arbitrary behaviours. The human dopaminergic system 
would enable any biologically-arbitrary belief and behaviour to be able to gain the 
status of primary reward like food and water. Read Montague (2007) describes such 
a capacity as a uniquely human “superpower.” What could make this “superpower” 
possible is a specific pattern of dopaminergic signaling that encourages the rest of 
our cognitive system to pursue certain beliefs and behaviours while increasing the 
relative valuation of stimuli that predict them. Phasic dopamine signals might allow 
such highly-valued beliefs and behaviours to gain access and hold onto the PFC 
(Montague et al. 2004). 
 Once such beliefs and behaviours gain this high-value status holding onto the 
PFC, they can become intrinsically motivating courtesy of the control enabled by 
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prefrontal activity. In some cases these beliefs and behaviours correspond to social 
norms and normative behaviour. They can lead us to comply with social norms “even 
when there is little prospect for instrumental gain, future reciprocation or enhanced 
reputation, and when the chance of being detected for failing to comply with the 
norm is very small” (Sripada and Stich, 2007, p. 285). Human norm-compliers would 
be able to ignore distracting stimuli and suppress disruptive, competing motivations 
in the pursuit of the social norms they are hungry for. 
 Note that florid control needs not be conscious. “A firmly held goal often 
means that potential distractions are nonconsciously ignored, and that disruptive 
emotions or drives are nonconsciously suppressed. When social niceties become 
‘second nature,’ one does not have to consciously work out what to do, or 
consciously suppress intentions that could intrude and make for awkwardness” 
(Suhler and Churchland 2009, p. 345). Consciousness therefore is not the mark of 
florid control or of norm-hungriness. 
 Because other animals lack florid control, they would not display norm-
hungriness of the kind displayed by humans. Other animals, unlike humans, cannot 
be motivated to comply with any arbitrary social norm. They do not appear to be 
able to bestow value onto biologically-arbitrary behavioural patterns. Although they 
display a capacity to exercise control and select appropriate actions in the pursuit of 
their goals, their control is not florid. Other animals do not seem to be able to display 
control over behaviours which do not bring any obvious benefit to their group or to 
themselves. 
 In social situations, other animals might pay attention to what others do, and 
rely on their past experience to learn what behaviour is most appropriate in that 
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situation. Once the appropriate behavioural pattern has been learned, they might act 
on it. But they cannot act on a pattern of behaviour in spite of the rewards and 
punishments delivered by others. Dogs, chimps and other non-human mammals have 
complex social knowledge, can be sensitive to subtle cues in their social 
environments, they can care for their juveniles, mates, kin and affiliates, can display 
articulate forms of social interaction, they might even attribute mental states 
(Churchland 2011; de Waal and Tyack 2003). What non-human animals cannot do is 
to comply with norms of chastity or hunger-strike. 
 
2.2 Beyond Terminological Disagreement. Local Moral Thought and 
Moral Systems 
Much of my disagreement with Clark seems to hinge on how ‘morality’ is best 
defined. I believe that in fact this is not the case: my disagreement with Clark isn’t 
merely a matter of terminology. While I can see at least two points of substantial 
disagreement, there are also two points where we can be in agreement. Clarifying 
these points will help us identify ways to make philosophical and scientific progress. 
 The first point of genuine disagreement is whether language is necessary for 
agents’ committing to certain ways of behaving in a community. Moral commitment, 
for Clark, appears only in moral debate. Moral behaviour, as noted above, would 
demand a “commitment to finding routes through moral space that accommodate 
multiple perspective and points of view” (Clark 2000b, pp. 309-10). Language would 
make such a commitment possible by creating the conditions for agents to enter and 
solve moral clashes. I disagree with this claim. 
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 Language does not create the conditions for moral commitment. I don’t 
question that moral debate is an important way to display and pursue one’s moral 
commitments in a community. But I’m not convinced that debate and argument are 
the only ways to make moral commitments and displays of such commitments 
possible. There are non-linguistic ways that create the conditions for agents to pursue 
practical agendas in a community. Non-linguistic agents can commit themselves to 
certain types of courses of action in a community, and display their commitments by 
relying, for example, on a suite of moral emotions. 
 Frank’s (1988) idea of emotions as commitment and signaling devices is 
relevant here. The idea is that emotions like anger or guilt can commit agents to 
pursue specific courses of actions even contrary to their immediate material self-
interest. Since emotions are typically visible to others and can be hard to fake, they 
also function as signaling devices. Anger, for example, would signal to others a 
commitment to aggressive behaviour. Being committed to aggressive behaviour and 
signaling this commitment could prevent other agents from acting on certain 
behavioural patterns and thereby clashes could be avoided. If clashes cannot be 
avoided, being committed to certain emotions can still prompt ways for solving 
practical issues. Sex or fights are two such ways: they are ways of solving moral 
clashes divorced from argument and debate. Hence, the emotions may be non-
linguistic means to “finding routes through moral space that accommodate multiple 
perspective and points of view.” 
 The second point of disagreement with Clark concerns the role of language in 
humans’ norm-hungriness. Clark holds that language, via the representational re-
coding it enables, is necessary to make available a normative domain of thinking. If, 
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for example, dogs cannot comply with a norm of chastity, that is because patterns of 
behaviour of certain types are unavailable to dogs’ minds. And, in turn, this is 
because dogs lack language. We can comply with a norm of chastity because we 
possess language, and language makes our minds sensitive to patterns of behaviour 
like chastity. For Clark, therefore, language is necessary for our peculiar norm-
hungriness. I deny this claim. 
 If we understand ‘chastity’ as abstention from all sexual intercourse, creatures 
with no language do not seem to be necessarily blind to the corresponding 
behavioural pattern. Non-human animals like macaques or baboons possess complex 
social knowledge. Macaques, we have seen, can recognize social concepts like 
mother-offspring. Baboons seem to understand “in what matriline every animal 
belongs, how the matrilines are ranked relative to each other, and who ranks where 
within each matriline” (Churchland 2011, p. 127). All this involves a lot of social 
knowledge which can be acquired courtesy of pattern recognition and social learning, 
based on other agents’ rewards and punishments and on imitation. Baboons’ social 
knowledge facilitates their social decision-making. For example, it facilitates them to 
act upon specific norms of cooperation, grooming and food sharing. 
 Given this capacity to acquire rich social knowledge and to act upon it, and 
given the saliency of a behavioural pattern like chastity, it does not appear wildly 
implausible that the concept of chastity could be available to the minds of some non-
human animals. 
 Even if such a concept is available to their minds, however, non-humans 
animals couldn’t comply with a norm of chastity because they lack florid control. As 
I suggested above, non-human animals could not value any biologically-arbitrary 
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behavioural pattern and they could not exercise control resistant to competing drives 
and distracting information so that they can act on such a pattern. It seems unlikely 
that dogs, baboons and macaques can act upon norms of chastity, but not because 
they lack language; they cannot comply with chastity because they lack florid 
control. 
 In spite of much disagreement, there are two points where Clark and I can 
find common grounds. To reach these common grounds we do not need firstly to 
tackle the question of how ‘morality’ should be defined. There’s room for substantial 
agreement once we bring Gibbard’s (1990) notion of accepting a norm to bear on our 
understanding of ‘norm-hungriness,’ and we distinguish between local moral thought 
and systemic moral thought. 
 Clark can agree with Churchland and me that other animals, even those with 
no capacity for representational re-coding, can display moral thought. They can 
possess knowledge of complex social relationships on which they can act, engage in 
altruistic behaviour, show empathy, punish norm violators, reconcile after fights, 
have subtle policies to regulate behaviour in their communities (see e.g. Churchland 
2011; de Waal 1996; de Waal and Tyack 2003). 
 Non-human animals, however, aren’t moral in the way humans are:8 They 
cannot accept a norm in the sense singled out by Gibbard (1990, Ch. 4); and they 
lack what I call systemic moral thought. Clark, Churchland, Haugeland and I can 
agree that language is probably an essential prerequisite for both accepting a norm 
and systemic moral thought. Let me explain. 
                                                 
8 Churchland (2011, p. 26) writes: ‘Of course only humans have human morality. But that is not news, 
simply a tedious tautology. One might as well note that only marmoset have marmoset morality, and 
so on down the line. We can agree that ants are not moral in the way humans are, and that baboon and 
bonobo social behavior is much closer to our own.’ 
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 The aim of Gibbard’s (1990) is to understand the nature of rationality and 
morality in a way that fits with a picture of ourselves as members of an evolved 
species facing recurrent bargaining situations. In order to reach his aim, the main 
notion to be explained is that of accepting a norm. Gibbard’s basic proposal is that 
“to think something rational is to accept norms that permit it” (Ibid., p. 55). 
 For Gibbard, accepting norms “is a significant kind of psychological state” 
unique to humans (Ibid.). He explains: “The state of accepting a norm, in short, is 
identified by its place in a syndrome of tendencies toward action and avowal—a 
syndrome produced by the language-infused system of coordination peculiar to 
human beings. The system works through discussion of absent situations, and it 
allows for the delicate adjustments of coordination that human social life requires” 
(Ibid., p. 75, emphasis added). 
 Accepting norms would be the capacity to be motivated to sincerely avow 
and to act upon certain behaviour patterns which evolved because of the advantages 
of coordination and planning through language. Successful coordination and 
planning in bargaining situations faced by complexly social species like ours would 
require normative discussion. This is the practice of evaluating with one another 
what to do, think or feel in various, typically absent, situations. Within normative 
discussion agents tend to be responsive to others’ demands and needs, and to be 
influenced by the avowals of others. The acceptance of norms arises from and is 
influenced by normative discussion. Since normative discussion is grounded in 




 Now, Haugeland’s notion of norm-hungriness is vague. Above I provided one 
possible characterization and I argued that norm-hungriness does not depend on 
language. If norm-hungriness is understood in terms of Gibbard’s notion of accepting 
a norm, however, it should be clear that norm-hungriness does depend on language. 
Norm-hungriness, in this sense, would be a capacity that can only be acquired under 
the pressure of normative discussion, whereby we determine what it is to count as 
rational, or morally right or permissible, or what we should believe or feel. Norm-
hungriness, in this sense, would also lead to systemic moral thought. 
 By ‘systemic’ I refer to the kinds of effects of moral thought. Non-human 
animals’ moral cognition can have only local effects. Courtesy of language, instead, 
human moral thought can spread throughout space and time by creating cognitive 
niches that foster a normative explosion (Clark 2006b). Such niches correspond to 
social structures such as families, churches, governments, markets, legal systems, 
post offices, hospitals, universities, museums, theatres and so forth. In such niches 
norms get propagated and become themselves objects of moral thinking. Churches, 
schools and museums not only secure that norms are transmitted by facilitating that 
people are instructed in the endorsement of evaluative, behavioural and epistemic 
norms. More importantly, they provide us with the conditions to bring normative 
considerations to bear on norms themselves. Social structures like churches, schools 
and museums are niches where normative thought can be objectified thereby 
promoting a normative explosion where higher-order norms can emerge to manage 
our endorsement of lower-order norms. 
 Language, it seems, is an essential prerequisite for the creation and policing 
of these social structures (Searle 1995). Language would be necessary for the 
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creation of such structures because it provides us with a unique means to collectively 
represent something as having a certain status beyond its physical features. For 
example, once a certain building is collectively represented and accepted as having 
the status of a school, and such collective representation and acceptance is common 
knowledge, then that building can perform functions that it could not perform before. 
Language is a unique means to grant a certain status to a something and to make 
common knowledge its purposes, the legitimate moves with it and within it, the roles 
attached to different agents engaging with it and within in it. 
 Language makes possible also to effectively police and give shape to these 
structures. We can manage and direct such complex structures only because language 
enables us to reflect on maxims, labels and moral summaries and categories; 
language enables us to make normative considerations concerning norms themselves. 
Thus we can manage such social structures so as to facilitate the attainment of 
determinate effects on the community as a whole, or direct their function towards 
new purposes. 
 Therefore, although language probably does not constitute a moral domain of 
thinking, it dramatically changes its scope. Language is probably constitutive of 
systemic moral thought as it enables and fosters local effects of moral thought to 
spread systemically and reiteratively across space and time. 
 
3. Causal Influences of Language on Moral Cognition 
Language can have important specific causal consequences on moral cognition and 
social decision-making. Clark identifies and discusses one such consequence: 
language would bias selective attention during moral problem-solving (Clark 1996; 
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2000a, Sec. 3). The remainder of the chapter integrates Clark’s discussion by 
identifying three further consequences that rules, normative maxim, moral discourse, 
and language more generally can have on moral cognition. Moral instructions can 
modulate the degree to which rewards and punishments impact social learning; moral 
labels can trigger looping effects; language bootstraps moral thinking into meta-
ethics. I succinctly characterize each in turn, after having critically presented Clark’s 
suggestion about the effects of language on selective attention. 
 
3.1 Language and Selective Attention 
Clark argues for a special, although not exclusive, causal role of linguistically 
encoded norms and summary principles on individual processes of selective attention 
and decision-making. To illustrate the point Clark (1996, pp. 118-9) recalls Kirsh and 
Maglio’s (1992) analysis of the performance of Tetris players. Kirsh and Maglio 
argue that expert Tetris players rely both on reactive, pattern-completing cognitive 
mechanisms, and on linguaform, high-level normative policies which they use to 
monitor the processes of the former. Normative policies express how things ought to 
be, that is something the agent should be concerned about. Examples of these 
policies are “Don’t cluster in the center,” “Keep the contour flat,” “Avoid piece 
dependencies” (Kirsh and Maglio 1992, pp. 8-9, quoted in Clark, 1996, p. 119). Such 
policies would bias the processes of selective attention thereby determining the input 
to reactive, pattern-completing mechanisms. After this bias, Tetris players’ behaviour 
tends to be in line with the policy, and their performance improves. 
 Clark suggests that the same might apply in the moral domain: explicitly 
formulated summary rules and moral maxims “may help us monitor the outputs of 
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our online, morally reactive agencies. When such outputs depart from those 
demanded by such policies, we may be led to focus attention on such aspects of input 
vectors as might help us bring our outputs back into line” (Clark 1996, p. 119). The 
idea is that the maxims, laws, normative policies and the linguaform moral rules can 
bias the workings of our more basic pattern-recognition capacities. Rules would flag 
cases where current moral practices diverge from the normative ideal, and ultimately 
they influence our judgements and decisions and lead us to conform to what ought to 
be the case. 
 Clark’s suggestion needs qualification. Casual observation indicates that 
much social behaviour is inconsistent with linguistically-codified rules which people 
are aware of. One reason why this is so is because one’s decision to follow a rule in 
some situation is significantly influenced by what she believes most people do in that 
situation. When the majority’s behaviour in some situation is inconsistent with the 
rule, people may not expect to be punished if they break that rule. Hence, under the 
causal pressure of information about what people typically do, selective attention 
seems to discount what is prescribed or proscribed by some normative policy. 
 In the case of games like Tetris there are specific standards of success. If we 
don’t follow those standards and don’t try to implement some normative policy, the 
game will be over soon. In the social domain, instead, we don’t have specific 
standards of success. In general, if people don’t have a particular personal concern to 
follow a rule, and the rule flies in the face of typical behaviour of the majority, 
information collected courtesy of learning and direct observation will be the major 
causal determinant of their behaviour. 
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 It seems then that laws and linguistically encoded social norms tend to have 
grips on people’s selective attention and decision-making only if they are consistent 
with information about what most people do (Bicchieri and Xiao 2009). Normative 
messages that focus on evidence that most people engage in some desirable 
behaviour are more effective than messages that focus attention on the detrimental 
consequences of norm violation. For example, in hotel rooms we often find cards 
asking us to reuse our towels for the sake of helping save the environment or to save 
resource. But the message communicated by these cards is often ineffective: “Within 
the statement ‘Look at all the people who are doing this undesirable thing’ lurks the 
powerful and undercutting message… ‘Look at all the people who are doing it’” 
(Cialdini 2003, p. 105). When people’s attention is drawn to the fact that the majority 
of guests do reuse their towels when asked, towel reuse increases significantly 
(Goldstein et al. 2008). The causal effect of rules and normative policies is often 
optimized when they are aligned with information about what people typically do. 
 
3.2 Language and Reward-Learning 
A second effect that verbal instructions and rules can have on moral cognition 
concerns learning. Besides trial-and-error learning, verbal instruction is an efficient 
means to learn how to navigate the social environment. Recent computational and 
neuroimaging work indicates that verbal information can have significant impact on 
reward learning (Doll et al. 2009; Li, Delgado and Phelps 2011). When reliable 
verbal instructions are available, we can assign less weight to observed feedback 
which can spare us multiple errors and learn more quickly. 
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 Doll et al. (2009) developed two neurocomputational models that could 
explain the precise effect of verbal information on reward learning: an “override” 
and a “bias model.” In the first, the striatum—a subcortical brain region and major 
target of dopaminergic neurons—learns cue-reward probabilities as experienced, but 
is overridden by the PFC—where instructed information would be encoded—at the 
level of the decision output. In the bias model action selection and learning supported 
by the striatum are biased by rules and instructions encoded in the PFC. 
 These types of models are first attempts to explain the roles and interactions 
of different types of information affecting learning and decision-making. Yet, it is 
not clear why linguaform information influences learning and behaviour in some 
cases and do not in others. Perhaps, verbal instructions and linguaform moral rules 
have special impact on how people learn from feedback in complex and social 
situations where basic reinforcement learning may not be the most efficient way for 
social navigation. 
 
3.3. Language and Looping Effects 
Third, normative talk and moral labels can have a looping effect on our moral 
judgement and behaviour (Hacking 1995). Hacking argues that the creation and 
spread of labels like ‘child abuse,’ ‘multiple personality disorder,’ ‘teen-age 
pregnancy’ can causally affect the ways we think about and interact with the objects 
they refer to. The labels and classifications we use to identify a certain human kind 
influence social behaviour towards the individuals that fall into that category. At the 




 The looping effect ‘is about how a causal understanding, if known by those 
who are understood, can change their character, can change the kind of person that 
they are. This can lead to a change in the causal understanding itself’ (Hacking 1995, 
p. 351). The use of linguistic labels to sort out people can affect what we classify, the 
classifier and the classifications itself, thereby making possible new ways of self-
knowledge. 
 
3.4 Language and Meta-Ethics 
Finally, language bootstraps thinking into meta-ethics: an abstract reflection on 
views, presuppositions and commitments of those who engage in moral debate and 
practice. Meta-ethics is a species of second-order thinking, which is probably a major 
consequence of language. 
 As already noticed, words and sentences can in fact serve as anchors for what 
Clark terms ‘thinking about thinking’ (Clark 1997, p. 209; Clark 2006b): The 
capacity to think about our own thoughts, reasons or cognitive profile. ‘To formulate 
a thought in words (or on paper) is to create an object available to ourselves and to 
others and, as an object, it is the kind of thing we can have thoughts about’ (Clark 
2006b, p. 372). 
 Linguistic formulations of moral thoughts create the conditions for meta-
ethics: ‘creates the stable attendable structure to which subsequent thinkings can 
attach.’ (Ibid.). Normative statements and moral discourse become ‘anchors’ for 
reflecting about the meaning, the psychological presuppositions, and the 





The chapter has explored the questions of whether and in which sense moral 
cognition could depend on language. These questions have been addressed by 
focusing on Andy Clark’s case for a discursive construction of the moral space. It has 
argued that language is probably not constitutive of the moral thinking and that 
humans’ peculiar norm-hungriness might be underlain by the unique human capacity 
for florid control. Linguaform normative policies, moral maxims and rules have 
many distinct effects on moral cognition and on our capacities for moral problem-
solving, moral reflection, social learning and decision-making. Four such effects 
have been identified. 
 There are a number of important questions I have overlooked. For example, 
how can language contribute to the persistence of certain norms? How can certain 
uses of language induce pro-social behaviour? Do language disorders impair the 
capacity to navigate the moral space? More generally, does it make sense to try and 
identify the aspects, if any, of our moral practice that fundamentally distinguish us 




Caring, Emotions and Social Norm Compliance 
This thesis has argued that the mechanism of norm compliance probably consists of 
RL-Bayesian neurocomputations. It has claimed that people in complying with 
norms are subject to many sources of motivation, and that social representations, by 
themselves, are not sufficient to motivate9 norm compliance. The reward-values 
attached to social representations courtesy of RL-systems are also necessary. Now, 
after having claimed in the previous chapter that humans’ peculiar norm-hungriness 
might depend on florid control, I want to examine more closely some of the aspects 
of the motivational structure of norm compliance, at both the personal and 
subpersonal level. 
 Emotion is the focus of this chapter since there is little doubt that it plays a 
crucial role in the regulation of our moral and social life. Yet, it is controversial in 
what sense emotion motivates people to abide by social norms. The empirical 
evidence doesn’t warrant firm conclusions and the philosophical debate has mainly 
focused either on emotion and norm violation, or on the relationship between 
emotion and normative judgement (see e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). This chapter 
asks three questions relevant to understanding the personal and subpersonal natures 
of the reward-values computed by the RL-system: 
 1) Are emotions or emotional processes generally the ultimate motivational 
source of social norm compliance? 
 2) Are the reward-values computed by RL-algorithms in the striatum best 
understood as emotions? 
                                                 
9 With ‘motivation’ I refer to processes that influence the triggering or direction of norm compliance 
behaviour. ‘Ultimate motives’ (sometimes also called ‘primary motives’) are the starting points of 
causal chains that lead to action. 
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 3) How could we characterize the capacity to care, on which the motivation to 
comply with social norms seems to depend, within the neurocomputational 
framework put forward in the previous chapters? 
 
The answers I shall argue for are: 
 1a) The emotions are not the ultimate motivational source of norm 
compliance. The capacity to care is probably necessary both to feel emotions and to 
comply with social norms. 
 2a) There is little evidence that the reward-values computed in the striatum 
should be understood as emotions—as hedonic units in particular. 
 3a) One way to give neurocomputational flesh to the capacity to care is in 
terms of the computational dynamics of various neuromodulatory systems. 
 
 The chapter is in three sections. Section 1 tackles the first question by 
engaging with one of the few explicit arguments that the emotions are the ultimate 
source of norm compliance: Robert Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis (Sugden 1998; 
2000). Sugden’s argument is congenial to this chapter—which does not hinge on any 
sophisticated account of emotions—because it seems to assume a commonsensical 
view of emotions understood as feelings that people experience. I argue, contra 
Sugden, that the emotions—in this sense at least—are not the motivational source of 
norm compliance. 
 With the results of my critique to Sugden’s account in hand, I tackle the 
second and the third question. Section 2 argues that Fehr and Camerer’s (2007) 
hedonistic interpretation of neurobiological data about social norm compliance is 
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unjustified. The reward-values computed by the brain mechanisms that might 
implement RL algorithms should not be understood in terms of pleasure. The last 
section suggests that caring, which is probably bound up with social norm 
compliance, might depend on a fundamental aspect of the RL-system. What we care 
about might be determined by the setting and adjustment of several parameters in 
RL-algorithms courtesy of specific neuromodulatory systems. 
 
1. Emotion and Norm Compliance 
Imagine you are travelling on a crowded train without a seat. While you are tired of 
standing, someone leaves her seat to go to the toilet. Why don’t you take her seat? A 
plausible explanation may invoke the existence of a norm that bounds the set of 
appropriate actions in that type of context. In the vocabulary of folk-psychology: 
because you believe that taking the seat of someone who leaves it to go to the toilet 
falls outside that set and you find that norm reasonable, you don’t take the seat and 
you keep on standing. 
 Robert Sugden (1998; 2000) argues that it is not your acceptance of the norm 
that plays a fundamental role in motivating you to comply with it. Sugden develops 
an “emotional sanctioning” account of norm-compliance. One of the aims of his 
work is to explain where the “feeling of normativity” comes from. He aims to 
explain the emergence of social norms in general, and norm compliance in particular, 
with no appeal to normative concepts. 
 Sugden’s argument is in two stages (Sugden 2000, Sections 3-4). The first 
leads to the formulation of an empirical hypothesis called the Resentment 
Hypothesis, which provides us with sufficient conditions for the arousal of 
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resentment. Resentment, for Sugden, is a non-moral sentiment which does not 
depend on any moral code. What ultimately motivates norm compliance would be 
the sensation of resentment. The second stage in his argument aims to defend the 
psychological plausibility of the Resentment Hypothesis. 
 Before examining Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis, I succinctly clarify how 
‘emotion’ is used here. ‘Emotion’ is a contentious term. Sugden uses ‘emotion’ 
interchangeably with ‘sensation,’ ‘sentiment,’ ‘affect,’ and ‘feeling.’ He seems to be 
influenced by Adam Smith’s (1759/1976) theory of moral sentiments (see also 
Sugden 2002 on this point). Smith in fact provides a commonsensical account of 
various feelings such as resentment and sympathy, which we are invited to test 
against our own experience. Accordingly, I use ‘emotion’ in an ordinary sense, as a 
type of feeling (see Bennett and Hacker 2003, Ch. 7; for accounts that deny that 
emotions are types of feelings see e.g. de Sousa 2010). 
 In this sense, emotions are mental episodes that one experiences, and their 
essential feature is their qualitative character. This ordinary notion of ‘emotion’ has 
two distinct aspects, which will be important in relation to Sugden’s argument. 
‘Emotion’ can refer both to emotional perturbations and emotional attitudes. 
Emotional perturbations are episodic, short-lived states. Some emotional 
perturbations, such as outbursts of anger, are accompanied by characteristic somatic 
changes, which can include increased heart-beat rate, sweating, muscular tension and 
throbbing temples. Other emotional perturbations, such as feelings of pride, manifest 
in expressive behaviours such as when one issues utterances of pride, changes in 
posture or in tone of voice. 
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 Emotional attitudes last for longer periods. Love and hate, guilt and regret are 
emotional attitudes that can last for years. For example, love as a standing attitude of 
fraternal feeling is distinct from love as the episodic perturbation of falling in love 
with a boy. Love as an emotional attitude is persistent; it can motivate certain kinds 
of actions and thoughts towards the beloved even after the initial perturbation has 
gone. Both emotional perturbations and emotional attitudes often motivate people to 
comply with social norms. For example, you may refrain from taking somebody 
else’s seat on a crowded train because of a negative emotional pang, or because of a 
long-standing shame of misbehaving in social situations like that. Having clarified 
my usage of ‘emotion,’ I now examine Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis on the 
relationship between emotion and norm compliance. 
 
1.1 Bob Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis 
Sugden begins by claiming that when other people’s actions constitute a predictable 
behavioural pattern, they thereby seem to impose “some obligation on me to conform 
to that pattern” (Sugden 2000, p. 112). The claim is not about the existence of a 
general moral principle. It is not that there exists some obligation to conform to 
behavioural patterns in virtue of their being predictable. The claim is that “people are 
in fact motivated as if by some such principle” (Ibid.). Certain behavioural patterns 
are associated with particular normative expectations. And normative expectations 
motivate us to comply with norms courtesy of specific affective signatures. When 
one has a normative expectation, she expects that others expect her to do something. 
But how is it that the fact that some people expect one to do Φ in a certain type of 
situation S makes her want to do Φ in S? 
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 According to Sugden, we naturally feel resentment against those who act 
contrary to our expectations and we also feel aversion towards frustrating others’ 
expectations. By ‘resentment’ Sugden means “a sensation or sentiment which 
compounds disappointment at the frustration of one’s expectations with anger and 
hostility directed at the person who is frustrating (or has frustrated) them” (Ibid., p. 
113). Aversion depends on resentment. One conforms to a behavioural pattern 
because others will resent her otherwise, she knows this, and she is emotionally 
averse to others’ resentment. In many situations resentment and aversion are 
intertwined with cognitions. ‘Cognition,’ recall, here refers to processes supporting 
such mental states as knowledge or belief that contrast with affective or emotional 
processes. 
 There are two ways in which cognitions enter Sugden’s account of norm 
compliance. First, he acknowledges that sometimes people feel resentment and they 
have knowledge that they have been wronged, given some normative standard. But 
people do not feel resentment because of their normative knowledge. That person j 
feels resentment at person i’s doing Φ doesn’t presuppose that j believes that i ought 
not to Φ. For example, your friend and you have agreed to meet for lunch. You are 
waiting for her, when she phones you telling you that she is ill and she cannot make 
it. Although you know that your feeling is unjustified, you may feel resentment 
towards your friend in this situation. Similarly, that person i feels aversion towards 
doing Φ doesn’t presuppose any belief by j that he ought not to Φ. 
 For Sugden, resentment and aversion are more fundamental than ought-
beliefs in two ways. On the one hand, resentment and aversion as sensations are 
evolutionarily more primitive than cognitions, such as ought-beliefs. On the other, 
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many of our ought-beliefs “are nothing more than generalizations of more primitive 
sentiments” like resentment and aversion (Ibid., p. 115). When ought-beliefs have the 
power to motivate people to comply with norms in particular cases, they do so in 
virtue of resentment and aversion of which they are generalizations. Hence, 
resentment and aversion are also more fundamental than ought-beliefs in motivating 
norm compliance in particular cases. 
 There is a second way in which cognitions may be linked to resentment and 
aversion. This leads us to the formulation of the Resentment Hypothesis, which relies 
on common knowledge conditions. Specifically: 
 
 Let P be a population and I a behavioural pattern dependent on some interaction 
among the individuals in P. Let i and j be any two individuals from P that engage in I. Let Φ 
and Ψ alternative actions that i can take in situation S. Whichever action i decides to take, it 
will be common knowledge after the event. Assume that it is common knowledge within P 
that individuals in i’s position normally do Φ rather than Ψ. It is also common knowledge 
within P that people in j’s position have grounds to expect i to Φ and that they normally 
prefer that people’s in i’s position do Φ rather than Ψ. Granted that j has that preference, then 
i’s doing Ψ will induce in j a feeling of resentment towards i; and i’s being aware of this will 
induce in i a feeling of aversion towards doing Ψ (Sugden 2000, pp. 114-116). 
 
 Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis says that people will feel resentment 
towards those who fail to conform to their expectations. Because this tendency of 
people feeling resentment is common knowledge, people will tend to avoid acting in 
ways so as to provoke feelings of resentment. The hypothesis is stated as sufficient 
condition for the arousal of resentment. The bottom line is that a “person can be 
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motivated to meet other people’s expectations about him” and this motivation is 
grounded in an emotion (Ibid.). 
 Sugden illustrates how the sentiment of resentment explains norm compliance 
with the following type of example. It is well-known that diners in the United States 
leave tips of at least 15% of the bill. I know this fact. I have good reason to expect 
that waitresses in the United States expect me to leave a 15% tip if I dine out in the 
US. I go to a restaurant in the US, but I am Italian and it’s not in my interest to meet 
the waitress’ expectation. Still, the existence of the expectation will motivate me to 
tip her. If I don’t tip, I will feel uneasy and embarrassed. I am emotionally averse to 
those emotions, and this aversion motivates me to comply with the norm of tipping. 
 
1.2 Not by Resentment Alone 
I believe that Sugden’s hypothesis is not sufficient. My claim is that the Resentment 
Hypothesis seems plausible only within a population where people care for each 
others’ preferences, expectations and behaviour. The notion of caring I have in mind 
will be articulated firstly by ostension, by pointing to the relevant phenomenon with 
a number of cases. Then, in the following subsection, I shall attempt to elucidate 
what ‘caring’ means here more carefully. 
 
The argument developed in this section can be summarized thus: 
 
 P1. Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis depends on an individual j preferring 
 agent i doing Φ. 
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 P2. If an individual j feels resentment about agent i doing Φ then j cares about 
 i doing Φ. 
 P3. Caring is distinct from preferring. 
 P4. Sometimes an individual j prefers things about which she doesn’t care 
 about. 
 P4’. Sometimes j prefers i to do Φ while j doesn’t care about i doing Φ. 
 C1. Sometimes j doesn’t feel resentment that i doesn’t do Φ even if j prefers i 
 to do Φ. 
 C2. Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis is in general insufficient. 
  
 P1 describes one of the conditions in the Resentment Hypothesis. P2 claims 
that caring about something is necessary for feeling emotions about it. More 
precisely, we should distinguish between two issues: under what conditions we feel 
resentment, and under what conditions we are affected by other people’s resentment 
towards us. P2 can be understood as making two claims: we feel emotions only for 
people, objects, behavioural patterns we care about; we are emotionally affected by 
other people’s resentment towards us only if we care about what other people feel, 
prefer or think about us. P3 and P4 are related. P4’ is a special case of P4. C1 and C2 
follow from the five premises. I start by focusing on P2. 
 Elizabeth Anderson’s (2000) can help motivate such claims. Anderson argues 
that Sugden’s account is incoherent. She focuses on the conditions under which 
people’s decision to comply with norms is affected by others’ resentment towards 
them. Sugden—she reasons—assumes that people can feel resentment on behalf of 
others since we all share the same basic non-moral sentiments. But then norm 
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violators should resent themselves: They need not be averse to others’ resentment to 
be motivated to comply with norms. “Given the impartiality of moral sentiments, 
they can just as easily be directed against [themselves] as against any other person” 
(Ibid., p. 184). Hence, other people’s normative expectations could be superfluous in 
motivating one to comply with norms. If self-resentment can be enough for norm 
compliance, then one can care about complying (or not complying) with social norms 
independently of what others expect her to do. In other words, people can have an 
intrinsic motivation to comply with norms: they can “comply with norms as ultimate 
ends, rather than as a means to other ends” (Sripada and Stich 2006 p. 281). 
 A criticism to Anderson’s argument is that in general the motivating power of 
normative expectations, or others’ resentment, is greater than self-resentment. 
Others’ resentment causes embarrassment and shame in the violator. These 
emotional sanctions work as norm-enforcers, and it is the aversion or fear towards 
such emotions, rather than some sort of intrinsic motivation, that generally motivates 
norm compliance. If aversion or fear of others’ resentment—as opposed to self-
resentment or other sorts of intrinsic motivations—has generally more grips on norm 
compliance behaviour, then people will tend to be less norm-compliant or behave 
much less pro-socially in anonymous or private conditions compared to what they do 
publicly. There is in fact experimental evidence that when their choices cannot be 
detected by other players, participants of economic games tend to behave more 
selfishly, or so as to merely appear to be fair without being fair (Bicchieri and 
Chavez 2010; Dana et al. 2007). Norm-abidance and pro-social behaviour would 
then depend more on what other people expect from the decision-maker than on 
some intrinsic motivation. 
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 But there are two problems with this criticism. First, a large number of studies 
in experimental economics also show that people are often motivated to repay gifts 
and punish violations of certain social norms in anonymous, one-shot interactions 
with genetically unrelated strangers, even at substantial costs to themselves (Fehr et 
al. 2002; Gintis et al. 2003). Even in games with asymmetric information like Dana 
et al.’s (2007), a significant proportion of participants behave pro-socially both in 
public and in private conditions. This body of evidence indicates that in experimental 
situations people generally behave pro-socially or comply with norms not only 
because they are averse to others’ resentment, but also out of intrinsic motives. In 
real-life situations, depending on the cues and the information available in a given 
context at a given time, aversion or fear of others’ resentment can have more or less 
motivational grip than self-resentment or other sorts of intrinsic motives (Cialdini 
and Goldstein 2004). People can therefore care about complying with social norms 
independently of what others expect them to do. 
 Secondly, conceptually, it seems that people should already care about others’ 
normative expectations in order for those emotions to have some grip on their minds. 
If I don’t care about others’ expectations, preferences and behaviour in a certain 
situation, then I shall probably be indifferent to their resentment. Along these lines, 
Anderson concludes “[emotional] sanctions are only a supplementary motive to the 
original motive for compliance, without which the norm would never have been 
established” (Ibid., p. 184). What I wish to emphasize here with Anderson’s 
argument is that, psychologically, the motivational source of compliance appears to 
reside in the capacity to care. To illustrate and give grounds for this point I now 
provide some counterexamples to Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis aiming to show 
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that its conditions are insufficient for the arousal of resentment. The bottom line is 
that caring for other people’s preferences, expectations and behaviour is a necessary 
condition for the arousal of resentment—and for norm compliance. 
 Consider this situation. After their weekly reading group the participants 
regularly go to the pub. Ana Maria and Angelica are two of the reading group goers 
who normally go to the pub. “Going to the pub” and “Not-going to the pub” are 
alternative actions open to Ana Maria in that type of situation. Within the reading 
group goers it is common knowledge that a person in Ana Maria’s position normally 
goes to the pub rather than not. It is common knowledge that Angelica has good 
grounds to expect that Ana Maria will go to the pub. It is also common knowledge 
that people in Angelica’s position prefer that people in Ana Maria’s position go to 
the pub rather than not. Would this be sufficient for Angelica to feel resentment if 
Ana Maria doesn’t go to the pub today after their reading group? 
 I don’t think so. Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis is fulfilled, yet this fails to 
qualify as a case where resentment is aroused. Ana Maria and Angelica are not close 
friends; Angelica might be surprised or curious for why Ana Maria is not going to 
the pub, but she hardly will resent her. To explain why I don’t think Angelica would 
resent Ana Maria, consider another situation. 
 It’s Kirsty’s birthday and Rhiannon is Kirsty’s best friend. Kirsty has invited 
Rhiannon to her birthday party. “Going to the party” and “Not-going to the party” are 
alternative actions open to Rhiannon. Now, would the Resentment Hypothesis be 
sufficient for the arousal of resentment in Kirsty if Rhiannon doesn’t go to her party? 
It is reasonable to believe that in this case Kirsty would feel resentment. In contrast 
to the situation above, now Kirsty and Rhiannon are friends and they care for each 
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other. To better illustrate the relevant phenomenon of caring, I point to yet another 
example. 
 I live in the Edinburgh area. I read in the newspaper that Miss Carr was found 
driving on the wrong side of the road in Leith, which is part of the Edinburgh area. I 
don’t know anyone in Leith, I have never been there, and don’t plan to go there. Is it 
plausible that I would feel resentment, in Sugden’s sense, towards Miss Carr? Again, 
I think it is not. In this case, both Miss Carr and I are part of the general population P 
of drivers in the Edinburgh area. P is quite large. The conditions in Sugden’s 
Resentment Hypothesis are fulfilled, yet it would be implausible to think that I will 
feel “a sensation or sentiment which compounds disappointment at the frustration of 
one’s expectations with anger and hostility directed at the person who is frustrating 
(or has frustrated) them.” I won’t resent Miss Carr even though she frustrates my 
expectations in this situation and I may interact with her in the future because her 
behaviour does not matter to me. 
 This last example also illustrates that in real-life situations, when we deal 
with less close people, we tend to care less about their preferences, expectations and 
behaviour. Such people are typically members of other groups, so they are not close 
to us in a literal sense as well: both spatially and temporally (on ingroup-outgroup 
and social preference see Bernard et al. 2006; Chen and Xin Li 2009). In real-life 
situations, especially when a population is large and it is unlikely that one individual 
will come to know and interact personally with another individual j, i will not tend to 
resent actions by j that frustrate her expectations. Also, in general, i will not tend to 
resent actions by j that frustrate her and another individual k’s expectations if it is 
unlikely that i will come to know and interact personally with either j or k. In real-
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life, that is, we seem to care more for people we are close to, people we regard as 
important to ourselves. Note that this claim is consistent with the experimental 
evidence mentioned above that participants often have an intrinsic motivation to 
comply with social norms. And in fact in experimental settings that more closely 
resemble everyday life participants tend to behave more generously with closer 
individuals (Hoffman et al. 1996; Charness and Gneezy 2008). 
 If the analysis of these cases is roughly correct, then Sugden’s hypothesis is 
probably insufficient for the arousal of resentment. Feelings of resentment arise in an 
individual not just because her expectations are disappointed. People seem to feel 
emotions only about things that matter to them, things they care about. If people feel 
no emotion about things which they don’t care about, then they will feel resented 
when their expectations are disappointed only if they care about the object of those 
expectations. If feeling resentment and aversion of being the focus of others’ 
resentment depend on caring, then the Resentment Hypothesis is not sufficient to 
explain in general norm abiding behaviour. 
 
1.2.1 Caring and Preferring 
Here is an objection to the claim that Sugden’s Resentment Hypothesis is insufficient 
because people feel emotions only about things they care about: ‘Preference’ can be 
considered a free parameter in Sugden’s account and can take different strengths. 
Caring about something would amount to having a strong preference for that 
something, and so P3 would be false—and P4 and P4’ would be incoherent. 




 This objection is problematic however. To begin with, even if we agree that 
preferences have different strengths and that ‘care’ can be treated as ‘strong 
preference,’ nothing in Sugden’s formulation of the Resentment Hypothesis suggests 
how to identify an adequate threshold for the preference parameter. An individual j 
may prefer that people in i position do Φ rather than Ψ. Still these pairwise 
preferences (for i doing Φ over i doing Ψ) might remain below a certain threshold. 
For example, if the strength of a preference is measured on an interval from 0 to 1, 
the preference of j for i doing Φ can be 0.2 while j’s preference for i doing Ψ can be 
0.1. Sugden’s conditions are satisfied, but if the preferences are so weak, it seems 
implausible to think that the Resentment Hypothesis is sufficient to raise resentment 
in j when i does Ψ instead of Φ. A further condition is required in Sugden’s 
formulation that specifies a suitable threshold such that i’s preferences, expectations 
and decisions do matter to j. 
 Yet, it may be protested that we could empirically uncover the value of the 
preference parameter such that if one’s preference is unsatisfied she will feel 
resentment. Different people may care more or less about the expectations and 
beliefs of others, or perhaps in different situations we care more than in others. By 
examining possible correlations between choice behaviour and non-choice data like 
emotional reactions in a given context, a threshold for the preference parameter for 
resentment arousal could be identified. In this sense, Sugden’s account is sufficient 
as it stands. 
 But in this sense, the concepts of what one cares about and what one prefers 
are assumed to be identical. If preferring is not the same as caring—as P3 above 
claims—then there are grounds to argue that in some sense Sugden’s Resentment 
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Hypothesis is insufficient. For—as claimed by P4 and P4’—it might be the case that, 
in some sense, j’s preference about i’s behaviour and expectations are strong but 
those expectations and behaviour don’t really matter to j: j doesn’t care about them. 
And if one does not feel resentment about something unless it matters to her, then j 
won’t feel resentment when her preferences are frustrated. 
 There are two questions then: First, what does it mean to care about 
something? Second, what is the relationship between caring and preferring? Would it 
make sense to say that an individual (strongly) prefers A over B and yet she doesn’t 
really care about A? My answers to these questions heavily rely on Harry Frankfurt’s 
(1982; 2004) analysis of caring. Let’s start from the latter question. 
 To care about something is not simply to prefer, desire or want it. Attributing 
a preference “to a person does not in itself convey that the person cares about the 
object” she prefers over another (Frankfurt 2004, p. 11). Many of our preferences 
and desires are “utterly inconsequential. We don’t really care about those desires. 
Satisfying them is of no importance to us whatever” (Ibid.). For example, in this 
moment I prefer to drink water over coke. As I am drinking coke, my preference is 
unsatisfied. But I don’t feel any frustration since I don’t really care about such a 
preference. Note, however, that my drinking coke now does make some difference to 
me, as everything does make some difference to us. This suggests that things we 
deem important to us, and hence things we care about, are not simply things that 
make some difference to us. Having coke and not water right now is a difference 
unimportant to me: it’s a difference that does not make difference to me. As argued 
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by Frankfurt, “nothing is important unless the difference it makes is an important 
one” (Frankfurt 1982, p. 259).10 
 This lack of caring and frustration need not be because my preference is 
weak, or has low intensity. “Sheer intensity […] implies nothing as to whether we 
really care about what we want.” Frankfurt goes on to explain: “Differences in 
strengths of desires […] may be radically incommensurate with the relative 
importance to us of the desired objects” (Ibid.). In the case of preference, from the 
higher strength of my preference for reading a book over doing the laundry, it does 
not follow that I especially care about the object of this preference. Even if I 
intensely prefer one over the other, the difference that reading a book instead of 
doing the laundry makes to me is not especially important to me now. 
 Furthermore, “a person who wants one thing more than another may not 
regard the former as being any more important to him than the latter” (Ibid., p. 12). 
Frankfurt makes this claim stick with an example. Suppose that you need to kill time 
and you decide to watch the television. You start to watch a certain program because 
you prefer it to the others that are available. “We cannot legitimately conclude that 
watching this program is something that [you] care about.” After all you are killing 
time. “The fact that you prefer it to the others does not entail that you care more 
about watching it than about watching them, because it does not entail that you care 
about watching it at all” (Ibid.). By the same argument, the fact that the individual i 
prefers that j does Φ rather than Ψ does not entail that i cares more, or at all, about j 
doing Φ than j doing Ψ. 
                                                 
10 It should be noted with Frankfurt that “whether a useful account of the concept can be developed 
without running into this circularity is unclear” (Frankfurt 1982, p. 259). 
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 Suggesting that preferring and caring are distinct concepts is also the 
empirical finding that our preferences are subject to powerful contextual influences 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). There may not be stable facts about one’s 
preferences independent of the way a given choice situation is framed. Caring, 
understood in a way to be made clearer in a moment, is more stable. “A person can 
care about something over some more or less extended period of time. It is possible 
to desire something, or to think it valuable only for a moment. […] But the notion of 
caring implies a certain consistency or steadiness of behaviour; and this presupposes 
some degree of persistence” (Frankfurt 1982, p. 261). 
 If caring and preferring are distinct, what does it mean to care about 
something? To care about something is not simply to desire it, or want it, or prefer it 
over something else. Caring is not the same as factoring in things that make some 
difference. In general “caring about something may be a complex mode of wanting 
it” (Frankfurt 2004, p. 11). For Frankfurt, the capacity to care about something can 
be understood more precisely as the capacity to commit ourselves to our own desires, 
wants and preferences. Caring, that is, is a mode of the will. 
 When people care about something, according to Frankfurt, they desire to 
have a desire for it, and they endorse such a desire. If a person cares about 
something, then she is willingly committed to her desire about that thing: she desires 
that she desires it (Ibid., p. 16). Thus, Frankfurt explains: “by its very nature, caring 
manifests and depends upon our distinctive capacity to have thoughts, desires, and 
attitudes that are about our own attitudes, desires, and thoughts” (Ibid., p. 17). 
 Note that this does not mean that all we fundamentally care about is ourselves 
and our well-being. It does not mean that we care about other people’s preferences, 
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expectations, and behaviour only because we care about our welfare and well-being. 
I can care about a waitress expecting me to leave a tip after my dinner and comply 
with a norm of tipping, even if I am aware that by meeting her expectation I won’t 
feel or be better off—next chapter will provide some experimental results relevant to 
this claim. 
 In sum, according to Frankfurt, “these alternative possibilities—commitment 
to one’s own desires or an absence of commitment to them—define the difference 
between caring and not caring” (Ibid., p. 21). It should be clear that, as Frankfurt 
characterizes it, caring about something is peculiar to members of our species since it 
requires the ability to reflexively deal with higher-order desires. This ability, it 
appears, is related to what I called florid control and to Gibbard’s accepting a norm, 
which we encountered in the previous chapter. These three abilities—it seems—are 
grounded on reflexive thinking on the one hand, and on the ability to commit oneself 
resiliently to distinct courses of actions on the other. So, strictly speaking, non-
human animals cannot care in Frankfurt’s sense. 
 Yet, we can understand caring more broadly than Frankfurt so that we can 
make room for the possibility of non-human animals that care. Fisher and Tronto 
(1990) offer a broader characterization, according to which caring is “a species of 
activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our ‘world’ 
so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves 
and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-
sustaining web” (Fisher and Tronto 1990, p. 40). 
 This definition is in line with Frankfurt’s: it construes caring as a complex 
activity supported and informed by a commitment to those desires and goals we 
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deem important for us and for our lives. According to this definition, however, 
commitment to one’s own desires need not be reflexive nor involve self-awareness, 
or florid control. Agents can hold on to their desires in a persistent, steady way 
without being conscious of their commitment. Caring, in this sense, would 
correspond to a relatively stable volitional profile, something with reference to which 
agents steadily orient themselves in their behaviour and in their environment in the 
pursuit of a good life. 
 Also non-human animals, in this sense, would have the capacity to care. And, 
as a matter of fact, also non-human animals care about staying alive, about avoiding 
injuries, predators, hunger, thirst and disorder; they may care about close kins, 
friends and other members of their group; and some may even care for strangers 
under certain circumstances (Churchland 2011, Ch. 3). So, caring can both be self- 
and other-directed. And both humans and some non-human animals can care not only 
about self, but also about others. 
 It is not obvious what mechanism could ground the capacity to care. Patricia 
Churchland has recently suggested that hormones such as oxytocin and vasopressin, 
which originally evolved to promote self-preservation and care for offspring, 
probably constitute basic features of the mechanism for caring. In their evolutionary 
trajectory, these hormones would have later been co-opted to serve new jobs so as to 
enable wider forms of sociability and ultimately to foster moral cognition. 
 The last section of this chapter integrates Churchland’s proposal by pointing 
to some neurocomputational features of a putative mechanism for caring within the 




1.3 Evolutionary Origins of the Resentment Hypothesis 
The target of the second stage of Sugden’s argument is the objection that the 
Resentment Hypothesis is not reducible to psychology because it is loaded with 
social and cultural content. To counter this objection Sugden considers the possible 
evolutionary origin of normative expectations. He asks us to consider an 
environment akin to a mixed-motive game such as Chicken which is assumed to 
stand for the environment of evolutionary adaptedness of our ancestors’ 
neurocognitive mechanisms. In such an environment individuals of the same species 
have to compete repeatedly and enter conflicts for fitness-enhancing resources that 
are scarce. An adaptive strategy in this game is to act aggressively with weak 
opponents, and to back down with aggressive stronger players. 
 The abilities that would enable agents to pursue this type of strategy are three 
according to Sugden. Firstly, agents should recognize and project patterns in the 
behaviour of others. A capacity for pattern-recognition would enable agents to 
identify behavioural patterns of different types of other agents. This would be a 
prerequisite for behaving in function of the situation and the agents that one is facing. 
Second, agents should desire to act aggressively against weak individuals. Finally, 
agents should be averse to acting aggressively against angry individuals. Endowed 
with these abilities agents can behave so as to get as many resources as possible. 
Agents can identify that some opponent is trying to frustrate their desire for the 
resource; but in that type of situation, against that type of opponent, those agents 
normally get the resource. They can then act aggressively at their opponent, thereby 
raising their probability of obtaining the resources. Since anger and fear—Sugden 
(2000, p. 118) reasons—are intrinsic components of the second and third ability 
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respectively, anyone acting on these emotions behaves adaptively. Hence, in a world 
akin to a game of chicken, anger and fear are adaptive. But what do anger and fear 
have to do with resentment? 
 Recall that Sugden defines resentment as “a sensation or sentiment which 
compounds disappointment at the frustration of one’s expectations with anger and 
hostility directed at the person who is frustrating (or has frustrated) them” (Ibid., p. 
113). Resentment is different from anger. As Sugden acknowledges, resentment is 
typically backward looking since it is characteristically experienced when one is 
“looking backward to past injuries” (Ibid., p. 118). How could resentment be 
evolutionary adaptive? 
 Sugden draws on Frank’s (1988) account of the emotions, which was 
introduced in the previous chapter, and argues that anger is a commitment and 
signaling device. Anger predisposes the angry agent to act aggressively in her next 
interaction with another agent. The angry individual could incur an immediate cost, 
but may derive greater benefit in the long run by deterring future frustrations of her 
desires or injuries. Angry agents would be more likely to get away with some 
resource for which they are competing with others. This advantage leverages anger 
as functioning as a signaling device. Other agents need reliably identify angry agents 
so that they have the opportunity to avoid them. By functioning as a signaling device, 
anger provides other agents with information about the state of the individual they 
are confronting. Thus, they will be in the best position to identify agents committed 
to aggressive behaviour. Put differently, by signaling their commitment to aggressive 
behaviour, angry agents will be more likely to be avoided by other agents, and 
consequently to attain some resource without having to fight for it. Resentment, 
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Sugden suggests, may be the side-effect of the evolutionary advantage attached to 
anger as a commitment device because commitment to aggression could depend on 
looking back at past injuries. “Backward-looking resentment—Sugden concludes—is 
the evolutionary price that has to be paid for the advantage[s] of anger” (Ibid, p. 
119). 
 Sugden recognizes that he’s telling us an evolutionary tale about how 
resentment may be a basic feature of human psychology. His aim is to argue for the 
possibility of reducing the Resentment Hypothesis to psychological features thereby 
countering the objection that it cannot be reduced since it has too much cultural and 
social content. I argue, however, that we have more reason to think that resentment, 
as understood by Sugden, is not a basic feature of our psychological make-up. It is 
unclear that anger is an adapted feature of human psychology, and it is controversial, 
at best, that resentment is a by-product of anger. In the remainder of this section I 
first argue that anger might not be an adaptation, and then I question the link Sugden 
draws between anger and resentment. 
 Sugden’s argument is endorsed on more or less the same grounds by 
evolutionary psychologists such as Tooby and Cosmides (2008, p. 131-132). They 
argue that anger is an adaptation, which was selected in response to survival 
challenges faced by our Pleistocene ancestors. Some arguments put forward by some 
evolutionary psychologists are often charged with mistaking explanation for 
evidence for the explanandum itself (Griffiths 1997). To carry weight, evolutionary 
explanations of psychological traits should be backed by independent evidence since 
“adaptive hypotheses are too easy to form and too difficult to test” (Griffiths 1997, p. 
71). In the case of emotions, they should be supported at least by evidence about 
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their purported mechanisms and actual functional significance (Machery 
Forthcoming). 
 I agree with Sugden that in a mixed-motive game like Chicken it can pay off 
to act aggressively with anger. It could be true that angry agents often get away with 
resources, and thereby they have evolutionary advantage over competitors. However, 
it also could be that they incur long-term costs—especially if chicken was not one of 
the games our ancestors played more frequently. On the one hand, anger prepares 
people to overcome obstacles to goal attainment. On the other, however, display of 
anger leads others to not deal with angry agents (Marsh et al. 2005). Elster (1998, p. 
72) argues that angry people will probably “gain more in each interaction, but 
interact more rarely.” Hence, they will not receive resources and feedback which are 
only available from cooperation with others. The effects of anger, therefore, may be 
negative overall. “One cannot show that [the effect of anger is] positive simply by 
citing a positive impact in isolation from other effects” (Ibid.). 
 Sugden might object to this conclusion that his goal is more modest than we 
have assumed it to be. He aims to provide something like an existence proof for the 
evolutionary origin of anger. This doesn’t entail an adaptationist approach towards 
anger. It entails that anger is a universal emotion and it emerges very early in 
infancy. That anger is universal means that people in all cultures have a similar 
emotional reaction to things that offend them. That anger appears early in infancy 
means that culture and socialization don’t make a crucial contribution to its 
emergence. 
 The problem is that there is evidence that supports the hypothesis that anger 
may be an emotion differentiated from a generalized, more basic, evolved negative 
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emotion. The innate correspondence between facial expressions and the emotions—
which has been traditionally taken as evidence for the evolutionary origin of the 
emotions since Darwin (Ekman and Friesen 1971)—has been challenged from a 
developmental perspective. Camras (1992), for example, presents data from a study 
of infants’ early expressive development that show that sadness, anger, discomfort, 
pain are characteristically displayed together across situations such as being bathed, 
having a pacifier taken away, exposition to unusual masks, and so forth. Infants often 
appear to display facial expressions customarily caused by distinct situations within 
the same burst of cry. These findings give us ground to conclude that anger may 
emerge as discrete emotion from a basic undifferentiated state of distress through a 
complex process of socialization (Lemerise and Dodge 2008). 
 Let us now consider the alleged universality of anger. Prinz (2004, p. 151) 
reviews anthropological evidence that indicate that some populations lack a word for 
anger and that people in different cultures respond in different ways to things that 
annoy them. If the language used to describe and express anger varies across cultures 
and times in history, and if angry reactions to annoying or offending things are 
significantly different, then culture might play an important role in the construction 
of angry reactions. Anger itself might not be a single universal emotion. From this 
type of evidence, Prinz (2004, p. 151) concludes that although anger is extremely 
likely to emerge, it is not inevitable. Anger not only regulates social interaction, but 
is itself partly constituted and comes to be regulated by social dynamics. Therefore, 




 Moreover, if culture and socialization are necessary for anger to emerge, then 
it seems that social norms should be already in place to give rise to anger-displays, 
and hence to backward looking resentment. So, in a sense, Sugden’s evolutionary 
argument about the origins of anger and resentment might depend on the pre-
existence of social norms. Rather than being explained by the emotions, social norm 
compliance would explain the emergence of certain emotions. 
 What about the link between anger and resentment? Sugden claims that 
resentment would be one of the effects of the evolutionary advantages reaped by 
angry agents since being committed to aggressive behaviour would depend, to a great 
extent, on looking back with anger to past injuries. There are two reasons to think 
that this claim is unjustified. The first draws on the distinction made above between 
emotional attitudes and emotional perturbations and distinguish between two senses 
of anger. The second reason draws on people’s memory for their past emotional 
reactions. 
 In one sense, anger corresponds to a stable attitude to respond aggressively to 
certain eliciting conditions. Anger, that is, would correspond to a more or less stable 
emotional feature of one’s personality. An irascible person is angry in this sense. In 
another sense anger is a perturbation: a state whereby an agent has an urge to act 
aggressively. As a perturbation, anger has relatively short duration, while as an 
emotional attitude anger is a permanent personality trait. Anger works best as a 
signaling device when it consists in an emotional perturbation. Agents, in fact, 
characteristically display certain physical cues such as facial expression, tone of 
voice and posture when they feel an emotional perturbation. Such cues can indicate 
an urge to yell out their rage and behave aggressively. But in this sense anger tends 
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to “spend itself” quickly (Frijda 1986, p. 43). After an outburst of anger people tend 
to calm down and the display of anger fades away even if the conditions that elicited 
that reaction still remain. So in this sense anger is not an enduring indicator of an 
agent’s future behaviour. It is not a reliable indicator either since outbursts of anger 
need not signal irascible agents. Irascible agents have a permanent predisposition to 
act aggressively, but they don’t display permanently such a commitment. Sugden’s 
argument requires that agents can reliably recognize what type of individuals they 
are interacting with; it requires that agents can reliably recognize irascible 
individuals. But irascible individuals do not permanently display their commitment 
to aggression. 
 Irascible people, however, might display the short-term cues fairly often 
given the right circumstances, and thus they could be reliably identified in fairly 
small communities. But then they will find themselves shunned and miss 
opportunities for mutually beneficial interactions with others. As already noted with 
Elster (1998, p. 72): “They may gain more in each interaction, but interact more 
rarely. They will not, moreover, be able to learn that their emotional disposition 
works against them, and hence will have no incentive to control themselves.” Hence, 
being reliably identified as irascible could not pay off in small communities. The link 
between the evolutionary advantages of anger as commitment and as signaling 
device on which Sugden builds his argument for the emergence of resentment seems 
lost. 
 The appeal to retrospective evaluation of past injuries may fail to establish the 
link between anger as a commitment device (which shapes our preferences) and 
backward-looking resentment for a second reason. If anger as a commitment device 
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doesn’t depend in any systematic way on looking back in anger at past injuries, then 
agents may often prefer not to behave aggressively by acting on their remembered 
anger. For the intensity of the emotion felt by retrospective evaluation of past injuries 
may often be attenuated, and so past anger may not shape agents’ preference towards 
aggressive behaviour in a durable way. If this is so, then looking back in anger may 
fail to commit agents to a certain course of action. 
 Now, there are multiple factors that can influence people’s memory for past 
emotions (Levine et al. 2006, for review). So, memories for past emotional reactions 
are often inaccurate. Specifically, there is evidence that current appraisals concerning 
whether or not an individual is responsible or not for negative circumstances predict 
whether the intensity of remembered anger is over or under-estimated: emotions 
inconsistent with current appraisals are underestimated (Levine et al. 2001). 
Furthermore, retrospective evaluation of emotional experience have been found to be 
explained by a peak-and-end rule according to which people’s estimates of past 
emotional experience can be reliably predicted as the average of the peak emotional 
intensity and the end emotional intensity of the experience (Fredrickson and 
Kahneman 1993). Two of the consequences of such rule are that the net 
(un)pleasantness and how long the experience lasted are not taken into account in our 
memory for emotional experience. Given two angry affective episodes A and B, 
adding an extra period of anger to A but not to B will attenuate the intensity of 
remembered anger in A if the added period ends less angrily. Backward-looking 
anger, then, may often be attenuated or fade away. 
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 Even assuming that anger is both evolutionary advantageous and a basic 
emotion, Sugden’s conclusion that “backward-looking resentment is the evolutionary 
price that has to be paid for this advantage” doesn’t rest on solid grounds. 
 
2. Hedonism and Norm Compliance 
Sugden’s argument focuses on negative emotions like anger, fear and resentment. 
Even if his argument fails, it would still be possible that positive emotions are the 
ultimate motivational source of norm compliance behaviour. Pleasure is the main 
candidate here, as it has traditionally been linked to motivation. 
 It has been suggested that data on the neurobiological processes underlying 
social preference are best understood in hedonic terms. From this perspective, 
pleasure would be the ultimate motivation for norm compliance. I now defend the 
claim that the current neurocomputational evidence does not establish a hedonist 
interpretation. 
 Let me start by briefly recalling what social preferences are. Theories of 
social preference model how people rank allocations of material payoff to self and 
others during strategic interaction (Fehr 2009). According to these theories, 
individuals are also concerned with the payoff, preferences and beliefs of other 
individuals. Notice that theories of social preferences are not committed to any 
specific interpretation of the processes underlying decision-making. In particular 
they do not make any claim with respect to the hedonic significance of norm 
compliance behaviour. 
 Ernst Fehr and Colin Camerer have argued that a hedonic interpretation of 
theories of social preference provides a good explanatory framework for interpreting 
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the neurobiological data on norm compliance (Fehr and Camerer 2007). They draw 
on experimental findings from neuroeconomics to support the claim that individuals 
derive “higher hedonic value” from outcomes associated to the decision to comply 
with norms of cooperation or fairness (Ibid., p. 420). Fehr and Camerer’s (2007) 
argument can be reconstructed as follows. 
 
 P1. Norm compliance, in general, and “altruistic, fair and trusting behaviors” in 
 particular, “are consistently associated” with neural activity in the striatum (p. 419). 
 P2. Activity in the striatum represents anticipated or experienced reward. 
 C1. Norm compliance is rewarding. 
 C2. People comply with social norms because it is rewarding. 
 
 If we assume that reward is just hedonic value or pleasure, then C2 is a 
version of motivational hedonism. Motivational hedonism, in its strongest 
formulation, is the claim that only pleasure (or pain) motivates us. Fehr and Camerer 
(2007) do not claim that the evidence they review is sufficient to establish C2. Still, 
they claim that the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that norm compliance 
and pro-social behaviour have special reward value. To evaluate Fehr and Camerer’s 
argument we need answer two questions: First, what does reward amount to here? 
Second, can the same data considered by Fehr and Camerer be plausibly explained 
with no appeal to pleasure? After having recalled the types of findings that 
purportedly support C1, I engage with P2 by considering different computational 
roles of the striatum. Different meaning of ‘rewards’ are distinguished, and I argue 
that pleasure does not ground norm compliance. 
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 Fehr and Camerer review evidence from three types of sources. First, they 
cite an unpublished work by Kosfeld, Fehr, and Weibull where questionnaire data 
would support the view that “mutual cooperation in social exchanges has special 
subjective value, beyond the value that is associated with monetary earnings” (p. 
420). Second, they survey the findings of a number of neuroimaging experiments 
where striatum activity has been observed to be significantly correlated with 
cooperative outcomes. Third, they notice that striatal activity in one experimental 
condition can be used to predict choice behaviour in a different experimental 
condition, thereby lending support to C2, that is to the claim that norm compliance 
occurs because it is rewarding. 
 Since Fehr and Camerer do not provide details of Kosfeld et al’s 
questionnaire, it is difficult to assess whether, and to what extent, a hedonic 
component plays a role in the subjects’ ratings. There is some evidence that 
dopamine activity does not most reliably correlate with ratings of the hedonic 
experience associated with a drug. For example, in spite of significant loss of most 
dopamine neurons in the basal ganglia, patients with Parkinson’s disease have been 
reported to have normal subjective pleasure ratings for sweet food (Sienkiewicz-
Jarosz et al. 2005). 
 However, the strongest reason provided by Fehr and Camerer in support of 
hedonic interpretations of theories of social preferences is that other-regarding and 
norm-compliance behaviour is consistently associated with activation in the striatum. 
The striatum is part of what is called the “reward circuit.” Camerer and Fehr interpret 
the processes carried out by activity in this area in terms of hedonic processes. But 
‘reward’ and ‘hedonic processes’ are equivocal. And in light of current evidence the 
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computational role of the striatum is probably complex and may well comprise a 
number of sub-computational routines, as Chapter 1 suggested. A brief description of 
the anatomy of the striatum should highlight this last point. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the striatum is a subcortical part of the brain. It is 
the main input station of the basal ganglia which are primarily implicated in motor 
control, learning and decision-making. Because dopamine is the major striatal 
neuromodulator, the striatum is thought to be one of the main hubs of the reward 
circuit. However, it is not the only area associated with “reward” processing: the 
ventral tegmental area, the amygdala, the prefrontal cortex and certain parts of the 
thalamus are also involved in reward processing. The ventral part of the striatum 
consists in the caudate nucleus and the putamen. The ventral striatum—or nucleus 
accumbens—constitutes a third subdivision of the striatum. These three striatal 
regions are anatomically and functionally distinct. Current evidence suggests that 
discrete regions of the striatum are differentially involved in the integration of 
sensorimotor, cognitive and emotional information, and in action selection and 
initiation (Knutson et al. 2009). But what does it mean that the striatum processes 
“rewards”? 
 Here are examples of rewards that seem to be processed by such a circuit are: 
sweet tastes, cocaine, sex, money, smiling faces, and norm compliance. In a general 
sense, rewards can be understood as objects or states that make us come back for 
more. In narrower sense, reward refers to subpersonal informational signals that play 
specific roles in RL algorithms implemented by certain populations of neurons. 
 Reward as a psychological notion has distinct aspects. The neuroscientist 
Kent Berridge identifies three dissociable aspects of reward: liking, wanting and 
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learning (e.g. Berridge 2003; Berridge et al. 2009). ‘Liking’ refers to the hedonic 
experience of a subject. Reward here is a state or outcome that generates a pleasant 
feeling. ‘Wanting’ (or ‘incentive salience’) refers to a drive towards the pursuit 
and/or consumption of some, typically salient, state or outcome. It need not be 
conscious. Reward in this sense is what is desired, often unconsciously, regardless of 
its hedonic properties. Learning involves the capacity to associate stimuli, and 
actions to consequences. Reward here consists in states, events and stimuli that guide 
agents’ learning. 
 In light of these distinctions, to say that the striatum processes reward can 
mean at least three different things. Since the relevant sense for Fehr and Camerer’s 
argument is the hedonic one, we should read P2 above as: Activity in the stratum 
represents anticipated or experienced pleasure. To assess P2 we should then turn to 
consider the evidence about the neurobiological underpinnings of hedonic 
experience. 
 Berridge and collaborators provide substantial evidence that liking or hedonic 
experience is generated by opioid, endocannabinoid and GABA-benzodiazepine 
neurotransmitter systems. Two “hedonic hot-spots” have been found respectively in 
the nucleus accumbens and in the ventral pallidum which are two regions of the 
striatum in fact. The first hot-spot comprises 10% of the volume of the nucleus 
accumbens: a relatively small portion of the striatum. Outside those hot-spots, in the 
same two regions, opioids do not enhance liking: enhancement of hedonic experience 
is then anatomically restricted to small portions of the striatum (Berridge and 




 One main reason for interpreting the striatum as a pleasure-centre has been 
that its major afferents come from dopamine neurons, which have been traditionally 
considered “pleasure neurotransmitters.” However, manipulations of dopamine 
activity do not appear to have systematic effects on hedonic experience (Berridge 
and Robinson 1998). This suggests that dopamine activity is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for generating hedonic experience, but, psychologically, is probably 
necessary for “wanting,” and neurocomputationally—as we have seen—for 
implementing certain forms of RL algorithms (see Berridge 2007 on “wanting”; 
Schultz 2007a for distinct computational roles of dopamine). 
 If hedonic experience is the ultimate motive of norm compliance, pleasure 
should be the triggering cause of the selection of a certain action. Pleasure should be 
prior to “wanting” and should determine what we shall do. Evidence needed to 
confirm or refute this claim might be gained by focusing on the causal relationship 
between mechanisms of action selection and “liking.” 
 Computational models of the basal ganglia, of which the striatum is the major 
nucleus, provide one way to approach this issue. Recall that in the framework of 
reinforcement learning, as Chapter 1 made clear, one of the best models of the basal 
ganglia mechanism is the Actor-Critic architecture (Houk 2007). This class of 
models seems to capture important principles of dopaminergically controlled 
plasticity in the striatum (e.g. Joel et al. 2002). In such models an “Actor” selects the 
action to be taken given the current input while the “Critic” drives the learning 
process by assessing how well the outcome of one action tallies with the attainment 
of a certain goal. Neurobiological data suggests that the ventral striatum is associated 
with the Critic, while the dorsal striatum is associated with the Actor (Daw, Niv and 
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Dayan 2005, Sec. 4). Although these computational models are simplistic if 
compared to the complex anatomy and physiology of the striatum, we can still draw 
some conclusions about the relationship between action selection and pleasure. 
 From the characterization of the computational architecture of the striatum, 
and the localization of hedonic hotspots thereof, it seems that the main computational 
business of the striatum is not hedonic-processing. Hedonic hotspots might be 
activated after the Critic has computed to what extent the outcome of the action 
taken matches with what was expected. They would register the pleasure of learning 
rather than driving learning itself. If this is so, then hedonic experience would be the 
output of decision-making systems over which pleasure has no direct control. The 
causal interplay between learning and what we want would then make pleasure a 
contingent result of the appraisal of the outcomes of our actions. Pleasure, therefore, 
is probably not the ultimate motive of norm compliance: people generally do not 
comply with norms because it feels good. If the story on offer in this thesis is roughly 
correct, then people generally comply with norms to minimize sensory- and reward-
prediction errors, and sensory and reward-prediction errors should not be identified 
with emotions agents feel. I now fill in my neurocomputational proposal by focusing 
on caring. 
 
3. Neurocomputation and Caring 
Caring, I have agreed with Frankfurt, is a complex mode of the will. It consists in 
committing oneself to one’s own desire. It corresponds to a relatively stable 
volitional profile that steadily and persistently orients and guides one’s behaviour. I 
conclude this chapter by proposing that caring might depend on as a fundamental 
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aspect of the RL-system. The mechanism for caring understood in this way might be 
necessary both to feel emotions and to act on certain social representations so as to 
comply with norms. Here is my proposal. 
 The capacity to care about something might depend on particular parameter-
values of RL algorithms being in a specific range. Chapter 1 argued that RL neural 
computations are crucial to agents’ capacities to act upon social representations so as 
to comply with norms. As already pointed out, the proper workings of RL algorithms 
depend on several parameters (also called meta-parameters). The experiment 
reported in the next chapter attempts to estimate some of these parameters, which 
may regulate subjects’ learning of social norms and decision-making in social 
contexts. For the moment, let me focus on three important parameters in RL 
algorithms: the learning rate η, the discount factor γ, and the temperature τ. 
 The learning rate η controls how quickly old information is updated by 
experience; for small values of η, learning will be slow, while for large values of η, 
what has already been learned may be quickly updated. When η is too large, the 
learning process becomes unstable. 
 The discount factor γ controls the time scale of reward prediction. More 
precisely, it determines how far in the future rewards should be taken into account. 
This is particularly important in case of possible conflicts between immediate and 
long-term outcomes. The smaller γ, the more the agent will be focused on short-term 
outcomes only. Too large γ can lead to unreliable predictions of future reward. 
 The temperature τ controls the randomness of the action choice. Small values 
of τ promote “explorative” behaviour by which more information is gathered about 
the mapping of which actions are rewarding. Large values of τ favor “exploitative” 
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behaviour whereby action selection is at making the best use of what has already 
been learned; as τ tends to infinity all actions have the same probability of being 
selected. 
 The setting and adjustment of these parameters are crucial for RL algorithms 
to successfully carrying out cognitive functions. If agents’ capacity to act upon social 
representations so as to comply with norms is enabled by RL neural computations, 
then the setting and adjustment of these parameters are crucial to successfully 
navigate our social environment and comply with norms. 
 Based on neurobiological data and computational results, Doya (2002) puts 
forward a hypothesis concerning the role of specific neuromodulatory systems in 
computing these parameters (see also Schweighofer and Doya 2003). 
Neuromodulators are neurotransmitters that have spatially distributed and temporally 
extended effects on their receptors. They affect globally and at longer time scale the 
computations that brains carry out. Doya’s hypothesis is that ascending 
neuromodulatory systems are the media for signaling and adjusting the parameters 
that regulate the workings of RL systems in the brain with their concerted 
interaction. Specifically, according to Doya’s hypothesis, the acetylcholinergic 
system controls the learning rate η; the serotonergic controls the discount factor γ; 
the noradrenergic system controls the temperature τ. Let me now expand a little on 
some details of Doya’s hypothesis. 
 Acetylcholine seems to modulate synaptic plasticity in the cerebral cortex, 
stratum, amygdala and hippocampus. Depletion of acetylcholine neurons is 
associated to memory disorders. So the acetylcholine system, Doya surmises, may 
modulate “the information coding in the cortex and the hippocampus so that their 
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response properties are not simply determined by the statistics of the sensory input 
but are also dependent on the importance of the sensory inputs” (Doya 2002, p. 503). 
The acetylcholine system then might control the learning rate η by affecting the 
storage and update dynamics of memory at both cellular and circuit levels. 
 Higher levels of serotonin would determine higher setting of γ which would 
lead agents to be sensitive to reward predictions longer in the future. Low levels of 
serotonin instead would lead agents to be insensitive to larger delayed rewards and so 
to behave impulsively. Serotonin might control the discount factor in RL systems by 
directly influencing the computations of reward-prediction errors in the basal 
ganglia, which receive serotonergic input from the dorsal raphe nucleus, or more 
diffusely by differentially enhancing or inhibiting the activity of parallel RL 
algorithms which might be implemented in distinct neural populations across the 
brain. 
 Noradrenaline is known to be involved in the control of fight-or-flight 
response and noradrenalinergic neurons are especially active in urgent situations. 
This is consistent with the idea that noradrenaline regulates the randomness in action 
selection, which should be sensitive to the urgency of the situation and the stage in 
learning: higher levels of noradrenaline would determine higher setting of τ which 
leads to “exploitative behaviour,” noradrenaline levels, Doya notices, should 
decrease when the action value function which determines the agent’s decisions has a 
high variance for a given state. 
 Now, the complex, concerted neurocomputational activity of these 
neurotransmitters might, at least partly, determine what an agent cares about. If 
caring is individuated by whether and when some novel action should be taken 
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instead some old course of action, by how far into the future outcomes of one’s 
action should be taken into account, and by what needs be retained in memory and 
what can be overwritten, then the concerted neurocomputational activity of these 
neurotransmitters would underlie the capacity to commit oneself to a certain desire, 
that is, the capacity to care. Given specific tunings of η, γ, and τ, the progress of 
one’s learning and the structure of the environment, an agent will be committed to a 
certain desire and tend to act in specific ways, feel certain emotions in determinate 
circumstances, and think in certain ways rather than others. The mechanism for 
caring understood in this way might be necessary both to feel emotions and to act on 
certain social representations so as to comply with norms and behave smoothly and 
co-adaptively with other agents in the social environment. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has filled in the neurocomputational mechanism of norm compliance on 
offer in this thesis with another detail. It characterized the capacity to care in terms of 
the concerted setting and adjustment of specific RL-parameters. Such parameter-
dynamics might be underlain by particular neuromodulatory systems. It argued that 
emotion is probably not the ultimate motive of norm compliance behaviour: caring 
might be the source of both feeling certain emotions and complying with norms. The 
focused on the notion of reward in RL-computation, and argued that hedonic 
interpretations of rewards are unjustified. 
 The next and last chapter of this thesis will elaborate further on the 
relationship between reward and norm compliance behaviour. It will address the 
questions of whether and how the nature of the rewards received by people after they 
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make decisions in a social situation affects their propensity to learn a social norm. 
The chapter will present experimental and computational results relevant to those 
questions, and provide me with the opportunity to put some of the ideas explored in 




Social Rewards and Learning Social Norms. 
An Experimental Study 
(Joint work with Aistis Stankevicius and Peggy Seriès) 
The goals of this chapter are twofold. First, the chapter will illustrate how some of 
the concepts and modelling tools used in previous chapters can be put to work. 
Second, it will address two questions concerning the relationship between rewards 
and the learning of social norms by reporting and discussing the results of an 
experimental project, to which I have contributed. In so doing, it will clarify, by 
means of experimental data, the impact of distinct types of rewards on people’s 
motivation to comply with norms, which was explored both in the introduction and 
in the previous chapter. Specifically, the questions addressed here are: 
 (i) Does the type of the reward outcomes obtained by people after they make 
decisions in social situations affect the way they learn a social norm? 
 (ii) When people are learning a social norm, how do social reward outcomes, 
as opposed to non-social reward outcomes, affect their decision-making processes? 
 The chapter has four sections. The first presents and motivates alternative 
hypotheses concerning questions (i) and (ii). The second reports the results of a 
model-based experiment I have collaborated to. The third section discusses these 
results. The fourth concludes. 
 
1. Social and Non-Social Rewards 
Consider question (i). One hypothesis is that the type of reward outcomes (or 
feedback cues) per se does not have significant impact on learning and social 
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decision-making because both social and non-social reward outcomes would be 
processed in the same way by the same neural circuit. Support for this hypothesis 
comes from two classes of findings in neuroeconomics. First, there seems to be 
substantial overlap between the neural circuits active in tasks where behaviour is 
guided by social norms, and neural activations observed in reinforcement learning 
tasks (for reviews see Fehr and Camerer 2007; Lee 2008). Second, both social and 
non-social reward outcomes—including money, food, juice, facial expressions and 
verbal feedback—engage overlapping neural substrates during reinforcement 
learning computations (e.g. Delgado et al. 2000; Berns et al. 2001; O’Doherty et al. 
2002; Walter et al. 2005; Behrens et al. 2008; Izuma et al. 2008; Spreckelmeyer et al. 
2009; Lin et al 2011). These types of neurobiological findings suggest, therefore, that 
the type of reward outcomes per se should not make any significant difference on the 
way people learn social norms. 
 An alternative hypothesis is that different types of reward outcomes (or 
feedback cues) have different impact on learning and decision-making. If widely 
different, both social and non-social environmental cues have large impact on 
people’s social behaviour, then different types of reward outcomes may also 
differently affect the way people change their behaviour to adapt to novel social 
situations. A substantial amount of evidence from experimental economics and social 
psychology indicates that in fact social behaviour is sensitive to very subtle 
situational cues. For example, people are more likely to litter in a particular 
environment when it is heavily littered than when the same environment is clean 
(Cialdini et al. 1990; Cialdini 2003). Showing experimental participants a picture of 
a library and instructing them to go to the library after the experiment can lead them 
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to whisper during the experiment (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2003). Finding a dime in 
the coin return slot of a public telephone makes it twenty-two times more likely that 
one will help a woman who has dropped a folder full of papers (Isen and Levin 
1972). More relevant here, contributions to public goods tend to increase when 
people make decisions while they are “watched” by a pair of eyes drawn on an 
honesty box (Bateson et al 2006; see also Haley and Fessler 2005; Rigdon et al 
2009). 
 Findings such as these demonstrate, therefore, a strong influence of 
apparently insignificant cues in the environment on social behaviour (see e.g. Bargh 
and Williams 2006; Doris 2002 for a critical review). This suggests that different 
types of reward outcomes (or feedback cues) observed multiple times in a given 
social situation may differently affect the way a social norm is learned in that 
situation. 
 Consider question (ii) now: when people are learning a social norm, how 
could social reward outcomes, as opposed to non-social reward outcomes, affect 
their decision-making processes? Some of the studies reviewed above indicate that 
social cues can have substantial impact on decision-making. Emotional expressions 
can systematically bias learning processes and decision-making (Averbeck and 
Duchaine 2009; Evans et al. 2011). Evidence indicates that social cues can increase 
pro-social behaviour: images of a pair of eyes can significantly increase cooperative 
behaviour not only in a laboratory condition, but also in real-world contexts (Bateson 
et al. 2006; Ernest-Jones et al. 2011). With respect to learning performance, some 
studies on a feedback-guided item-category association task show that learning is 
more effective when the feedback provided to participants consists of facial 
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expressions of emotion (happy or angry faces) instead of non-social cues such as red 
and green lights, and that this effect is supported by brain regions such as the 
amygdala, distinct from the dopamine-based reward circuit (Hurlemann et al. 2010; 
Mihov et al. 2010). Results from a recent study also indicate that feedback 
information provided by some social cues is processed by different neural circuits 
than non-social, cognitive feedback (Evans et al. 2011). 
 These findings, therefore, underwrite the hypotheses that social cues 
significantly affect cooperative behaviour and social reward outcomes, in 
comparison to non-social reward outcomes, often enhance learning performance. 
These effects would be mediated by brain regions besides dopamine-based reward 
circuits. 
 In light of this body of evidence, relevant to address the two questions above, 
three hypotheses were tested in the present study. First, different types of reward 
outcomes have different effects on learning and social-decision making. Specifically, 
social reward outcomes have a different impact on learning and social decision-
making than non-social reward outcomes. Second, when compared to non-social 
cognitive feedback, social reward outcomes in the form of facial expressions lead 
participants to display more pro-social behaviour. Third, when compared to 
participants who are provided with non-social cognitive feedback, participants 
receiving feedback in the form of facial expressions learn a social norm more 
effectively. 
 The study presented in what follows tested these hypotheses by using an 
associative learning task, which we called “the tipping game.” The task allowed us to 
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examine the effects of social reward outcomes, as opposed to non-social reward 
outcomes, on learning and decision-making. 
 
2. The Tipping-Game 
2.1 Methods 
Participants 
Forty participants (17 females), between the ages of 19 and 37 (Mean = 26.22; 
Standard Deviation = 4.31), performed a decision-making task. The majority of the 
participants were students in the University of Edinburgh recruited through an 
internal university mailing list. All participants signed informed consent and were 
compensated with £6/hour for taking part in the experiment. The study was approved 
by the University of Edinburgh, School of Informatics Ethics Committee. 
Task 
Participants were initially given five short questionnaires to fill in: the “Empathy 
Quotient” (EQ) questionnaire (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004), one version of 
the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997), the “Self Report 
Altruism” questionnaire (Rushton et al. 1981), the “Sensitivity to Punishment and 
Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire” (SPSRQ) (Torrubia et al. 2001), and the 
“Behavioural Inhibition/Approach” (BIS/BAS) questionnaire (Carver and White 
1994). These questionnaires measured the levels of empathy, mentalizing, altruism, 
and punishment and reward sensitivity of the participants. 
 The aims of collecting questionnaire data about participant’s personality traits 
were twofold. Firstly, we were interested in understanding whether performance in 
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the tipping game could be explained solely by some relatively stable personal trait, 
rather than by the feedback provided. Secondly, information about personality traits 
could be used to better characterize qualitatively the nature of the behavioural results 
observed. 
 Once they completed the questionnaires, participants took part in a decision-
making task. In the task, participants were instructed to pretend that they were 
visiting a foreign country far-away, and that they repeatedly were going to dine at 
restaurants. They were endowed with fictional monetary units (mu), with which they 
had to pay for restaurant bills and for any tip they decided to leave. Their goal was to 
learn how much they were expected to tip at the end of a meal in that country without 
spending too much money. The goal, put differently, was to learn a social norm of 
tipping so as to display adaptive behaviour in the social situation they were facing 
(the exact instructions given to participants are reported in Appendix A, at the end of 
the chapter). 
 To motivate participants to pursue this goal, they were informed at the 
beginning of the task that the best performance would be rewarded with £20 and that 
this performance would be measured in function of both how well the social norm 
was learned and how much fictional money (mu) was saved. 
 The task represented tipping situations as sequential interactions, where a 
server chooses the service quality, and then the diner chooses the tip. After each 
decision, a reward outcome is revealed and can be used by the diner to learn how to 




























Figure 1. Sequence of events during one trial. The state of the environment is initially 
revealed: it corresponds either to good or to bad service received at a restaurant. A decision 
screen follows, which informs the participant about how much money mu is available and 
how much the bill is. The participant is then asked to make a decision about how much he or 
she wants to tip. The last screen provides feedback. The feedback depends stochastically on 
state-action pairs and the underlying social norm of tipping. In the social condition, the 
feedback consists of either happy or angry faces, while in the non-social condition it 
consisted of a tick or a cross mark. 
 
The task consisted of three blocks each of which comprised forty trials. At the 
beginning of each block, participants were endowed with 1,100 mu. For each trial, 
the service quality could be either good or bad. In each trial across the three blocks, 
the chance of getting good service was 0.5. After the service quality was revealed, 
participants were informed about how much mu they had left and the amount of the 
bill they had to pay. Bills were drawn from a distribution with mean 18 and standard 
deviation 5, truncated to [3, 45]. Participants were then asked to make decisions 
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about how much they wanted to tip. Any sum equal or greater than zero could be 
tipped. The bill and the amount tipped were subtracted from this endowment after 
each trial so that participants could keep track of the mu they were spending. After 
participants made a decision, either positive or negative feedback was shown. This 
ended a trial. 
 Participants were informed at the beginning of the task that there could be 
some manipulations across blocks. In fact, two types of manipulations took place. 
The first type of manipulation consisted in changing the underlying social norm of 
tipping. In the first block the social norm of tipping was 23% of the bill. In the 
second block the social norm was 50%. In the third block it was 23% again. 
 The second type of manipulation across blocks was the variation in the 
reliability of the reward outcomes: the feedback provided had different levels of 
noise. Reward outcomes, in fact, depended stochastically on the underlying social 
norm of tipping and on the pair service quality-amount tipped (Table 1). 
 
 Action (tip < norm / tip ≥ norm) 
 Block 1  
(Norm: 23%) 
Block 2  
(Norm: 50%) 
Block 3  
(Norm 23%) 
Good State 20/80 20/80 35/65 
Bad State 30/70 30/70 40/60 
Table 1. Mapping from state-action pairs and underlying norm to outcomes. 
Numbers in the cells refer to the chance (in percentage) of obtaining a positive reward-
outcome, which was a function of the state observed, the underlying norm of tipping and the 
action taken. In each cell, the first number refers to the chance of obtaining a positive reward 
outcome when the action taken was less than the social norm of tipping; the second number 
refers to the chance of obtaining a positive reward outcome when the action taken was 




In the first and second blocks, if the service quality was good and the amount tipped 
by the participant was equal or greater than the social norm, then there was an 80% 
chance to receive a positive reward outcome and a 20% chance to receive a negative 
reward outcome. If the service quality was good, but the amount tipped was less than 
the social norm, then there was a 20% chance to receive a positive reward outcome 
and an 80% chance to receive a negative reward outcome. 
 If the service quality was bad and the amount tipped was equal or greater than 
the social norm, then there was a 70% chance to receive a positive reward outcome 
and a 30% chance to receive a negative reward outcome. If the service quality was 
bad and the amount tipped was less than the norm, then there was a 30% chance to 
receive a positive reward outcome and a 70% chance to receive a negative reward 
outcome. 
 In the third block, if the service quality was good and the amount tipped was 
equal or greater than the social norm, then there was a 65% chance to receive a 
positive reward outcome and a 35% chance to receive a negative reward outcome. If 
the service quality was good, but the amount tipped was less than the norm, then 
there was a 35% chance to get a positive reward outcome and a 65% chance to get a 
negative reward outcome. If the service quality was bad and the amount tipped was 
equal or greater than the norm, then there was a 60% chance to receive a positive 
reward outcome and a 40% chance to receive a negative reward outcome. If the 
service quality was bad but the amount tipped was less than the norm, then there was 
a 40% chance to receive a positive reward outcome and a 60% chance to receive a 
negative reward outcome. 
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 The between-subjects independent variable in the task was the type of the 
reward outcomes provided to the participants after they made a decision about how 
much to tip. In one condition (Social Condition), twenty participants (7 females), 
between the ages of 20 and 33 (Mean = 25.7; Standard Deviation = 3.82), received 
feedback in the form of a happy or an angry face. In a second condition (Non-social 
Condition), twenty participants (10 females), between the ages of 19 and 37 (Mean = 
26.75; Standard Deviation = 4.78), received non-social feedback in the form of a tick 
or an X mark after their decisions. 
 In the Social Condition, two types of facial expressions were used: one had a 
happy expression and the other had an angry expression. Two different identities for 
the facial expressions were also used; they were alternated pseudo-randomly across 
the three blocks. Four pictures were used in total: two happy facial expressions and 
two angry facial expressions (Figure 2). The pictures were selected from the 
Japanese Female Facial Expression (JAFFE) database (Lyons et al 1998). 
Figure 2. Feedback stimuli in the social condition. In the social condition positive feedback 
consisted of happy faces, while negative feedback consisted of angry faces. Feedback stimuli 





All participants displayed normal capacity for recognition of facial expressions. On 
average, they also presented normal levels of altruism, empathy and attitudes towards 




Faces Altruism BAS Drive BAS FS BAS RR BIS EQ SR SP
SOCIAL
MEAN 18.0 55.4 10.3 11.9 15.8 21.3 39.1 11.0 11.5
STD 2.0 10.3 1.6 3.0 2.4 3.5 15.0 3.9 5.4
NON-SOCIAL
MEAN 18.1 56.3 11.0 11.8 17.4 21.1 44.6 10.3 10.2
STD 1.3 8.8 1.9 2.0 2.2 3.2 9.2 3.9 4.3
ALL
MEAN 18.0 55.8 10.7 11.8 16.6 21.2 41.8 10.6 10.8
STD 1.7 9.5 1.8 2.5 2.4 3.3 12.6 3.9 4.8
Table 2. Average scores per group. Table entries indicate average scores for “Reading the 
Mind in the Eyes” (Faces), “Self Report Altruism”, “Behavioural Inhibition/Approach” 
(BIS/BAS) questionnaires, “Empathy Quotient” (EQ), “Sensitivity to Punishment and 
Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire” (SPSRQ). All scores are in “normal” ranges. 
 
In the Non-social Condition, two types of symbols were used: a tick (also known as a 
check mark or check) and an X mark. The tick is a symbol generally used to indicate 
that the action taken is good or correct. The X mark, instead, generally indicates that 
the action taken is bad or incorrect. Although there are cross-cultural differences in 
the way the tick mark and the X mark are understood, all participants in the present 
experiment stated in a debriefing questionnaire administered after the task that they 
recognised the symbols as the notation respectively for “good” (or “correct”) and for 
“bad” (or “incorrect”) (the debriefing questionnaire is found in Appendix B, at the 





From the debriefing questionnaires, it was found that one participant reported that he 
had not understood the task. This participant’s results were then excluded from data 
analysis. To examine our hypotheses, paired two tailed t-tests were used. The t-tests 
were run on data concerning the decisions of 39 participants (20 participants for the 
Social Condition; 19 participants for the Non-social condition) averaged for each 
trial. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison between participants in the social and non-social condition with 
respect to the average amount tipped over trials in the three blocks in the task. The blue and 
green lines correspond to the average amounts (as percentage of the bill) tipped per trial by 
participants receiving respectively social and non-social feedback. The dotted red line 
corresponds to the underlying social norm of tipping (as percentage of the bill). Blue and 
green shades refer to standard deviations from the group-average amounts tipped. 
 
As shown in Figures 3-4, social reward outcomes were found to have a different 
impact on learning and social decision-making than non-social reward outcomes, 
thus confirming our first hypothesis. Specifically, it was found that: first, participants 
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in the social condition tipped significantly more than participants in the non-social 
condition (across all blocks, mean difference = 4.17%, p < 0.001; in Block 1, mean 
difference = 0.99%, p = 0.043 ; in Block 2, mean difference = 4.94%, p < 0.001; in 
Block 3, mean difference = 8.19%, p = 0.019). 
 
 
Figure 4. A: Amount tipped in the social (black bars) and non-social (white bars) condition. 
The leftmost histogram pair shows the average amount tipped by participants in the social 
and non-social groups with respect to the whole task. The other three pairs of histograms 
show results with respect to single blocks. B: Absolute difference between the social 
norm and the amount tipped in the social and non-social condition. The leftmost histogram 
pair shows results over the whole task. The other three pairs of histograms display results for 
single blocks. C: Time (in seconds) taken to make decisions. The leftmost histogram pair 
shows results over the whole task. The other three display results for single blocks. 
Asterisk indicates that the difference between the two groups is statistically significant (p-
value < 0.05). 
 
Second, the absolute difference between the social norm and the amount tipped by 
participants in the social condition was significantly lower than the absolute 
difference between the social norm and the amount tipped by participants in the non-
social condition (across all block, mean difference = - 4.17%, p < 0.001; in Block 1, 
mean difference = - 0.99%, p = 0.043; in Block 2, mean difference = - 4.94%, p < 
0.001; in Block 3, mean difference = - 8.19%, p = 0.019). 
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 Third, participants in the social condition made significantly quicker 
decisions than participants in the non-social condition (across all blocks, mean 
difference = - 749 ms, p < 0.001; in Block 1, mean difference = - 409 ms, p = 0.176; 
in Block 2, mean difference = -1538 ms, p < 0.001; in Block 3, mean difference = - 
301 ms, p = 0.047). 
 These three differences were observed across all blocks. The first finding 
confirms the second hypothesis: social reward outcomes in the form of facial 
expressions led participants to display higher degree of pro-social behaviour. The 
second and third findings confirm the third hypothesis: learning is facilitated by 
social feedback. 
 A large inter-individual variability of performance was observed at the task, 
with some subjects learning to adapt their decisions to conform to the norm much 
better than other subjects, who seemed to behave independently of feedback 
throughout the experiment (Figure 5). 
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 Figure 5. Two examples of subjects’ learning performance: subject 10 (social group) at the 
top, subject 35 (non-social group) at the bottom. Blue or green solid curves represent the 
percentages tipped, coloured areas in the background represent the cumulative rewards 
received and dotted black curve is the underlying norm of tipping. Subject 10 is an example 
of a good performer: the subject displayed significant changes in behaviour towards the 
social norm across blocks. Subject 35 is an example of a bad performer, as the behaviour the 
subject displayed across blocks does not significantly change towards the social norm. 
Coloured dashed curves represent percentages tipped by the corresponding model. The 
actions with maximum Q-values are plotted to show how much actions with the maximum 
likelihood differ from the ones chosen by the subject. 
 
 With respect to our third hypothesis, we observed that significantly more 
participants displayed learning in the social condition than participants in the non-
social condition. More specifically, to identify the number of learners in the task, we 
assumed that if the mean amount tipped by a participant was significant different 
from one block to the next and moved towards the underlying social norm, then that 
participant displayed learning. According to this criterion, we found that 12/20 















Figure 6. Individual data plots for tipping percentages, cumulative rewards and learning 
criteria satisfaction. Red (good learners) or black (bad learners) coloured curves represent the 
percentages tipped, and blue curves show the cumulative rewards received. 
 
Two further points should be noted about the behavioural results that we observed. 
First, although the absolute difference between the social norm and the amount 
tipped by participants in the social condition was significantly lower than that for 
participants in the non-social condition, in the first two blocks, participants in both 
groups failed to learn the underlying social norms: they always tipped much less than 
the norm. One hypothesis is that they had a strong prior bias towards a specific 
action different from the social norms in our task. Second, standard deviations from 
average percentages tipped in both groups were high, especially in the third block 
(see Figure 1). In the first block, standard deviations were respectively 2.99 mu and 
3.03 mu for the social and non-social group respectively. In the second block, they 
were: 6.9 and 3.79, while in the third they were 20 and 6.34. Finally, considering the 
311 
 
whole experiment, the standard deviation from the average percentage tipped by the 
social group was 5.6402 mu, vs. 3.3948 mu for the non-social group. So, in general, 
we observed high variability in the behavioural data; in particular, participants in the 
social group took actions, which were more spread out over a larger range of values 
in comparison to the actions taken by participants in the non-social group. 
 
2.3 Model 
To further describe quantitatively the nature of the effects that we observed, we 
explored whether the behaviour of participants could be modeled with a type of 
Rescorla-Wagner reinforcement learning algorithm (Rescorla and Wagner 1972). 
The model algorithm could make decisions in our task with the goal of maximizing 
its total reward. It could do this by learning action values Q for state-action pairs, and 
selecting, at each trial, actions in function of their estimated Q-values. 
 The possible states were two, corresponding to “good” or “bad” service 
quality. The action space comprised 101 actions, corresponding to tip percentages 
from 0% increasing in steps of 1% to 100%. For each of the two states, the action 
taken by the model was assigned a value, which was a function of both the reward 
outcome obtained for taking that action, the economic cost incurred, and the Q-value 
of that state-action pair stored in memory. This is expressed by the Q-update 
equation: 
 




where α is the learning rate (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), which determines the learning step-size, that 
is, how fast learning takes place. The smaller α, the least the existing knowledge is 
modified. Conversely, as α tends to 1, what has already been learned can be quickly 
overwritten. 
 The action selection mechanism was governed by a softmax function. At any 
given trial, the model chose action a from among the possible actions with 
probability: 












where N is the number of actions the agent can take. τ is a positive parameter called 
inverse temperature. As τ tends to ∞, the action with highest Q-value has a much 
higher probability of being selected than the others. As τ tends to 0, all actions 
become equally probable. 
 Given the questions and hypotheses that motivated our study, we focused on 
the reward signal in our model. The reward consisted of the weighted average of two 




wrwr=Reward econeconoutout +  
where recon is an economic factor and is equal to the Tip/Bill ratio, which could take 
any value in the interval [0, 1]. The economic weight wecon (-wmax ≤ wecon ≤ wmax) is a 
parameter that determined to what extent spending money was valued in the tipping 
game. If wecon was – wmax, then spending money was valued very negatively, thereby 
characterizing a type of agent with a “stingy” attitude; if wecon was wmax, then 
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spending money was valued very positively, thereby characterizing a type of agent 
with a “generous” attitude. rout is a reward outcome factor, which was associated to 
the two possible outcomes in the task: either positive feedback or negative feedback. 
The reward magnitude of both happy facial expressions and the tick mark was 
assumed to be 1. The reward magnitude of both angry facial expressions and the X 
mark was assumed to be – 1. The outcome weight wout (-wmax ≤ wout ≤ wmax) is a 
parameter that determined to what extent positive feedback was valued in the tipping 
game. If wout was – wmax, then positive feedback was valued very negatively, and 
negative feedback was valued very positively. Agents with a negative wout could be 
characterized as “punishment-seeking” types. If wout was wmax, then positive feedback 
was valued very positively, and negative feedback was valued very negatively. 
Agents with a positive wout could be characterized as “reward-seeking” types. Four 
types of agents could be distinguished in function of the values of the two reward 
parameters, that is, in function of their attitudes towards economic costs and reward 
outcomes. 
 
2.4 Modelling Results 
To estimate parameters values, for each block in the task we fitted the model to 
participants’ data using maximum likelihood estimation. For each participant, we 
rounded each of his or her action to the corresponding entry in the Q-table of the 
action space. Each entry in the Q-table represented the value of selecting a particular 
action a for a given state s in our task. The actions that our model could take were 
“clamped” to the actions taken by each of our participants. We then fitted the model 
by using maximum likelihood estimation. By searching the parameter space, we 
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found the set of parameters that maximized the likelihood of each participant’s 
observed sequence of actions. 
 Our model could describe the behavioural data reasonably well, for both 
group and individual performance (Figure 5 for two examples). For the social 
condition, the mean difference between percentages tipped by participants and those 
tipped by the fitted models was 4.2% (standard error 0.16%). For the non-social 
condition, the mean difference was 4.4% (standard error 0.17%). 
 The parameter values thus obtained confirmed that participants in the social 
group displayed learning and decision-making profiles different from the non-social 
group. Specifically, across blocks average parameter values governing learning and 
decision-making for participants in the social condition differed from parameter 
values for participants in the non-social condition (Table 3 A). Such variation 
indicates that participants’ learning and decision-making were affected by the nature 
of the feedback outcomes received as well as by the changes in the underlying norm 
and reliability of the feedback that took place across blocks. 
 Considering the modelling results for the whole task, instead of per individual 
blocks, participants in the social condition displayed on average higher learning rate 
α and economic weight wecon than participants in the non-social condition. On the 
contrary, they displayed smaller inverse temperature τ and outcome weight wout 
(Table 3 B). These results indicate that on average, in comparison to participants in 
the non-social condition, participants in the social condition: learned more quickly, 
explored more actions, sought positive feedback less, and cared less about spending 





  α τ wout wecon 
Block 1 
Social 0.56 4.80 2.15 5.125
Non 
Social 
0.46 8.50 1.725 5.30 
Block 2 
Social 0.44 6.50 1.225 4.025
Non 
Social 
0.53 5.60 2.275 6.375
Block 3 
Social 0.60 4.40 2.375 4.05 
Non 
Social 
0.48 5.20 2.80 6.15 
Table 3. A). Average parameter values per block for participants in the social and non-social 
condition. 
 
  α τ wout wecon 
Tipping 
Game 
Social 0.42 3.60 2.575 5.75 
Non 
Social 
0.31 5.80 3.225 4.00 
Table 3. B). Average parameter values per experiment for participants in the social and non-
social condition 
 
The most significant differences between the two groups concerned the learning rate 
α and the inverse temperature parameter τ. Except for the second block in the task, 
the learning rate was significantly greater for participants in the social group than for 
participants in the non-social group. Except for the second block, the average values 
of the temperature parameter τ for participants in the social group were significantly 
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smaller than those for participants in the non-social group. These two findings were 
confirmed by modelling results for the whole task. 
 From results concerning mean values of the weights wout and wecon, it was 
found that four participants (three in the social condition) were “stingy reward-
seekers” (i.e. wecon was negative, while wout was positive), two (one per group) were 
generous punishment-seekers” (i.e. wecon was positive, while wout was negative), the 
rest of the participants in the task were of the “generous reward-seeker” type (i.e. 
both parameter weights wout and wecon were greater than zero). So, attitudes towards 
economic cost and reward outcomes were not abnormal. This was independently 
confirmed by questionnaires results, given the “normal range” of our participants’ 
personality scores (Table 2 above). 
 Finally, the hypothesis that the behavioural effects observed in the tipping 
game could be explained solely by some stable personality trait was ruled out. In 
fact, no pattern of significant correlations was found between questionnaire scores 
one the one hand, and behavioural and modelling results on the other. 
 
3. Discussion 
Our study asked whether and how the type of the reward outcomes obtained by 
people after they make decisions in social situations affects the way they learn a 
social norm. We addressed these questions by determining whether the influence of 
facial expressions on participants’ decisions in an associative learning task, called the 
“tipping game”, was significantly different from the influence of non-social feedback 
in the form of conventional marks. We found that participants receiving feedback in 
the form of happy or angry facial expressions behaved significantly different from 
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participants receiving feedback in the form of tick or cross marks. This effect was 
observed across all the blocks in our task, and, specifically, had impact on: how 
much participants were willing to give as a tip, how well they learned the underlying 
social norm and how fast they made decisions. 
 Interestingly, results about reaction time together with self-reported 
information about the strategy used to make decisions indicate that participants’ 
decision-making processes were distinctively affected by the type of reward 
outcomes received (Appendix C at the end of this chapter). Unlike participants in the 
non-social condition, nearly all participants in the social condition stated that they 
relied on the feedback provided, either positive or negative, without attempting to 
work out the right amount they were expected to tip. Thus, in comparison to 
participants in the non-social condition, their learning and decision-making relied 
more on quick, unconscious, and apparently more effective processes. 
 In blocks one and two, on average, no participant learned the value of the 
underlying social norm. The most significant differences between groups were 
observed in blocks two and three. One plausible explanation for this finding is that, 
when they started the task, participants had an initial bias in favor of a specific 
amount that one should leave as a tip in restaurants. Results from the debriefing 
questionnaire (Appendix C) indicate that in fact most of the participants had specific 
expectations about tipping in restaurants, namely: they generally expected that tips 
should be in the range of 15-20% of the bill. As confirmed by the average amount 
tipped in the first block, participants may have initially relied more heavily on such 
prior expectation. Systematic exposure to feedback stimuli may have then gradually 
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overcome the effect of this initial bias, and led participants to acquire new beliefs 
about how much one should tip in the situations they faced in our task. 
 Taken together, our findings are prima facie inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that the type of reward outcomes per se does not have significant impact on learning 
and social decision-making. It should be pointed out, however, that this conclusion 
holds only if we assume that the magnitudes of the reward outcomes in the two 
conditions of our experiment were perfectly matched. Based on behavioural results 
alone, it might be granted that angry faces and cross marks were aversive and that 
happy faces and tick marks were appetitive. However, one might hypothesize that 
their magnitudes were different, so that participants found more rewarding viewing a 
happy face than a tick mark (or more punishing viewing an angry face than a cross 
mark). Thus, in comparison to tick and cross marks, viewing angry and happy facial 
expressions could have had more impact on the computations driving learning and 
decision-making because of their differential magnitudes, and not because of their 
social or non-social nature—in other words, they could have more impact because 
rout would be greater in the case of facial expressions. This would be consistent with 
the hypothesis that because all types of reward outcomes are processed through a 
common circuitry different types of reward outcomes per se do not make significant 
difference in learning and decision-making. 
 Whether different types of reward outcomes are perfectly matched for 
magnitude cannot be determined easily using behavioural results (see Evans et al. 
2011). It is important to notice, however, that although shared neural circuits might 
be involved in the computation of both social and non-social reward outcomes—as 
suggested, for example, by Lin et al. (2011) and Jones et al (2011)—the full network 
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involved in processing both types of reward outcomes is probably not identical. 
Hence, when considered in the context of neuroimaging studies investigating the 
impact of social stimuli on reward-based decision processes (Evans et al. 2011; Lin 
et al. 2011; Walter et al. 2005), and if we take into account results about reaction 
times in our task, our findings provide increasing support to the hypothesis that 
social reward outcomes bias learning and decision-making differently from non-
social outcomes. 
 Our modelling results provided one possible way to quantitatively 
characterize this bias whose effects were observed in the behaviour of our 
participants. The parameter values that we estimated suggest that obtaining social, 
instead of non-social, reward outcomes may have greater impact on (1) the rate to 
which newly acquired information overrides old knowledge and (2) the tendency to 
explore more of the action space available. According to our modelling results, in 
fact, the behavioural differences observed between groups in our task were better 
accounted for by differences in their rate of learning and action selection strategy 
than by differences in the attitudes that participants could have towards different 
types of reward outcomes. This conclusion was independently underwritten by our 
questionnaires results, where no significant difference was found between the two 
groups with respect to their level of empathy, altruism, and sensitivity to rewards and 
punishments. 
 Feedback in the form of facial expressions could lead people, who are 
learning a social norm in a new environment, to adapt more effectively to the social 
situation they are facing. Angry facial expressions, in particular, might drive such 
learning by affecting the decision-making strategy underlying social behaviour. 
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Angry facial expressions might signal social disapproval of a failure to comply with 
a certain norm. Such a failure might be due to a lack of knowledge of the social 
environment. Thus, learners of a social norm might feel anxious and uncomfortable 
in observing an angry reaction, which might draw their attention to their ignorance of 
the structure of the social situation they are facing (on the role of punishment on the 
emergence of norms of cooperation see e.g. Fehr and Gächter 2002). Interestingly, 
the desire to avoid social disapproval is in fact one of the main factors that may 
motivate people to tip in restaurants (Azar 2007b; Conlin et al 2003). 
 If discomfort is to be avoided and knowledge of how one ought to act is to be 
acquired in that situation, then people should, at least initially, sample extensively the 
action space by trying many different actions until an accurate representation of the 
environment is gained. Even after people are confident that they have come to 
possess accurate knowledge of the environment, it could still be effective to trying 
new actions occasionally. Using this type of action selection strategy, people would 
make sure that nothing has changed in the structure of the environment. This is 
especially important in social situations, also involving social norms of tipping, 
where new social norms can appear, existing social norms change and old ones 
disappear relatively quickly across places and over time (see Azar 2004a, 2004b on 
the evolution of tipping). 
 Accordingly, the tendency of our participants in the social condition to 
display a less “greedy” action selection strategy could be explained if social negative 
feedback was especially effective in drawing their attention to the need to gain a 
better representation of the structure of the environment. Awareness of their need to 
have accurate knowledge of the situation along with a desire to steer clear from 
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social disapproval could have stimulated a willingness to explore a bigger portion of 
the action space available. By exploring more actions, participants could improve 
estimates of non-greedy action values and, at the same time, display on average more 
generous behaviour. Ultimately, exploration along with a relatively higher learning 
rate could lead participants in the social condition to better adapt to the situation they 
were facing. 
 Two limitations of our study should be noted before we conclude. The first 
concerns the distinction between social and emotional cues. The stimuli that we used 
in the social condition of our task did not help us to determine whether the 
behavioural effects we observed depended on social rather than on only the 
emotional dimension of facial expressions. Facial expressions are in fact means to 
convey both social and emotional information. Besides communicating information 
about other agents, facial expressions can often elicit emotional reactions in the 
observers. In order to identify the role of emotional cues alone, in contrast to facial 
expressions, on participants’ learning and social decision-making, a third condition 
for our task may employ emotional, non-social reward outcomes. 
 Second, one reason why our subjects did not generally perform well in the 
tipping game might be that its reward structure made the learning task especially 
hard. The level of noise in the mapping between state-action pairs and reward 
outcomes was high across the three blocks, making the feedback provided not very 
reliable. Moreover, the reliability of the feedback was independent from the distance 
between amount tipped and underlying social norm, so that tips well above the social 
norm could still receive negative feedback outcomes. In order to improve learning 
performance, the reward structure of the task may be modified in two ways. On the 
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one hand, the level of noise in the mapping between state-action pairs and reward 
outcomes may be diminished across all blocks. On the other hand, the reliability of 
the feedback provided may be made dependant on the distance between amount 
tipped and underlying social norm, so as to strengthen the reliability of feedback 
outcomes for tips well above or well below the social norm. 
 
Conclusion 
Our study confirmed the hypothesis that different types of reward outcomes 
differentially affect the way people learn a social norm and make-decisions. Results 
from our tipping game demonstrated that social reward outcomes in the form of 
facial expressions, if compared to non-social reward outcomes in the form of 
conventional feedback marks, can lead people to learn more effectively a social norm 
of tipping. Specifically, social reward outcomes in the form of facial expressions can 
lead people to make relatively quicker and more pro-social decisions, and ultimately 
to adapt more easily to novel social situations. In order to explore quantitatively our 
participants’ behaviour, we used a version of the Rescorla-Wagner algorithm to 
model performance in the tipping game. Modelling results suggest that the different 
pattern of performance between participants in the social and non-social condition 
could be better explained by a drive, displayed by participants in the non-social 
condition, to acquire knowledge by trying more novel actions. 
323 
 
Appendix A: Instructions provided to participants of the Tipping Game 
Imagine that you are a stranger just arrived in a foreign country. You believe that when 
people go to a restaurant they normally leave a tip at the end of their meal. You also believe 
that how much people tip in a restaurant depends on the quality of the service they receive in 
that restaurant. But you may be wrong. You are going to have a number of meals at 
restaurants in that new country. Imagine that this is the type of situation you are about to face 
in this experiment. 
The experiment consists of three parts. There are 40 trials in each part. Each trial 
corresponds to a meal that you have in a restaurant while you are in that country. Each part 
of the experiment corresponds to a new visit to that country. So each time you go to that 
country you have 40 meals at restaurants. You believe that some things might have changed 
since your last visit. But you are not sure. 
Imagine that every time you arrive in that country you have mu 1,100 in your pocket – mu is 
the local currency. You need to use this money to pay your bills and for any tip you wish to 
leave at the end of your meals. 
In each trial in the experiment, you will initially be revealed the quality of the service you 
receive in the restaurant. Here is an example: 
[service quality screen] 
You will then be reminded how much you have left in your pocket, and you will be 
presented with your bill. You will be asked how much you wish to leave as a tip in that 
situation on top of your bill. You can tip any sum greater than or equal to zero by pressing 
the appropriate keys on the keyboard. When you have decided press ENTER to confirm your 
decision. 
Here is an example: 
[decision screen] 
After your decision you will receive some feedback. 
[face or symbol] 
This is an example of feedback you may receive. 
In each part of the experiment, do your best to adapt your behaviour to the new situation 
without spending too much money. 
At the end of the experiment you will receive a score based on how well you have adapted in 
that type of social situation in that country and on the amount of money left in your pocket. 
You will receive an extra prize in cash depending on your score in the task. 
Remember that you are making a non-negligible contribution to science… and that you have 





- You have to imagine that you are a stranger just arrived in a foreign country, and that you 
are going out for dinners in that country. 
- The service quality in that restaurant is revealed. 
- Imagine you have eaten your dinner and you pay the bill. 
- You decide how much you want to leave as a tip. 
- Some feedback is displayed. 
325 
 
Appendix B: Debriefing Questionnaire 
1. Did you find the first, second or the third part harder, or were they both the same? 
 
1st part harder 2nd part harder 3rd part harder  about the same 
 
2. Did you notice any change across the three parts of the experiment? 
 
Yes  No 
 
3. If you answered yes in the question above, then please explain what changes you noticed 
between: 
 
1st and 2nd part:____ 
 
2nd and 3rd part:____ 
 
1st and 3rd part:____ 
 
4. What do you think was the social norm of tipping (please give a percentage of the bill, e.g. 








5. What do these signs mean? 
 
 _____ 
       X _____ 
 
6. Did you use the feedback provided to make your decisions? 
 
YES  NO 
 
7. Which of the following descriptions best describes the strategy you used to make your 
decisions? (tick statement that you most agree with) 
 
a. I relied on the feedback and I tried to work out the right percentage. 
 
b. I relied on the feedback provided without working out the right percentage. 
 
c. I relied on the positive feedback mostly without spending too much time thinking. 
 
d. I relied on the negative feedback mostly without spending too much time thinking. 
 
e. I considered the norm of tipping in my country. (Please indicate your country of origin:__) 
 
f. Don’t know. 
 
g. Other. (Please give a short description): _____ 
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This neurocomputational investigation into social norm compliance began with a 
triplet of questions and answers. The triplet—recall—goes like this: 
 
Q: How can we make progress in our understanding of social norms and 
norm compliance? 
A: Adopting a neurocomputational framework is one effective way to make 
progress in our understanding of social norms and norm compliance. 
Q: What could the neurocomputational mechanism of social norm 
compliance be? 
A: The mechanism of norm compliance probably consists of Bayesian-
Reinforcement Learning algorithms implemented by activity in certain 
neural populations. 
Q: What could information about this mechanism tell us about social norms 
and social norm compliance behaviour? 
A: Information about this mechanism tells us that: 
a1 Social norms are uncertainty-minimizing devices. 
a2 Social norm compliance is one trick we have devised to interact co-
adaptively and smoothly in our social environment. 
 
This journey now concludes by considering each of the Q-As in light of the claims 
articulated and defended by the previous chapters. 
 Progress with respect to research questions such as “What are social norms? 
And why do people comply with them?” is due to empirical discoveries, 
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mathematical advances, but also to development of new theoretical frameworks. 
Establishing a novel framework to studies of human normativity is in fact a 
significant contribution in itself. 
 The first main claim defended by this thesis is that social norms and norm 
compliance can be effectively understood within a neurocomputational framework, 
whereby the workings of the mechanism of social and moral behaviour can be 
identified and described. Analytical tools and concepts from fields such as statistical 
decision theory, machine learning, computer science and reinforcement learning have 
been increasingly used to make sense of data about the neural bases of social norm 
compliance. The marriage between theoretical approaches and experimental research 
in social neuroscience has helped to unify results from such disciplines as 
philosophy, economics, anthropology, psychology and artificial intelligence, to 
articulate more sophisticated theories of social behaviour and to address more 
complex empirical problems concerning norm compliance in a precise and reliable 
way. In the last section of Chapter 1, these reasons were given in support of the claim 
that our understanding of social norms and norm compliance can make effective 
progress if we examine social and moral behaviour within a neurocomputational 
framework. Chapters 2 and 3 argued, more specifically, that adopting a 
neurocomputational perspective is fruitful to understanding whether (Chapter 2) and 
how (Chapter 3) explanations of social norm compliance should appeal to 
representations; Chapter 6 argued that a neurocomputational perspective can help us 
to identify the motivational structure of norm compliance. Finally, the experiment 
described in Chapter 7 attempted to showcase some of the fruits that a 
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neurocomputational exploration of norm compliance can yield. My hope is that 
future research will vindicate the claims I put forward in those chapters. 
 Bayesian decision theory and Reinforcement Learning have proved 
successful in uncovering important features of the mechanisms of perception and 
action. Drawing upon such successes, the second main claim advanced in the thesis 
is that the building blocks of the mechanism of social norm compliance probably 
consist of Bayesian and Reinforcement Learning algorithms running on certain 
neural circuits. The suggestion is that social/moral behaviour piggybacks on neural 
computations that enable agents to process incoming sensory input so as to form 
probabilistic beliefs about the states of the world causing that input, and to choose 
actions so as to maximize the value of their future reward outcomes in the social 
world. Thus, social norms could be grounded in features of human nature, which are 
more fundamental than either the beliefs and preferences of individuals or the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the culture in which they live. 
 Chapter 1 laid down the beginnings of such a neurocomputational model of 
norm compliance and pointed to possible neural circuits for perception and action in 
the social/moral domain. The concerted activity of these circuits would be geared 
towards minimizing uncertainty over interactions with other agents in the social 
environment. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 articulated particular aspects of the model put 
forward in Chapter 1. Putative Bayesian, explanatory ingredients of the mechanism 
of normative judgement were considered in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 examined the 
relationship between language and moral cognition, and suggested that the peculiar 
“norm-hungriness” of humans is dependent on the capacity for florid-control, which 
might be enabled by neural computations executed by basal ganglia-prefrontal cortex 
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activations. In focusing on the relationship between emotion and the motivational 
structure of norm compliance, Chapter 6 argued that the capacity to care, which is 
essential to motivate norm compliance, is enabled by certain interactions between 
specific neuromodulators. The dynamics of these neuromodulators—the chapter 
claimed—might correspond to specific settings of the parameters that control 
Reinforcement Learning algorithms. 
 A full neurocomputational account of social norm compliance—it should be 
clear—is far from being simple. Here, I point to two important challenges. First, if 
the neural system carries out Bayesian and Reinforcement Learning algorithms so as 
to enable norm compliance, then such algorithms must run quickly and efficiently. 
Rapid adaptation to changes in real-world social circumstances often requires that the 
learning of new pieces of social knowledge and that the decision of whether one 
ought to comply with a certain social norm should be “thoughtless” and effortless. 
Yet, Bayesian computations seem to be too resource demanding, especially in the 
social domain, where hidden states of the environment are extremely high-
dimensional and continuous. Moreover, Reinforcement Learning algorithms are 
often too slow when confronted with real-world situations where the number of 
possible states and actions that an agent can take is huge. This means that there are 
two key challenges for a descriptively adequate neurocomputational model of social 
norm compliance. One challenge is to identify appropriate forms of approximate 
Bayesian inference; the other challenge is to explore more sophisticated learning 
algorithms, which could operate quickly upon suitable representations of the 
environment. Approximate Bayesian inferences and sophisticated learning 
algorithms might enable us to deal with the complexity of the social world, while 
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making feasible demands on our resource-bounded brains. These types of 
algorithmic models should be explored systematically in the context of social 
navigation. 
 The second challenge for an adequate neurocomputational model of norm 
compliance is to identify algorithms with richer dynamical interactions between 
perceptual, motivational-valuation and control systems. As Gershman and Daw 
(Forthcoming) put it: “Perception, action and utility are ensnared in a tangled skein.” 
Although the model I put forward in this thesis may suggest that perception and 
action underlying norm compliance are supported by separate signals, with a clean 
separation between inference-driven perception and reward-based action selection, it 
is likely that (social) perception is in fact modulated through and through by reward-
information. Accordingly, motivational-valuation and perceptual systems may not 
consist of separate, dedicated neurocomputational mechanisms. As research on the 
neurocomputational foundations of social norms proceeds, it is plausible that the 
building blocks of the mechanism of social norm compliance will include algorithms 
beyond “pure” Bayesian and Reinforcement Learning ones. 
 If the mechanistic model I have proposed is roughly on the right track, there 
are two properties that appear to be essential to social norms and social norm 
compliance. Social norms would be uncertainty-minimizing devices and social norm 
compliance would be one of the tricks we can employ to interact co-adaptively and 
smoothly in our social environment. These two properties are uncovered by the 
mathematical concepts from statistical decision theory, which I have used to 
investigate the neurocomputational foundations of norm compliance. Accordingly, 
the notions of “uncertainty” and “management of social uncertainty” would be 
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crucial to describe and make sense of social norm compliance. If this is so, then the 
concepts we use to account for why people comply with norms should be informed 
by the fact that norms are intimately related to social uncertainty. Chapters 1 and 4 
explained in which sense uncertainty is bounded up with social norms and moral 
judgement. Chapters 5 and 6 were partly concerned on how co-adaptive and smooth 
interaction is facilitated by norm compliance. 
 One way to summarize the thrust of the argument developed over these 
chapters is with Mary Douglas’s words: 
 
 “Institutional structures [can be seen as] forms of informational complexity. Past 
experience is encapsulated in an institution’s rules, so that it acts as a guide to what to expect 
from the future. The more fully the institutions encode expectations, the more they put 
uncertainty under control, with the further effect that behavior tends to conform to the 
institutional matrix […]. They start with rules of thumb, and norms; eventually, they can end 
by storing all the useful information” (Douglas 1986, p. 48). 
 
 From a neurocomputational perspective, the idea is that by minimizing 
uncertainty over their social interactions, agents’ cognitive systems become models 
of the social environment in which the agents are embedded. To perceive our social 
world would then be to successfully predict our own sensory states brought about by 
social states. A normative system can be understood as one device for 
communicating, sharing and acting upon information concerning states in our social 
landscape. The more a social norm is entrenched in a society, the less computing is 
needed in order to take the right action. To comply with norms would then be one 
means to make social predictions come true at little computational cost, so that we 
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can “thoughtlessly” occupy high-valued, low-uncertainty states in our social 
landscape. 
 Human life and thought exhibit a range of normative features. One cluster of 
such features can be brought under the head of social/moral normativity. Humans are 
first and foremost social creatures who are deeply concerned about what is right or 
wrong and tend to care for the people with whom they interact. These are among the 
most theoretically intriguing and practically important characteristics of human life. 
Understanding social norms and social norm compliance in terms that allow us to see 
them as aspects of the natural world is a challenging as well as fascinating project, 
whose significance cannot be overestimated. My neurocomputational journey into 
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